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Although the introduction is the first - and often the only - section of a
thesis that is being read, it is usually the last part written. This is at
least the case for my thesis, that apart from this section consists of four
separately readable chapters that were independently written1. As the
research in the chapters developed in different directions, it has become
difficult for the reader to discover a common theme. This introduction is
meant to point out the similarities between the seemingly unrelated chap-
ters that do exist. The applied research methodology and analyzed agents
are for example very comparable. Moreover, apart from links to pensions,
ageing and retirement research, it is possible to distinguish three broad
research themes in the thesis: expectations, power and social security.
1.1 On the methodology and units of anal-
ysis
All four chapters are empirical, meaning that observations from reality
are used to derive the main results. I have used several econometric
techniques to analyze the available information. Econometrics is defined
in this context as using statistical methods in order to characterize re-
lationships between economic variables in reality. In Chapters 2 and 4
novel techniques, or new variations of existing techniques, are developed
to answer the relevant research questions, whereas in Chapters 3 and 5
1Chapter 4 was written jointly with Jan Boone and Frederic Vermeulen, both at
Tilburg University. The other chapters are written without co-authors. I did receive
great help from my promotor, Arthur van Soest, my co-promotor, Frederic Vermeulen
and many others that will be named in each chapter separately.
1.1. On the methodology and units of analysis
well-known methods are applied.
All four papers, which the chapters are based on, analyze information
of individuals or households. This implies that the research in this thesis
has a micro-economic emphasis. The focus is on individuals in all chapters
but Chapter 4, in which we focus on households to investigate differences
in preferences between husbands and wives. Micro-data has the advantage
that it allows the researcher to analyze fundamental economic decision-
making and also, that it enables conclusions on causal relationships. It
must be said that only Chapter 5 draws explicit conclusions on causality
in this thesis. In Chapters 2 and 4 structural models are estimated. This
means that the econometrician has been explicit about which model is
assumed for reality and that the structural parameters within this model
(such as preference parameters) are estimated using the data at hand.
The results in Chapter 3 are based on a reduced-form analysis and should
be interpreted as purely associative. Reduced-form regressions require
less a-priori assumptions about the data-generating process, but at the
same time allow for less bold conclusions.
The fourth chapter is the only using data on individuals from the
United States, i.e. individuals participating in the Consumer Expen-
ditures Survey (CEX) conducted by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics. The three other chapters employ data about individuals from The
Netherlands, compiled by either Statistics Netherlands (the Socio Eco-
nomic Panel, SEP, in Chapter 5) or by CentERdata which is affiliated
to Tilburg University (the Pensionbarometer in Chapter 2 and 3 and the
Dutch Central Bank Household Savings Survey, DHS, in Chapter 3). To
collect information CentERdata uses an Internetpanel, which is a group
of people that after being selected to participate in the panel regularly
answers questions through the Internet. Those who initially do not have
access to the Internet are provided with a connection and/or a simple
computer in order to keep selection effects as small as possible.
All datasets that I use are survey panel datasets. Surveys have the
advantage that although typically smaller than administrative datasets,
they contain more qualitative and more subjective information. Specifi-
cally in the first part of the thesis on expectations, subjective information
is crucial for the analysis. Panel datasets, which are defined as datasets
in which the same individuals are interviewed several times in a row,
are practical as these provide better opportunities to analyze individual
changes over time. This feature, important in Chapter 5, enables the
researcher to distinguish between the true influence of a certain charac-
teristic and the effect of being an individual that is likely to have that
2
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characteristic. Also, several econometric techniques have been developed
specifically for panel datasets, that ensure higher efficiency (i.e. better
precision of the estimates). I exploit the panel dimension of the data
specifically in Chapters 2 and 5.
1.2 On a common research theme
My PhD research was financed by the Dutch institution that pays out,
among other things, old age social security benefits (the Sociale Verzek-
eringsbank). This was arranged by Netspar, the Network for Studies on
Pensions, Ageing and Retirement, that has its administrative headquar-
ters at Tilburg University. The research themes of Netspar are reflected
in the topics of the chapters in this thesis.
Chapter 2 deals with individual expectations concerning the future
of the Dutch old age social security system. In Chapter 3 I investigate
whether these subjective expectations help to explain voluntary savings
behavior for retirement. The last chapter in this thesis exploits a pol-
icy change in employment protection that rendered it less costly to fire
workers older than 44 that were in the same job for more than three
years. This policy change had an impact on the labor market position of
these workers. As an ageing society requires more participation from older
individuals in order to keep the social security and health care system fi-
nancially sustainable, there is a link between Netspar’s research focus and
this chapter. It is hard to recognize anything pension-related in Chap-
ter 4 as this chapter investigates public good consumption behavior in a
non-cooperative household. However, it can be argued that saving for re-
tirement is a public good within the household as longevity risks generate
uncertainties about who will consume the savings in old age. The general
results discussed in this chapter could thus also apply to a couple that
jointly decides on how much to save for old age. Besides pensions, ageing
and retirement, three themes are identified that play a role in (a subset
of) the chapters in this thesis. These themes, that feature in the thesis’
title - Essays on Expectations, Power and Social Security -, are discussed
below.
1.2.1 Social security
Social security is defined as general as possible here so that it encom-
passes concepts used in all four chapters. Social security is the provision
3
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of goods by a superior entity that enables all individuals that meet certain
criteria to benefit from this provision, and that arranges for the supply
of this provision. Typically, we think of social security as being pro-
vided by the state, and the goods to be some sort of insurance against
undesirable life events. Social security is often installed to mitigate the
negative consequences of these events, such as poverty. Think of unem-
ployment insurance, disability benefits and old age social security. Often,
the provision of social security generates some undesirable externalities
as individuals adapt their behavior to the eligibility requirements or to
the mandatory contribution schemes. One example of such behavior is
that unemployed individuals who are still eligible for several months of
unemployment benefits search less intensively for a job than those who
are on the brink of exhausting their benefit (e.g. Lalive, Van Ours and
Zweimuller, 2006).
In The Netherlands, social security schemes are divided into employee
insurance schemes, that are compulsory for all employees, and national
insurance schemes, that everybody living in the country could be eligible
for when meeting certain criteria. Chapters 2, 3 and 5 deal with tradi-
tional social security. Two broad schemes are dealt with, namely old age
social security (good provided: income in old age, provider: Dutch govern-
ment, beneficiaries: all inhabitants of The Netherlands) and employment
protection (good provided: protection against prompt lay-off, provider:
Dutch government, beneficiaries: employees). In Chapters 3 and 5 I ex-
plicitly address some of the externalities in economic behavior that these
schemes could generate. In Chapter 3 I investigate an alternative type
of externality; whether uncertainty about the provision of social security
changes behavior. I find some evidence that uncertainty about the future
of the old age social security system increases savings. In Chapter 5 I find
strong evidence that employment protection affects the bargaining posi-
tion of employers and employees and as such - unintendedly - influences
wages.
In Chapter 4, social security in its traditional format does not play
a role. However, this chapter discusses voluntary contributions to public
goods that are consumed within the household. In this case the good pro-
vided is public consumption and the superior agent providing the good is
the collective of all members of the household. It is obvious that external-
ities play a role in any public goods game, as there is an incentive not to
contribute when you are expecting your partner to do so. As preferences
on which public goods and how much of those goods to purchase differ
within the family, the opposite externality is plaguing this game as well.
4
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In order to obtain the allocation of public goods that separate spouses
desire both have an incentive to contribute to the goods they prefer, and
this could potentially lead to higher total spending on public goods than
when the spouses would coordinate their spending.
1.2.2 Expectations
Subjective expectations are dealt with in Chapters 2 and 3. In this the-
sis an expectation refers to the image an individual has formed over the
future realization of a random variable. Economists like to believe that
expectations play a role in almost every decision that has an intertempo-
ral dimension. Individual expectations seem crucial when thinking about
insurance decisions, where one assesses the trade-off between the cost of
insurance, the probability of an adverse event and the cost associated to
that event, and investment decisions, where one has to decide on large
and often irreversible investments before knowing their return exactly. In
real estate markets for example, individuals’ perception of the trend in
housing prices seems important in determining how much they are willing
to pay. Other micro-economic areas in which expectations are assumed
to be a factor are buying health insurance (how large is the probability to
get cancer?), human capital accumulation (does it pay to go to college?)
and long-term decision-making in households (shall we move abroad for
his career?).
However, there is still a lot unknown about how individuals come to
have certain expectations and also on whether and how they use their
expectations in everyday life. It seems likely that not all individuals are
always capable of perfectly incorporating all available information in their
expectations (if high-educated high-paid bankers in the City couldn’t, why
would a regular carpenter?). This is probably particularly true when the
expectations concern events exogenous to the individual that rarely oc-
cur (see for example the studies on natural disasters by Kunreuther and
Pauly, 2004, and Viscusi and Zeckhauser, 2008). Chapter 2 in my thesis
tries to find out more about how real-life expectations on a rare event, in
this case a policy change, are formed. I specifically examine the role of
publicity, defined as media attention on the relevant topic, in the expecta-
tions formation process. Chapter 3 shows how the generated expectations
influence actual savings behavior to see whether expectations are indeed
as important as presumed. In both chapters, differences among individu-
als and demographic groups are explicitly addressed.
A unique longitudinal dataset on social security policy expectations,
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the Pensionbarometer which is collected by CentERdata in Tilburg and
initiated and financed by Netspar, is used in both Chapters 2 and 3. Ev-
ery three months, a group of respondents are asked for the probabilities
they assign to certain policy changes in the Dutch pension system within
the next twenty years. Although people do seem to understand the con-
cept of probabilities, there is a remarkable tendency to provide different
answers every time the same question is being asked. Filtering out some
of the noise, the remaining expectation changes on the aggregate level due
to publicity in the media on the relevant topic are minimal. In Chapter
2 I find that higher educated and high income groups hardly adapt their
expectations to relevant publicity. Other subgroups do show a publicity
reaction. The middle-aged and those who do not often read a newspaper
have a relatively high publicity reaction. A potential explanation for this
latter finding is that these groups have low quality initial expectations.
Chapter 3 investigates whether and how these individual expectations
are related to individual voluntary pension scheme participation. Because
the expectations are found to be so noisy in the earlier chapter, this chap-
ter uses average expectations over time to represent people’s perception of
the future. I find that participation in private pension schemes is higher
for those who assign high probabilities to the dismantlement of old age
social security. The effects are however not equal for all age and income
categories. The young and those with a high income do not seem to pre-
pare much for a policy change, regardless of how likely they believe such a
change will be. Although no causal conclusions can be drawn here, these
results suggest that subjective expectations are correlated with economic
behavior.
1.2.3 Power
Power, or bargaining power, is a crucial element of both Chapters 4 and 5.
In organizational science the power of an individual is sometimes defined
as the extent to which that individual has control over resources within an
organization. Those who can make financial decisions are typically pow-
erful, but also the secretary that knows everyone and everything about
the place has considerable power. In economic theory someone’s (bar-
gaining) power often depends on the outside options that are available
to the individual. A beautiful woman with many suitors can negotiate a
better marriage contract than her mediocre fiancé.
Control over resources is important in the non-cooperative model of
household consumption and labor supply that is developed in Chapter
6
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4. In this chapter two spouses play a Nash bargaining game, in which
they decide how much to contribute to different public goods that are
consumed by the household, given the other spouse’s contribution. Power
matters in this game, as it turns out that the spouse who (potentially)
earns much more than the other gets to dictate his/her preferences over
the consumption of the public goods. In our model power is a function of
relative earning capacity, but also of the estimated preference parameters
of the two spouses. If reality was best represented by the so-called uni-
tary model, i.e. if the family’s decisions could best be characterized by a
single utility function, the relative power of the two spouses should not
make a difference. Our model is estimated by focusing on one particular
public good - expenses on children’s goods. We find that for couples with
two or three children we reject the standard unitary model in favor of our
non-cooperative approach. Moreover, it turns out that for the majority of
these couples, there is a Wife Dictatorship in the sense that the spending
pattern is according to her preferences.
Power has a somewhat different connotation in Chapter 5. This pa-
per deals with the wage negotiations between employees on the one hand,
and employers on the other hand. The bargaining power that each party
brings to the table is partly determined by the relevant outside options.
How simple and cheap it is for an employer to dismantle an employment
contract, or in other words how easy it is to fire a worker, is important in
this respect. An employee’s power is furthermore influenced by the extent
to which she has control over the effort she exercises in her job (which is
an important resource to the employer). In this chapter, the influence of
the employer’s term of notice is examined. The term of notice is defined
here as the amount of time an employer has to notify an employee in
advance of her upcoming dismissal. I find that a worker that is protected
by a longer term of notice (so that the worker is more costly to fire) earns
a significantly higher wage than a comparable individual with a shorter
term of notice. Because an exogenous policy change in the term of notice
is analyzed in the chapter, it is argued that this relationship should be
interpreted causally. It is probable that the higher wages are explained by










Economists like to believe that expectations play a role in almost every
decision that economic agents make. In our models, retailers for example
have beliefs over competitors’ future prices while determining their own
price and households are assumed to take their unemployment risk into
account before signing a mortgage contract. The academic debate on the
actual role of expectations in decision-making is still ongoing though. An
expanding literature relates subjective expectations, sometimes measured
in probabilities, to individual behavior such as saving, criminal activities
and smoking. Interesting papers on the relationship between observed ex-
pectations and observed actions include Stephens (2004), Lochner (2007)
and Viscusi and Hakes (2008). While I try to contribute to this literature
in the Chapter 3 by showing that old age social security expectations are
related to pension scheme participation, the current chapter takes one
step back.
This study investigates how public information dissemination influ-
ences observed expectations for different demographic groups. As more
and more evidence is being presented that subjective expectations are
1Thanks to Arthur van Soest, Frederic Vermeulen, James Banks, Jan van Ours,
Damjan Pfajfar, Stefan Hochguertel, Mauro Mastrogiacomo and several seminar par-
ticipants for useful comments and suggestions.
2.1. Introduction
important in decision-making, policy-makers would like to know whether
expectations can be influenced through information dissemination in the
media. This is especially important when individuals’ expectations are
overly optimistic or overly pessimistic. Two examples in the literature
of systematically biased expectations are the yen/dollar exchange rate
expectations that were too low for Japanese exporting companies (Ito,
1990) and the probabilities of obtaining certain diseases that were too
high for Dutch women (Carman and Kooreman, 2007). In assessing the
importance of the publicity reaction, I am answering the call for more
knowledge on the underlying mechanism generating expectations by both
Manski (2004) in his influential paper on measuring expectations2 and by
Bernanke (2007) in his speech for the NBER monetary economics summer
workshop3.
Unlike the majority of papers in the empirical expectations forma-
tion literature (e.g. Gramlich, 1983, Caskey, 1985, Keane and Runkle,
1990, Souleles, 2004 and Lamla and Lein, 2008), this chapter will not
base its findings on inflation expectations. Instead I will analyze the in-
fluence of publicity on Dutch old age social security expectations, specif-
ically focusing on individuals’ expectations regarding the future eligibil-
ity age4. These expectations are recorded in the Pensionbarometer, a
monthly Dutch longitudinal household survey of pension policy expecta-
tions, collected by Tilburg University’s CentERdata. As U.S. social se-
curity expectations are typically best documented, the literature mostly
focuses on Americans’ perception of their old age benefits (e.g. Dominitz,
Manski and Heinz, 2003). Subjective social security expectations have
been studied mostly in order to understand the impact of social security
policy on retirement savings (e.g. Bernheim and Levin, 1989, Dominitz
et al., 2002 and Van der Wiel, 2008).
A major advantage of the Dutch eligibility age expectations over the
2“I see a critical need for basic research on expectations formation. Understanding
how persons revise their expectations with receipt of new information often is a prereq-
uisite for credible use of econometric decision models to predict behavior.” (Manski,
2004, p.1371)
3“We must understand better [...] the relationship between policy actions and the
formation of inflation expectations.” [...] A fuller understanding of the public’s learn-
ing rules would improve the central bank’s capacity [...] to evaluate the implications
of its policy decisions and communications strategy.”(Bernanke, 2007, p.4)
4The Dutch old age social security system, ‘AOW’, is a universal Pay-As-You-Go
pension scheme that is currently rewarded to all Dutch citizens from the age of 65
onwards. The monthly amount an individual receives depends on years of residence in
The Netherlands and cohabitation status, and is independent of contributions, income
or wealth.
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U.S. expectations is that there cannot be valuable private information in-
volved when Dutch individuals consider the future of their old age social
security system. Future benefits perceptions in the U.S. are influenced by
individual health, job security and income expectations, besides future
policy expectations. The same holds for inflation expectations: private
information plays an important role as absorbed price information varies
across consumers. Unlike the U.S. system, Dutch old age social security
is uniform and universal, and expectations regarding its future will there-
fore only reflect general policy expectations. The information set that
individuals could use in forming expectations would for example include
the debates and decisions of the Dutch Parliament as well as Statistics
Netherlands’ estimates of future population growth. This information is
all publicly known. A lack of relevant private information is necessary
in order to distinguish the publicity reactions of different demographic
groups. If unobservable private information would also play a role in the
eligibility age expectations, it would be impossible to separate differences
in information absorption from differences in the available information
set.
Like in most of the expectations formation literature based on survey
data (e.g. Carroll, 2003, Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers, 2003, Souleles, 2004,
and Branch, 2004), I also observe a high degree of heterogeneity in the
level of expectations. The theoretical model developed in this chapter
takes this heterogeneity explicitly into account. A method is proposed to
assess the influence of publicity on expectations using the second moment
of expectation changes. The variance is the relevant unit of analysis here
as all publicity reactions are a-priori interesting; i.e. both the positive
and negative expectations shifts. The proposed estimator is named the
Publicity Reaction Coefficient (PRC) and is estimated for different demo-
graphic and media consumption groups.
Public information dissemination, or publicity, is defined here as the
information concerning the entity at interest that is disseminated through
various public media outlets. Although publicity as such is practically im-
possible to quantify, newspaper articles are carefully documented in the
LexisNexis database. From this I have constructed a dataset contain-
ing the weekly frequency of newspaper articles on old age social security,
which will be used as a proxy for publicity intensity. Naturally, it is un-
observed how many and what newspaper articles individuals read or take
notice of when determining expectations. However, those survey periods
before which hardly any relevant newspaper articles appeared can be uti-
lized. The observed expectation changes in these surveys are likely to be
13
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realizations of the heterogeneous reporting error term which allows me
to estimate the value of the reporting error variance per subsample. The
Publicity Reaction Coefficient is then estimated by subtracting this error
variance from the variance of expectation changes in high-publicity peri-
ods.
It turns out that media coverage of the old age social security system
typically accounts for between zero and thirty percent of the variance in
expectation changes. Rather than publicity, random shifts thus explain
the majority of the variance in reported changes in eligibility age ex-
pectations, with especially older individuals being more imprecise in their
expectation reports. When comparing subgroups, I find that middle-aged,
those who infrequently read a newspaper, those who consider themselves
below-average informed about Dutch politics and those who read free or
populist newspapers have a relatively high PRC. These respondents thus
change their expectations more after heavy media attention than other
demographic groups. On the contrary older age groups, those with a uni-
versity degree and those who earn a relatively high income have a low
Publicity Reaction Coefficient. These socio-economic groups are thus rel-
atively insensitive to heavy media attention on old age social security.
This could be counter-intuitive at first, but several plausible explanations
can be given. First, it becomes understandable when the majority of
newspaper articles about the old age social security system contains ‘old
news’. It is after all likely that those with lower quality initial expectations
adapt their expectations more whenever already available information is
repeated in the media. Second, another explanation could be that those
for whom the future of old age social security is more important - those
with lower incomes for example - pay more attention to the relevant me-
dia exposure.
This chapter will proceed with a short overview of some of the relevant
economic literature in Section 2.2. An econometric approach to estimate
the Publicity Reaction Coefficient is then proposed in Section 2.3. Fur-
thermore, I describe the Pensionbarometer dataset (Section 2.4) and the
information set that was available to respondents during the observation
window (Section 2.5). Section 2.6 presents the results of the empirical
analysis. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Literature
Before data on subjective expectations were available, economists already
formulated models for expectations formation in order to complete their
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theoretical and structural econometric models. Especially in monetary
economics expectations formation is of the utmost importance, and most
of the literature thus analyzes inflation expectations. The majority of
expectations formation theories have one thing in common; they link the
relevant information that is available at time t to what organizations,
firms and individuals expect to happen at time t + 1. Among the first
to formalize a theory on expectations formation were Arrow and Nerlove
(1958) who expanded the adaptive expectations theory in which one learns
from previous prediction errors. Another well-known example of such a
theory is the rational expectations hypothesis proposed by Muth (1961).
He introduced the convenient notion that individuals and firms use all the
currently available information to correctly compute expectations so that
their ex-post prediction errors are orthogonal to this information. Given
the evidence of judgement biases in simple evaluation tasks (e.g. Tversky
and Kahneman, 1974), the rational expectations assumption is unlikely
to hold in reality. Several authors have indeed shown that not all relevant
and available information is incorporated in expectations (e.g. Figlewski
and Wachtel, 1981, and Carroll, 2003) and that changes in expectations
are typically more extreme than ex-post justified (e.g. De Bondt and
Thaler (1990)). As most of these studies analyze inflation or exchange
rate expectations of professional forecasters, the extent to which expec-
tations of the general public are biased is probably even larger.
Mankiw and Reis (2002) relatively recently introduced a more realis-
tic theory: the sticky expectations model. In this expectations formation
model all new information is correctly absorbed in the expectations of a
certain fraction of the population, while the other - ignorant - fraction
sticks to their previous expectations. Although a vast improvement to
the earlier literature on expectations formation, the sticky expectations
literature does not discuss which individuals belong to the updating and
which belong to the ignorant group. In fact, there is no room for individ-
ual heterogeneity as the theory assumes that each period all individuals
are equally likely to update their expectations.
Some authors have tested the sticky-expectations model by quantify-
ing the fraction of the population that belongs to the ignorant group,
typically analyzing ex-post prediction errors in inflation expectations.
Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers (2003) estimate that professional economists in
the Livingstone survey update their expectations once every ten months
and that households in the Michigan Survey update their inflation expec-
tations once every thirteen months. This comes down to more than ninety
percent of individuals ignoring new information revelations each month.
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Carroll (2003) finds that the typical household in the Michigan Survey
updates inflation expectations roughly once a year, while unemployment
expectations appear to be updated more frequently.
Carroll also pays attention to media intensity on the relevant random
variable, proxied by the number of newspaper articles published about in-
flation on the front page of the New York Times and the Washington Post
each year. In his paper, Carroll provides a micro-foundation for Mankiw
and Reis’s sticky expectations, as he proposes that the media are the in-
formation channel through which individuals, in different degrees, absorb
professional forecasters’ inflation expectations. He uses the Michigan Sur-
vey to find that the average inflation expectations of households are more
accurate, i.e. more like the average expectations of experts, in periods
in which there is a lot of news coverage on inflation. Carroll also finds
that the updating speed in the total population is faster, or the fraction
of the population that has rational expectations, when there has recently
been more news coverage. Another example of a study in which publicity
plays a direct role is a paper by Lamla and Lein (2008) who examined the
effect of both printed media and television coverage on average German
consumers’ inflation expectations. Their findings support Carolls results
that more news indeed leads to household expectations being closer to
expert expectations. Lamla and Lein also investigate the effect of the
wording of inflation news and find that the expectation bias increased in
periods in which the media were blaming the introduction of the euro
for significant price increases. Given that both studies analyze average
expectations rather than individual expectations, they cannot address if
and how demographic groups differ in their uptake of relevant information
in the media. As an addition to their work, this study thus focuses on
this heterogeneity in the publicity reaction.
While ignoring the publicity element of expectations formation, other
authors have examined demographic differences in expectations. Several
papers have analyzed the differences in ex-post expectation errors between
professional forecasters, or economists, on the one hand and households
on the other hand (e.g. Gramlich, 1983). Unexpectedly, this comparison
does not always favor the professionals. Gramlich also provides sketchy
evidence that low-income and low-education households forecast inflation
better. He argues that this counterintuitive finding has its origin in the
accelerating inflation during the survey period 1978-1979. Congenital pes-
simists, which he believes low-income and low-educated individuals are,
would have had a forecast advantage in that period. Jonung (1981) was
one of the first to decompose household inflation perceptions and expecta-
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tions demographically and he found that women perceived higher inflation
rates than men using Swedish data. Jonung suggests that this might have
to do with the different products that men and women buy, as especially
food inflation had been relatively high in the survey period. This im-
portance of private information sets in inflation expectations has been a
major argument to analyze policy change expectations in this chapter.
Not all papers in the expectations formation literature focus on inflation
expectations. Souleles (2004) related macro-economic forecast errors to
demographic characteristics and he found that the forecast bias decreased
in magnitude with age, income and education.
2.3 Expectations formation model
2.3.1 A theoretical model of the information reac-
tion
I consider the following expectations formation model that makes only
weak assumptions on the relationship between information, publicity and
expectations. Individual i reports expectations at time t over the realiza-
tion of a random variable y at a specified moment in the future, t+z. This
expectation will be denoted as ỹt+zit and is the sum of three components:
a function fi of the absorbed information set that is available at time t,
Ωit, a time-invariant component, υi, and a reporting error term, εit. The
following equation presents this expectations formation model:
ỹt+zit = fi(Ωit) + υi + εit.
Individual heterogeneity enters the expectations formation formula in
many ways. First, individuals do not necessarily absorb all available in-
formation. This means that the personal information set Ωit is a subset
of the generally available information set Ωt (Ωit ⊆ Ωt). Note that this
means that private information is excluded in this expectations formation
model; individuals differ in their information absorption but they could
in principle all access the same knowledge.
A second source of individual heterogeneity resides in how the ab-
sorbed information is translated into an expectation. The information
processing function fi(·) in the expectations formation model therefore
has subscript i. Although information absorption and information pro-
cessing are conceptually different concepts, it is empirically very difficult
to distinguish the two effects. Therefore, I will from now on refer to their
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combined effect on expectations as the information consumption effect.
The expectations formation model includes two additional sources of
interpersonal variation. The time-invariant component υi represents in-
dividuals’ inherent inclination towards low or high expectations, i.e. to-
wards pessimism or optimism. Moreover, I make the following assump-
tions on the distribution of the error term εit that allow for individual
heteroscedasticity:
εit ∼ n.i.d.(0, σ2i ).
The larger the variance of the error term, σ2i , the larger is the typical
deviation in the expectations report from the information-based expecta-
tion. In this model, individuals thus differ in the size of these deviations.
A way of thinking about this is that someone with a small error variance
is a precise individual and someone with a high error variance is typically
sloppy.
One source of heterogeneity in the expectations, namely the individual-
specific constant term υi, can easily be eliminated by taking first differ-
ences. It is important to note that in empirical applications this individual
constant term will, besides optimism, also include the influence of initial
information on expectations. This is because the expectations formation
process will have started (long) before the expectations are first observed
by the researcher. The first difference expectations formation model can
be found below:
ỹt+zit − ỹt+zi,t−1 = fi(Ωit)− fi(Ωi,t−1) + εit − εi,t−1
∆itỹ
t+z = ∆itf(Ω) + ∆itε.
Note that that the second line in this equation is simply a rewritten
version of the first; no additional assumptions have been made. Expecta-
tion changes are thus a linear combination of the change in the processed
and absorbed information set (∆itf(Ω)) and an error component (∆itε).
As a result of the assumptions on εit, these new errors are independent
normal with mean zero and a variance that is twice the individual error
variance σ2i . The systematic effect of information on expectation changes
(∆itf(Ω)) is referred to as the information reaction. This chapter will
empirically assess the size of this effect and how this size varies over in-
dividuals.
2.3.2 Information, publicity and newspaper articles
Public information dissemination, or publicity, is likely to play an impor-
tant part in how individuals obtain the information that is absorbed in
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their expectation. The publicity set, Θt, is defined here as the set of all
information on the realization of the random variable y at time t+ z that
is disseminated through publicly available media outlets between period
t−1 and period t. These outlets would include television programmes, In-
ternet blogs and magazine and newspaper articles. The publicity set, Θt,
can be divided in two separate subsets: the set of truly new information
revelations that were unavailable last period, ∆tΩ, and the set of repeated
information elements that were already known last period, Φt. The exact
explanation of the publicity set is given in the following equations:
Θt = ∆tΩ ∪ Φt
∆tΩ ∩ Φt = ∅
∆tΩ * Ωt−1
Φt ⊆ Ωt−1.
Note that the publicity set is defined such that each informational
element can only enter the set once, so that the number of times that a
certain piece of information is mentioned in the media does not play a
role in Θt.
I assume that the only sources from which individuals derive new
information, ∆itΩ, are the public media outlets. Library visits and say,
university lectures, are thus excluded. Note that one does not have to
watch a certain television programme oneself to know what it was about.
I am allowing for hearing about news from others - colleagues, family,
friends - as long as there is only a short period between the broadcasting
of the television programme and the informal information dissemination.
Lagged publicity effects are however excluded. A person that chooses
not to read the newspaper in a certain period cannot decide to read it
three months later. This is not such a strong assumption as repetitions
of existent information (Φt) are an important component of the publicity
set (Θt). These two assumptions on the newly absorbed information are
summarized as follows:
∆itΩ ⊆ Θt.
Unfortunately, there are two empirical problems concerning the pub-
licity set Θt. First, as I am interested in quantifying the information
reaction in expectations, a quantitative measure of information dissemi-
nation is much more useful than a set of informational elements. This is
because each element of the information set will have a distinct influence
on expectations and these effects cannot be separated empirically. Second,
it is technically impossible to exactly observe all informational elements
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of the publicity set Θt. Even if a researcher would have time to carefully
read the thousands of relevant newspaper articles, there is no way to as-
semble all television programmes that have featured information on the
random variable y. Because of these data problems, a new quantitative
and observable measure of publicity intensity is introduced, θt, which is
defined as the number of newspaper articles that mention the relevant
random variable y (in this chapter, the old age social security eligibility
age) in their content . Newspapers are naturally not the only available
media outlet. However, θt is restricted to newspaper articles as this is
the only information source that can easily be retrieved. The underlying
assumption is that the correlation between the publicity intensity across
all media outlets is very strong.
A positive relationship between the number of elements in the public-
ity set Θt and the quantitative measure of publicity intensity θt is easy to
imagine. It is likely that the more newspaper articles appear about a cer-
tain subject, the more information about that topic will be disseminated.
How strong this relationship is from period to period is hard to say how-
ever. One frontpage article by a well-known journalist could have much
more influence than a standard press release that has been copied in all
large newspapers. I therefore do not further formalize the relationship be-
tween the content and quantity of media coverage. The only assumption
made is that the publicity set Θt is empty when the amount of newspaper
articles on the relevant variable y is very low, i.e. when θt ≈ 0. What is
meant with very low will become explicit in Section 2.5.
It turns out that the restrictions on no lagged publicity and on the re-
lationship between Θt and θt are very useful assumptions. Together they
imply that the information-related component of expectation changes -
i.e. the information reaction - will equal zero when the media intensity
on the random variable is very low. The information reaction in such
circumstances is as follows:
∆itf(Ω) = 0 if Θt = ∅ , i.e. when θt ≈ 0.
Because this proposition requires important assumptions on how indi-
viduals obtain their personal information set from the media, it is appro-
priate to name the information related component of expectation changes
the publicity reaction here rather than the information reaction. Although
the two are the same by assumption I want to avoid the possible misin-
terpretation that the information effect has to do with real information
revelations only (∆tΩ) rather than also with repeated elements of the in-
formation set (Φt).
Note that a lack of publicity is not the only circumstance as a result
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of which a zero publicity reaction is observed. The publicity reaction
could also be zero when 1) the individual does not absorb any new pub-
licity, 2) all elements of the consumed publicity set were already known to
the individual or 3) the individual does not change her expectation after
processing the newly absorbed information.
2.3.3 Identification of the publicity reaction
The proposition that the informed component of an expectation does not
change whenever the publicity on the realization of the relevant variable
has been negligible will prove useful in identifying the actual publicity
reaction later on. To see this, let me first define two types of time periods:
the set L contains periods in which there is hardly any publicity between
t − 1 and t (t ∈ L if θt ≈ 0) and the set H contains periods before
which some publicity, containing real and/or repeated news, has appeared
(t ∈ H if θt À 0). For these period subsets, different expectation change




∆itε if t ∈ L
∆itf(Ω) + ∆itε if t ∈ H.
It turns out that in low-publicity periods expectation changes are only
a realization of the change error, while in high-publicity periods the pub-
licity reaction enters the expression as well. In order for this distinction
between L and H to be empirically relevant I need to observe expecta-
tion changes in time periods in which the quantity of relevant newspaper
articles is low (θt ≈ 0) and in periods in which it is high (θt À 0). In
Section 2.5 it is explained that I indeed observe such periods for my social
security policy expectations.
It is difficult to derive interesting empirical results from the expec-
tations change model in terms of positive and negative changes. This
is because both increases and decreases in expectations could be due to
publicity reactions but such observations would cancel out in estimations.
Instead, the variance of expectation changes which, under assumptions,
can provide insights into the degree to which expectations are formed by
publicity consumption. In this chapter, the word variance will represent
the second moment of expectation changes, i.e. the average squared ex-
pectation changes. This is a very intuitive unit of analysis, as it will always
increase in the degree of publicity reaction. The traditional variance mea-
sure is the second central moment, i.e. the extent to which different obser-
vations of a variable typically vary from its mean (E[(∆itỹ
t+z−∆ỹ)2]). For
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the publicity reaction analysis however the second moment (E[(∆itỹ
t+z)2])
rather than the second central moment is utilized as changes in expecta-
tions and not levels are the unit of analysis. Think about an individual
that increased her expectation by the same (large) amount for a couple
of time periods in a row. The second central moment of this person’s
expectation changes would equal zero, although it is very well possible
that the individual did (strongly) react to publicity. The second moment
of her expectation changes will have been relatively large however.
The data at hand does have to satisfy one non-testable assumption in
order for the variance to be a suitable unit of analysis. I have to assume
that there is no linear relationship between the publicity reaction and the
new error term i.e. the covariance between these elements of expectation
changes should equal zero:
E[∆itf(Ω)∆itε] = Cov(∆itf(Ω), ∆itε) = 0.
The zero correlation assumption is necessary for the variance of the
expectation changes to be the sum of the variance of its components. Note
that this relatively weak assumption does not rule out heteroscedasticity.
It remains possible for the variance of the change errors (2σ2i ) to be a
function of individual time-invariant characteristics. If the covariance is






2] if t ∈ L
E[((∆itf(Ω))
2] + E[(∆itε)
2] if t ∈ H.
The periods with very little publicity on the variable that individuals
have expectations over (L) can now be exploited to identify the proportion
of the variance in expectation changes related to publicity. A two-step
procedure has to be applied. First, I can estimate the variance of the er-
ror component in expectation changes by computing the average squared
expectation change in the low-publicity periods. Second, I can decompose
the total variance in publicity-rich periods (H) into the variance of the
publicity reaction and the variance of the error term which is estimated
in the first step. This can be done as the variance of the reporting error
term is assumed constant over time, so that the variance of the error term
in low-publicity times will be similar to that in high-publicity times. This
procedure then generates an estimate of the proportion of the variance in
expectation changes that is related to information dissemination.
Using this estimate, I can calculate the Publicity Reaction Coefficient
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(PRC). The PRC is defined as the ratio of the estimated systematic vari-
ance over the total variance of expectation changes. The higher the PRC,
the more important is the role of information dissemination in expecta-










The Publicity Reaction Coefficient is ideally estimated on the indi-
vidual level. This can be done when sufficient observations are available
per individual in both publicity-rich and publicity-poor periods. Obser-
vations in the latter periods are especially important because these are
used to estimate the variance of the error term. The dataset that will
be used in this chapter does not contain enough of these observations for
each individual. Therefore the reporting error variance and consequently
the PRC will be estimated per demographic and media consumption sub-
group. The subscript i in this section should for my empirical application
thus be interpreted as representing different groups rather than persons.
2.3.4 The prediction error variance estimated
Under the assumption of normality of the reporting error term it is fur-
thermore possible to see how the noise variance σ2i is related to demo-
graphics. Although this is not central to the publicity reaction analysis,
it is nevertheless interesting to see which groups are more prone to errors
in their expectation estimates. I choose to model the heteroscedasticity in
the variance of ∆itε in the multiplicative fashion that is often used. Like
in the textbook examples, the assumption is that the individual variance
is an exponential function. The squared expectation changes in periods
before which no publicity entered the scene (t ∈ L) can then be seen as
drawings from the variance distribution. Taking logs on both sides, the
model simplifies to a linear equation which can be estimated using OLS.
These steps are laid out in the equations below. The γ-coefficients deter-
mine which demographic groups make larger errors. The covariates in x
′
i
include age groups, educational categories, income groups and dummies
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for gender and marital status.
V ar(∆itε) = E[(∆i,tL ỹ
t+z)2]
(∆i,tL ỹ




t+z)2) = (ln(2) + α) + x
′
iγ + ηit
ηit ∼ n.i.d.(0, ς2).
2.4 Expectations data
2.4.1 The Pensionbarometer
Although this paper study wishes to say something about the publicity
reaction in general, the expectations that will be empirically examined
are people’s beliefs over the future of the Dutch old age social security
eligibility age. This subjective expectation is interesting and useful in
the publicity reaction analysis for the following four reasons. First, as the
Dutch old age social security system (the ‘AOW’) is completely universal,
i.e. all individuals receive a similar level of benefits from the same age
onwards irrespective of contributions paid, all forecasts about potential
policy changes refer to the same random variable. The expectations are
therefore fully comparable. Second, the majority of individuals expects
to grow old and therefore to receive the non-negligible5 ‘AOW’ benefits
at some point in time. Hence, the future of the old age social security
system is of direct consequence to respondents, thereby enhancing the
quality of answers provided. Third, as the future of the old age social
security system basically depends on a few individuals only (i.e. on 150
members of parliament) and as the debate about its sustainability is fol-
lowed closely by the media, it seems plausible that all the information
that could enter the formation process of eligibility age expectations is
publicly available. This implies that differences in expectations only re-
flect differences in which pieces of information individuals absorb and on
how this information is processed, not on which information individuals
in principle have access to.
The expectations data analyzed in this chapter are taken from a Dutch
survey on pensions’ opinions and expectations, the Pensionbarometer,
5In 2008 the level of an ‘AOW’ benefit was equal to gross e997,12 for a single
individual and e682,51 for a cohabitating individual. Note that the gross amounts
would almost have been equal to net amounts in this case.
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which is collected by CentERdata at Tilburg University in The Nether-
lands. Netspar, a Dutch research network on pensions, ageing and re-
tirement, has initiated and funded the data collection process. The Pen-
sionbarometer is collected mainly to produce longitudinal statistics for
confidence-levels in the Dutch pension system. Every month about 500
individuals are asked to answer a few general questions about social se-
curity, pensions and retirement via the Internet. The respondents are
randomly selected from the CentERdata Internetpanel, which in turn is
a random sample of the population drawn from the municipal registry.
Whenever a selected individual does not have access to the Internet, Cen-
tERdata makes sure that access is arranged. The Pensionbarometer is
designed as a panel-type survey, and every respondent receives the ques-
tionnaire every three months so that there are in total three recurring
groups of respondents. This was done to be able to produce the con-
fidence statistics monthly while not overwhelming the respondents with
questions. In this chapter, I use the first thirty-one waves of the Pen-
sionbarometer (16,669 observations). The first wave of the survey was
enumerated in May, 2006. The last wave that is included in my analy-
sis was enumerated in November, 2008. A total of 2,573 individuals were
interviewed. Individuals participated eight times on average. 296 individ-
uals reply only once (there is replacement sampling) and 707 individuals
answer the probability questions ten or more times.
The Pensionbarometer asks a series of four questions about individu-
als’ eligibility age expectations that read as follows:
“What is the probability (between 0 and 100) that within ten
years/ within twenty years the ‘AOW’-eligibility age will be
...
- higher?
- higher by at least two years?
- lower?
- lower by at least two years?”
The questions were always asked in the order above. Four rather then one
questions were posed to provide insight in the internal consistency and
underlying distribution of the expectations. For longitudinal studies it is
however more interesting to examine each question separately as this al-
lows me to focus on changes in expectations. The total sample PRCs will
thus be reported for all four probabilities. To be concise, the subgroup
Publicity Reaction Coefficients are however reported for the first question
on a higher eligibility age only.
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Each Pensionbarometer survey, the time horizon for which an individ-
ual is asked her expectations is randomly chosen and this time horizon
thus varies over the surveys for each individual. The questions either con-
cern a ten or a twenty years time horizon. As there is no clear, cardinal
relationship between the ten and twenty year expectations the results for
both horizons are reported separately. This leaves me with a first sample
of expectation levels with 8,521 ten year observations (2,339 individuals)
and 8,148 twenty year observations (2,322 individuals). A second sam-
ple of expectation changes is smaller for two reasons. First, the initial
Pensionbarometer wave drops out when changes are considered. Second,
consecutive expectation answers over different time horizons - when for
example first ten year expectations are given and later twenty year expec-
tations - are also ignored. A change in expectations could in such a case
namely also reflect a different opinion on the time horizons rather than
a publicity reaction. 4,646 first period observations are lost and another
6,716 observations are lost because the time horizon that the individual
was asked to provide an expectation over changes from one survey to the
next. This ultimately generates a second sample of 2,736 ten year ex-
pectation changes (1,296 individuals) and 2,571 twenty year expectation
changes (1,283 individuals).
The Pensionbarometer data also contain several important demographic
characteristics such as education level, age and income. The Publicity Re-
action Coefficient of all relevant subgroups will be estimated in Section
2.6. As the PRC is estimated on the second sample, information on the
covariates is reported for this sample only. Three independent variables
concern media consumption, which will be interesting when analyzing the
publicity reaction. The media consumption data is based on additional
questions that were asked to all respondents in June 2008. Unfortunately,
this means the media information is available for only 987 respondents.
Two questions about direct media consumption read:
“How often do you read a newspaper (free papers and Internet
papers included)?”
and
“How often do you watch a regular news bulletin on the tele-
vision?”
The response scales individuals could use were 1) Every day, 2) Multiple
times a week, 3) Once a week, 4) At least once a month, 5) Less than
once a month. The distribution of answers can be found in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1: Frequencies of informative media consumption - in terms of
newspaper and television bulletins - for respondents in second sample.
Newspaper Television news
Every day 66% 61%
Multiple times a week 18% 30%
Once a week 7% 5%
At least once a month 2% 2%
Less than once a month 6% 3%
Observations 987 987
The Pensionbarometer sample often reads a newspaper and frequently
watches news bulletins on television. More than sixty percent of respon-
dents state that they read the newspaper on a daily basis. It should be
noted that newspaper take-up is generally high in The Netherlands. The
Dutch Bureau of Statistics reports that in 2006 51% of the population had
a paid newspaper subscription. For the empirical analysis of this chapter
the consumption data is transformed into two dummies for relatively low
media consumption: low newspaper consumption (once a week or less)
and low television news consumption (once a week or less). This was
done because the latter categories contain relatively little observations.
Sensitivity analysis has been performed using a different threshold for the
dummy. This had little effects on the results.
I also know which newspaper the respondents most often read, as they
were asked to state from which newspaper they typically obtained most
information. The frequencies can be found in Table 2.2. The most read
category are the free newspapers such as Metro, ‘Spits’ and ‘De Pers’
which are distributed in and around public transport and in communal
buildings. 12% of respondents indicate that they obtain most information
from these sources. Other large categories are two morning newspapers,
one more conservative/ populist - ‘De Telegraaf’ and another more pro-
gressive - ‘De Volkskrant’6. It will be interesting to see whether the slant
of a newspaper affects how individuals absorb publicity into their expec-
tations in the empirical section.
Additionally, respondents were asked to rate their own knowledge of
current political events. The exact question posed read:
“Compared to the average Dutch person, how well informed
6The classification of newspapers according to their tone or background is taken
from a newspaper article in the ‘NRC Next’ on March 4 2009.
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Table 2.2: Response frequency for which newspaper the respondents most
read in second sample.
Most read
Free newspapers 12%
‘De Telegraaf’ (populist) 11%
‘De Volkskrant’ (progressive) 10%
‘NRC Handelsblad’ (liberal) 7%
Other 60%
Observations 926
Table 2.3: Response frequency for subjective political informedness for








are you about current affairs in Dutch politics?”
Respondents could choose from five answer categories: 1) Very bad, 2)
Bad, 3) Average, 4) Well, 5) Very well. Table 2.3 shows that the Pen-
sionbarometer respondents on average consider themselves well-informed,
although still sixteen percent believe that they know less than the aver-
age Dutchmen. Because of the limited number of observations, in Section
2.6 this data is translated into a dummy for being relatively ill-informed
(very bad and bad answer categories). This partition was chosen as it
best explains the differences in empirical publicity reactions.
2.4.2 Characteristics of the expectations formation
process
Figure 2.1 shows the development of the average subjective expectations
in the Pensionbarometer over all waves and both time horizons. Each
data-point represents the mean of about 250 observations. The observed
average probability of later benefits is well above 50 for all waves and both
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time horizons. Hence, pessimism prevails. The average does vary over the
relevant time horizon. As one would expect, people believe that the prob-
Figure 2.1: Average probability assigned to higher eligibility age for both
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ability of a policy change within the next twenty years is higher (average
is 65) than within the next ten years (average is 61). This difference
was consistent in all but one waves. The Pensionbarometer respondents
were most optimistic around the end of 2006/ beginning of 2007 (when
a new government was being formed) and most pessimistic around the
summer of 2008 (when a government appointed committee proposed to
raise the eligibility age to 67 years)7. The average probability seems con-
siderably volatile; the difference between the smallest and largest average
probability is about 15 probability points for both the ten and the twenty
year expectations. A histogram in Figure 2.A.1 in the appendix provides
more information on the distribution of the twenty year answers. Some
clustering of probabilities around 50 is visible. It has been argued that
respondents also provide a fifty percent chance response when they have
no idea what probability to assign. Manski (2004) however states that
7Note that high probabilities are named pessimistic here and low probabilities op-
timistic out of convenience, not as a normative statement.
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“This concern has largely been laid to rest as empirical evidence has accu-
mulated.” (p. 1342). Given that only one percent of respondents always
answer 50 to both the ten and twenty year horizon questions I will assume
here that all 50 answers represent true opinions.
Although in general respondents are pessimistic about the future of
the old age social security eligibility age, considerable heterogeneity in
expectations exists. Figure 2.A.2 in the appendix represents the median
and the 25th and 75th percentiles for the expectations with a twenty year
time horizon. The average interquartile range is substantial and rela-
tively constant over time, at about 40 probability points. This individual
heterogeneity in the assessment of future policy changes is to a certain
degree persistent. Those individuals who assign a higher (or lower) than
average probability in one period are more likely to do so in the next
period. The probability of assigning a higher than average probability to
a policy change in two consecutive periods is equal to 74% for the ten
year expectations and 67% for the twenty year expectations. The proba-
bility of assigning a lower than average probability twice in a row is 77%
for the ten year expectations and 77% for the twenty year expectations.
This means that despite the general tendency to remain less or more op-
timistic than others, still more than twenty percent of individuals move
their expectation to the other side of the distribution from one period to
the next.
The vast majority of individuals, also those who remain on one side of
the average expectation, alter their stated expectations between consecu-
tive surveys. Figure 2.2 shows the percentages of respondents that change
their subjective probabilities by more than five points compared to their
previous answer. Absolute changes below six probability points (say from
65 to 60) are ignored as these could just be due to rounding differences.
Remember that my second sample only includes observations of individu-
als who happened to have answered questions for a similar time horizon in
two adjacent surveys and that expectation changes are thus measured over
a three month period. The average percentage of respondents that display
a positive change equals 34% and the average percentage of respondents
that display a negative change over all waves equals 32%. About seventy
percent of individuals thus significantly update their beliefs within three
months. Moreover, only six percent of respondents never change their
expectations by more than five probability points.
Table 2.4 finally displays the regression results of two-limit Tobit re-
gressions of the subjective probability of a higher eligibility age on some
relevant demographic characteristics for both the ten and the twenty year
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Figure 2.2: Percentage of respondents adapting eligibility age expecta-
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expectations. A tobit estimation technique was chosen to accommodate
censoring of the given probabilities at 0 and 100. In both time horizon
regressions, the older one gets, the more optimistic one becomes. Also
persistent in both columns; respondents with higher incomes as well as
those with a partner are significantly more pessimistic. Gender is also cor-
related with short-term social security expectations. Women assign higher
probabilities to an increase in the eligibility age within ten years. Educa-
tion moreover has a significant influence on the long-term eligibility age
probabilities. Those who completed a higher vocational or an academic
education are significantly more pessimistic about the future. Despite the
significant covariates, individual heterogeneity and noise seems to be most
important in explaining differences in expectation levels as the regressions
only explain about 0.4% of the variation in expectations.
2.5 Publicity set
The publicity set Θt is defined in Section 2.3 as the set of all informa-
tional elements on the realization of the relevant entity (here the old age
social security eligibility age) that is disseminated through publicly avail-
able media outlets between two survey periods. As it is empirically very
difficult to identify the exact elements in and the precise size of the pub-
licity set, Section 3 already introduced the quantity of newspaper articles,
θt, as a reasonable proxy for the intensity of publicity in a given period.
Carroll (2003) and Lamla and Lein (2008) use similar newspaper quantity
variables in their papers.
The data on the quantity of newspaper articles is assembled through
an online database of written Dutch media content, LexisNexis. Every
piece of text that is published in large magazines and newspapers can be
retrieved through this database. For each week between the first wave
of the Pensionbarometer (week 19 in 2006) and the last reported wave
(week 46 in 2008) I have selected all relevant articles that appeared in
Dutch national newspapers. Four different series of weekly quantities
were generated that could partly overlap: the number of articles contain-
ing the acronym ‘AOW’ in their title, the number of articles containing
the acronym ‘AOW’ in their introduction, the number of articles contain-
ing the word ‘AOW (eligibility) age’ in their total content and the number
of articles containing the word ‘ageing’ in their introduction. Note that
‘AOW’ is the acronym of the Dutch equivalent of old age social security.
Figure 2.3 displays these four series separately. Considerable variation in
the number of relevant newspaper articles can be seen, with especially the
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Table 2.4: Coefficients and standard errors of two-limit Tobit regressions.
Dependent variable: probability of higher eligibility age (between 0 and
100).
(1) (2)
10 years 20 years
Coef. S.e. Coef. S.e.
Vocational secondary -4.638∗ (1.90) -1.341 (2.940)
General secondary -1.317 (2.11) 3.845 (3.124)
Vocational tertiary 0.052 (2.01) 1.430 (3.016)
Higher vocational 1.803 (1.98) 4.921∗ (2.950)
Academic education 1.865 (2.21) 7.709∗∗∗ (3.158)
Age 15-24 -7.106 (35.84) -0.163 (1.865)
Age 35-44 -6.414∗∗∗ (1.42) -6.305∗∗∗ (1.631)
Age 45-54 -8.283∗∗∗ (1.36) -5.281∗∗ (1.616)
Age 55-64 -11.889∗∗∗ (1.38) -8.880∗∗∗ (1.721)
Age >64 -14.394∗∗∗ (1.40) -14.086∗∗∗ (1.761)
Low middle income 1.954 (1.31) 0.385 (1.753)
Middle income 5.828∗∗∗ (1.42) 4.968∗∗∗ (1.872)
High middle income 5.350∗∗∗ (1.48) 4.895∗∗ (1.965)
High income 6.049∗∗∗ (1.62) 5.824∗∗∗ (2.094)
Dummy female 2.570∗∗ (0.99) 0.316 (1.307)
Dummy partner 6.318∗∗∗ (0.99) 6.476∗∗∗ (1.296)
Observations 8,450 8,087
Individuals 2,317 2,290
Censored at 0 288 231
Censored at 100 1,285 1,491
Pseudo R2 0.40% 0.42%
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Base categories: primary education, age 25-34, low income
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middle time period low in media attention for all four series.
Some peaks in the publicity quantities have a deducible information
Figure 2.3: Weekly number of newspaper articles in Dutch national media
featuring words relevant to the old age social security system and special
interest weeks (a-f) (week 1-52: 2006, week 53-104: 2007, week 105-157:
2008).
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cause and these events are indicated with vertical lines in Figure 2.3.
Here is a summary of important events related to old age social secu-
rity during the period May 2006 - November 2008: a) April 2006: The
leader of the social-democrats (Mr. W. Bos) gives a speech in which he
promotes higher tax rates for retired individuals. These rates have been
lower because those over 64 do not pay old age social security contribu-
tions; b) August 2006: The presentation of general election programs by
all relevant parties. Most parties, including the liberals and Christian-
democrats, promise to keep the old age social security scheme exactly
as it is. Some small parties propose to raise the eligibility age. The
social-democrats stick to their idea to alter the contributions scheme; c)
November 2006: The election results come in. Relatively to polls half-a-
year earlier, the Christian-democrats win and the social-democrats loose.
It is widely viewed, that this loss is mainly due to the unpopular so-
cial security contributions policy proposal; d) February 2007: A coalition
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government of Christian-democrats and social-democrats is formed and a
compromise to increase tax rates for rich retired individuals is revealed;
e) June 2008: A special government-appointed committee (‘committee
Bakker’) of prominent social- and Christian-democrats that was asked to
think about labor force participation in the long run proposes to e.g. in-
crease the social security eligibility age by two years from 65 to 67 years.
The government officially rejects this idea immediately; f) November 2008:
Parliament accepts a new taxation law that introduces marginally higher
tax-rates for those over 64 and also a tax credit for those between 61 and
65 who are still employed.
Apparently no changes to the old age social security eligibility age
were introduced during the discussed period. The contribution scheme
was adapted at the very end of the observation window however. The lat-
ter could have had spillover effects (positive or negative) to the eligibility
expectations. Note that from this short description of events, it becomes
clear that for more than a year, between March 2007 and May 2008, the
discussion about the future of Dutch old age social security disappeared
from the political scene as other matters were more pressing (such as em-
ployment protection). This period will be very useful in identifying the
variation in expectations that can be attributed to noise.
The quantity of newspaper articles that matters for the publicity re-
action in expectations is actually the number of newspaper articles that
have appeared since the last time someone participated in the survey, as
those will be the potential inputs for changes in expectations. Remember
that although the Pensionbarometer is surveyed each month, a single re-
spondent only participates in it every third month. The relevant quantity
here is thus the cumulative number of newspaper articles that have been
published over these three months since the respondent last answered an
expectation question.
To estimate the Publicity Reaction Coefficient my survey span has to
include periods in which hardly any newspaper articles appeared (θt ≈ 0).
I will now introduce two different definitions of low-publicity periods,
based on the four different series in Figure 2.3. A period is qualified as
a standard low-publicity period when the cumulative quantity of articles
for all four publicity series was below the median of that variable. The
bar plots in Figure 2.4 show these cumulative series per survey week in
comparison to their respective medians. The publicity-low periods (L) are
those in between the dotted lines. In total eight periods can be classified
as information-low using this definition. In the same figure, very-high
publicity periods (HH) are identified as those periods before which there
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Figure 2.4: Cumulative newspaper articles three months before each sur-
vey, relative to median per variable. Low publicity periods between dotted



















































































0 50 100 150
Week of survey
was more than the median level of publicity in all four series. The dataset
contains seven of these periods. Table 2.A.1 in the appendix provides a
list of all periods and their categories.
For the purpose of sensitivity analysis in Section 2.6 a second defini-
tion of publicity-poor periods is introduced, based on the first quartile of
the article quantities rather than on the median. Figure 2.5 shows the cu-
mulative number of articles compared to their respective first quartiles. A
period is qualified as a very-low publicity period (LL) when the quantity
of articles for all four publicity series was below the first quartile of that
variable. The very-low publicity periods are those in between the dotted
lines in Figure 2.5. Only three periods can be classified as information-
low using this definition. In the same figure, high publicity periods (H)
are identified as those periods before which - for all four series - more
newspaper articles appeared than their respective first quartile. There
are thirteen of such high-publicity periods.
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Figure 2.5: Cumulative newspaper articles three months before each sur-
vey, relative to first quartile per variable. Very-low publicity periods
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2.6 Estimation results
2.6.1 Reduced form analysis
This subsection presents reduced-form results of the extent to which the
variance of expectation changes and publicity intensity are related. This
is done to investigate whether more publicity before a survey indeed leads
to larger changes in expectations. Table 2.5 presents the results of OLS
regressions of the logarithm of squared changes in the higher eligibility
age expectations on publicity intensity and several other covariates that
control for individuals’ propensity to change their expectations. In Table
2.5 each newspaper articles coefficient was estimated in a separate model,
on both the entire sample (column I) or the ten years (column II) and
twenty years horizon (column III) subsamples.
The results suggest that higher publicity levels are significantly as-
sociated with changes in eligibility age expectations. The effect is non-
negligible. One hundred additional newspaper articles that feature the
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Table 2.5: Selected coefficients and standard errors of separate OLS mod-
els. Dependent variable: logarithm of squared expectation changes in
higher eligibility age expectations. Newspaper article series in units of
100.
(I) (II) (III)
All Ten years Twenty years
Articles ‘AOW’ 0.252* 0.255 0.232
in title (0.114) (0.155) (0.171)
Articles ‘AOW’ 0.115* 0.124 0.099
in introduction (0.048) (0.067) (0.073)
Articles ‘AOW-age’ 0.006 -0.054 0.064
in total content (0.093) (0.129) (0.141)
Articles ‘Ageing’ 0.231** 0.227* 0.226
in introduction (0.076) (0.105) (0.113)
Observations 5,275 2,714 2,561
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Other covariates: education level, age group, income group, gender and partner
Dutch acronym for old age social security (‘AOW’) in their title increase
changes in expectations by 25 percent. Not only quantity but also the
quality of news seems to matter; newspaper articles mentioning ‘AOW’ in
their title have an effect on expectation changes that is more than twice
as large as the effect of those mentioning ‘AOW’ in the introduction. An
additional probit-analysis of whether respondents changed their expecta-
tions (e.g. with at least 6 probability points) more often in periods of high
publicity intensity showed no significant publicity coefficients. This indi-
cates that the results in Table 2.5 are driven by larger expectation changes
rather than by more respondents adapting their expectation answers.
2.6.2 Publicity Reaction Coefficient
In this section I estimate the publicity reaction in old age social security
expectations using the Dutch Pensionbarometer data. To obtain a first
impression, Figure 2.6 depicts average squared expectation changes per
survey week for the two different time horizons. As in Figures 2.4 and 2.5,
the periods between the dotted lines are classified as low publicity periods
(L) and the periods between the dashed lines as high publicity periods
(H). Although the extent to which respondents adapted their expectations
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does seem somewhat lower in the information-poor periods the difference
is not overwhelming. This indicates that random shifts in expectation re-
ports account for a substantial proportion of the variance in expectation
changes; something that will be supported by the PRC evidence below.
Table 2.6 presents the estimates of the Publicity Reaction Coeffi-
Figure 2.6: Average squared change in probability assigned to later eli-
gibility age per survey week. Low publicity periods between dotted lines
(L). High publicity periods between dashed lines (H).
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cients for the total sample over the two different time horizons and for the
four different expectation questions. To remind the reader: the Publicity
Reaction Coefficient is defined as the ratio of the estimated systematic
variance over the total variance of expectation changes. The estimated
systematic variance equals the variance of expectation changes in high





The PRCs in the first column are estimated exploiting expectation
changes in the high publicity and low publicity periods. To check the
robustness of these results, the PRC estimates in the second column only
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use observations in very-high and very-low publicity periods. How high
and low and very-high and very-low publicity periods are exactly defined
is explained in Section 2.5. In Table 2.A.2 in the appendix one finds
the number of observations used per estimate divided into those from
publicity-poor and those from publicity-rich periods. Throughout this
section, PRC estimates are depicted in normal text when the involved
error variance estimate is based on more than 50 observations. Italic text
displays Publicity Reaction Coefficients that used error variance estima-
tions based on in between 30 and 50 observations. Finally, a PRC is not
displayed whenever less than 30 observations could be used to estimate
the associated error variance.
All but three out of sixteen PRC estimates in Table 2.6 are posi-
Table 2.6: Publicity Reaction Coefficients for the total expectation
changes sample
(I) (II)
Publicity-poor vs. Publicity-very-poor vs.
publicity-rich publicity-very-rich
10 years 20 years 10 years 20 years
Prob. for higher age 6.8% 1.8% 20.3%* -1.7%
(7.6) (9.0) (9.5) (13.4)
Prob. for two year 3.4% -2.2% 16.1%* -4.5%
higher age (7.7) (8.2) (9.5) (12.9)
Prob. for lower age 13.5% 19.5% 20.5% 9.0%
(16.4) (15.6) (21.1) (28.2)
Prob. for two year 10.9% 30.5%* 18.8% 26.4%
lower age (21.6) (16.0) (28.2) (25.6)
Standard errors are bootstrapped and in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
tive, indicating that expectations do change more in periods with a larger
publicity set. The publicity reaction is typically larger when the consid-
ered time horizon is shorter. Moreover, the probabilities that individuals
assign to a lower eligibility age are more sensitive to publicity than the
probabilities they assign to a higher eligibility age. For all subsamples
however at least seventy percent of the variance in expectation changes
was due to random shifts in expectations (as the highest significant PRC-
estimate equals 30.5%). This is emphasized by the fact that only three
PRCs are significantly different from zero.
The subsequent tables report Publicity Reaction Coefficients that
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Table 2.7: PRCs for the probability of a higher eligibility age for five
different age groups
(I) (II)
Publicity-poor vs. Publicity-very-poor vs.
publicity-rich publicity-very-rich
10 years 20 years 10 years 20 years
Age 25-34 42.0%* -9.0% 22.4% -73.7%
(16.2) (29.2) (33.5) (60.6)
Age 35-44 -24.9% -11.2% -9.6% -92.5%
(22.4) (31.9) (31.0) (81.2)
Age 45-54 15.6% 20.1% 33.6%* 39.9%**
(14.5) (14.4) (15.1) (15.8)
Age 55-64 21.7% -6.5% 30.9%* -9.2%
(13.3) (17.9) (15.7) (26.9)
Age >64 -16.1% -8.1% 4.3% 2.1%
(19.0) (19.4) (23.5) (32.6)
Number in italics: error variance based on 30-50 obs
Standard errors are bootstrapped and in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
have been estimated for different partitions of the total sample. To be
relatively concise, results are only shown for the higher eligibility age
expectations. It should be noted that the subgroup PRC estimates are
conditional on the partition in the specified table only and not on other
characteristics. This is because there are only a limited number of ex-
pectation changes in publicity-poor periods available to estimate the nec-
essary error variance. Estimating the Publicity Reaction Coefficient for
smaller subgroups would render these error variance estimates unreliable.
The number of observations for each estimate in the subsequent tables can
be found in Tables 2.A.3, 2.A.4, 2.A.5, 2.A.6 and 2.A.7 in the appendix.
Table 2.7 reports Publicity Reaction Coefficients for different age
groups. Although it is hard to distinguish a clear pattern in the relation-
ship between age and the reaction to publicity, the middle age category
(between 45 and 54) displays the largest publicity reaction in three out of
four columns. Moreover, the PRC of the middle aged is relatively large
and significant when only the very-low and very-high publicity periods
are taken into account. Interestingly, the subgroup with the lowest - even
negative - publicity reaction are those individuals over the age of 64 that
are already receiving old age social security. It can be argued that once
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Table 2.8: PRCs for the probability of a higher eligibility age for five
different education groups
(I) (II)
Publicity-poor vs. Publicity-very-poor vs.
publicity-rich publicity-very-rich
10 years 20 years 10 years 20 years
Primary -49.1% 27.9% .% .%
(60.8) (26.4) (.) (.)
Vocational secondary 8.7% 0.3% 23.5% 6.6%
(13.0) (16.3) (15.3) (23.7)
General secondary 24.1% -3.1% 40.9%* -2.3%
(19.9) (24.9) (19.9) (42.8)
Vocational tertiary 16.2% -1.2% 5.5% -2.4%
(16.9) (22.9) (30.2) (34.5)
Higher vocational 6.3% 2.2% 10.3% -4.9%
(15.5) (19.0) (21.4) (30.2)
Academic education -25.8% -30.7% 6.4% -58.3%
(31.7) (35.7) (32.9) (68.8)
Number in italics: error variance based on 30-50 obs
No number: error variance based on <30 obs
Standard errors are bootstrapped and in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
someone receives a benefit she is no longer interested in news about the
eligibility age as changes in this policy will not apply to her anymore. The
same mechanism could explain that those in between 55 and 64 display
a significant publicity reaction for a change within ten years (column II)
but not for a change within twenty years.
Table 2.8 reports Publicity Reaction Coefficients for education sub-
samples. There does not appear to be a linear relationship between level
of education and the degree to which a respondent reacts to publicity.
Hardly any of the PRCs are significantly different from zero. What is
striking however is that those respondents who managed to obtain a uni-
versity degree do not respond to publicity at all; their negative PRCs even
indicate that they change their expectations more in publicity-poor than
in publicity-rich periods. Perhaps high educated individuals have such
high-quality initial expectations that information disseminated through
the media does not induce them to change their policy forecasts.
The sample is stratified in five income classes for the estimation of
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Table 2.9: PRCs for the probability of a higher eligibility age for five
different income groups
(I) (II)
Publicity-poor vs. Publicity-very-poor vs.
publicity-rich publicity-very-rich
10 years 20 years 10 years 20 years
Low income 1.0% 27.6%* 25.8% -0.4%
(17.5) (16.6) (17.7) (37.1)
Lower middle 19.2% -11.8% 29.7%* -4.5%
income (15.6) (20.1) (19.4) (33.0)
Middle income -9.0% 3.3% -32.0% -0.1%
(18.4) (19.8) (30.4) (29.8)
High middle 33.7%* -5.7% 37.9%* -1.3%
income (11.7) (23.5) (17.1) (33.6)
High income -2.7% -17.8% 10.3% -23.5%
(19.2) (22.6) (27.7) (35.5)
Number in italics: error variance based on 30-50 obs
Standard errors are bootstrapped and in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
the Publicity Reaction Coefficients in Table 2.9. The ranking of income
subgroups in terms of PRC estimates is rather different over the four
columns. However, the high middle income category displayed the highest
publicity reaction in both ten years-columns, the middle income category
displayed the lowest publicity reaction in these columns and the highest
income category displayed the lowest publicity reaction in both twenty
years-columns. These differences between adjacent groups are surprising
and suggest that several opposing factors influence the relationship be-
tween income and the publicity reaction. A possible explanation for the
low PRCs of the highest income group could be that the future of old age
social security does not interest them as they foresee enough alternative
income sources.
Table 2.10 reports Publicity Reaction Coefficients for media consump-
tion and self-reported political awareness subgroups. While focusing on
newspaper consumption, what catches the attention is that those who
read the newspaper once a week or less have the highest publicity reac-
tion. This is the case for all estimates, except for the ten years-horizon in
the publicity-poor versus the publicity-rich comparison. A similar picture
emerges from the results on individuals’ knowledge of current affairs in
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Table 2.10: PRCs for different media consumption groups
(I) (II)
Publicity-poor vs. Publicity-very-poor vs.
publicity-rich publicity-very-rich
10 years 20 years 10 years 20 years
Average newspaper -9.9% 3.1% 14.7% -6.5%
consumption (11.3) (12.0) (14.2) (19.8)
Low newspaper 30.9% -4.3% 40.8% 9.9%
consumption (27.0) (26.4) (28.0) (31.5)
Average knowledge -5.1% -4.0% 22.4%* -12.3%
of current affairs (12.1) (12.1) (13.6) (19.3)
Low knowledge 14.3% 31.7% -0.6% 34.1%
of current affairs (21.4) (23.8) (32.5) (39.0)
Average television -2.3% 2.1% 20.7% -6.6%
news consumption (11.3) (11.9) (13.2) (18.8)
Low television 13.7% 2.3% .% .%
news consumption (26.2) (34.9) (.) (.)
Number in italics: error variance based on 30-50 obs
No number: error variance based on <30 obs
Standard errors are bootstrapped and in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Dutch politics. Individuals who themselves report that their knowledge
is lower than that of the average Dutchman, display higher Publicity Re-
action Coefficients. This thus means that ill-informed individuals do pick
up on some of the released publicity on the relevant topic and change their
expectations accordingly. At first, these results seem counterintuitive. If
low media consumption is however correlated with low initial knowledge
of old age social security, one can imagine that publicity should induce
more changes in the expectations of the low informed group. The tele-
vision news results are in the same direction, but very imprecise as the
number of respondents who report low television news consumption is
low.
Finally, Table 2.11 shows PRC estimates for a partition of the dataset
into what type of newspaper one most often reads. Four specific cate-
gories are selected: those who obtain most information from free newspa-
pers, those who most often read ‘de Telegraaf’ - a populist/ conservative
newspaper, those who most often read ‘de Volkskrant’ - a progressive
newspaper and those who most often read ‘NRC Handelsblad’ - a liberal
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Table 2.11: PRCs for the probability of a higher eligibility age for five
different newspaper readership groups
(I) (II)
Publicity-poor vs. Publicity-very-poor vs.
publicity-rich publicity-very-rich
10 years 20 years 10 years 20 years
Free newspapers 19.3% 20.3% .% .%
(25.7) (26.9) (.) (.)
De Telegraaf 11.8% 33.4% .% .%
(Populist) (32.9) (21.9) (.) (.)
Volkskrant 0.9% -55.5% .% .%
(Progressive) (35.8) (60.2) (.) (.)
NRC Handelsblad 13.0% -34.5% .% .%
(Liberal) (31.7) (62.5) (.) (.)
Other -20.6% -7.5% -13.7% 13.0%
(15.6) (15.1) (21.7) (20.3)
Number in italics: error variance based on 30-50 obs
No number: error variance based on <30 obs
Standard errors are bootstrapped and in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
newspaper. It turns out that those who only read free newspapers and
those who often read the populist newspaper have the highest, although
insignificant, publicity reactions. This could be because of the specific
wording in and content of the articles, but also because the individuals
that typically read these newspapers have low-quality initial expectations.
Those who read the progressive newspaper do not seem very influenceable
by the media in terms of their expectations. Respondents who are in the
‘other newspaper’ category, which includes regional and smaller national
newspapers, display the smallest publicity reaction.
All in all, the presented Publicity Reaction Coefficients for the differ-
ent demographic and media consumption subgroups paint an interesting
picture. Three groups are identified that do not adapt their expectations
more strongly in high publicity-periods: those over the age of 64, those
with a university degree and the highest income group. The middle aged
respond relatively heavily to publicity in terms of their expectations, just
like those who do not often read a newspaper and those who read free
newspapers or ‘de Telegraaf’. Also the respondents that indicate them-
selves that they know little about Dutch politics display a higher publicity
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reaction. Since the PRC estimates in this section are only conditional on
the characteristic presented in each table, it it unclear what the most im-
portant determinants of differential publicity reaction are. More research
will be needed to uncover this.
Two explanations of these results come to mind that probably both
explain some part of reality. Both involve the publicity set Θt that in-
dividuals use as an input in their expectations formation process. First,
generally less-informed groups are more susceptible to repetitions of old
news in the media, Φt. The quality of the initial expectations of those
with a university degree and the highest income groups is probably higher
than the quality of expectations of, say, those who do not often read a
newspaper. If the publicity set contains mostly ‘old’ news those who did
not pay enough attention to the news before, should respond to these
publicity items by shifting their expectations up or down, depending on
which old news elements they absorbed over the last period. Second, as
mentioned before, some groups have lower stakes in the future of the old
age social security eligibility age so that they will hardly pay attention
to the relevant publicity set Θt. Those already receiving a benefit and
those who are financially well-off probably do not suffer much when the
eligibility age goes up and hence will ignore news on the matter.
2.6.3 Variance in expectation change error terms ex-
plained
A side product of the estimation of the Publicity Reaction Coefficients is
that one can analyze individuals’ reporting errors by investigating their
expectation changes in the publicity-poor periods. Table 2.12 presents
estimation results for regressing the log of squared expectation changes
in the low publicity periods as defined in Section 2.5 on several demo-
graphic characteristics. Changes in expectations are assumed to be draw-
ings from the reporting error variance here and the presented regressions
thus capture the factors that influence heteroscedasticity. The regression
coefficients will explain which groups are more likely to provide erroneous
expectation answers.
The age group dummies turn out to be among the few significant
covariates in explaining how error-prone individuals are. Typically, the
younger the respondent the lower the error variance is. This means that
especially those over 64 are more inclined to randomly shift their expec-
tations up and down, even if no publicity forces them to do so. In the
twenty years-horizon regression, the group of people between 35 and 44
46
Chapter 2. Have You Heard the News?
Table 2.12: Coefficients and standard errors of OLS models. Dependent
variable: logarithm of squared expectation changes in publicity-poor pe-
riods.
(I) (II)
10 years 20 years
Coef. S.e. Coef. S.e.
Age 25-34 -1.530*** (0.390) -0.217 (0.420)
Age 35-44 -0.492 (0.364) -0.701* (0.409)
Age 45-54 -0.718* (0.331) -0.435 (0.368)
Age 55-64 -0.706* (0.337) 0.300 (0.364)
Vocational secondary -0.248 (0.503) -0.362 (0.528)
General secondary 0.210 (0.535) -0.687 (0.620)
Vocational tertiary -0.464 (0.532) -0.627 (0.555)
Higher vocational -0.208 (0.521) -0.841 (0.562)
Academic education -0.184 (0.609) -0.291 (0.638)
Low middle income 0.001 (0.365) 0.956** (0.412)
Middle income 0.106 (0.376) 0.929* (0.431)
High middle income -0.329 (0.377) 0.517 (0.464)
High income -0.400 (0.446) 0.549 (0.552)
Dummy female -0.095 (0.259) 0.228 (0.292)




Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the individual level
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Base categories: primary education, age >64, low income
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years old is the only that is significantly less error-prone than the elderly.
Income also matters significantly in explaining mistakes in the second col-
umn. Those with lower middle incomes and middle incomes have higher
estimated error variances. In general, the explanatory power of these re-
gressions is low, indicating that there is large individual heterogeneity in
the prediction error variances.
2.7 Conclusion
As empirical evidence is accumulating that subjective expectations influ-
ence economic decision-making and that these expectations are sometimes
biased, it becomes policy-relevant to know how to influence individuals’
expectations. It is likely in this respect that information in the media
affects how people feel about the future. This chapter analyzes the role
of public information dissemination, or publicity, in a real-life expecta-
tions formation process. More specifically: I estimate the degree to which
different demographic and media consumption groups adapt their expec-
tations to publicity about the relevant random variable.
To examine demographic differences in the publicity reaction, one
needs data of an expectation on which private information has no in-
fluence in order to circumvent identification problems. I therefore use
the Pensionbarometer, a unique monthly dataset of expectations on the
Dutch old age social security eligibility age. As the relevant media atten-
tion differed substantially over the survey period, I am able to estimate
the proportion of the variance in the eligibility age expectation changes
that can be attributed to publicity (the Publicity Reaction Coefficient -
PRC) without making strong assumptions on the expectations formation
process.
My findings are in line with other empirical papers that suggest me-
dia intensity affects the precision and updating of inflation expectations
(Carroll, 2003, and Lamla and Lein, 2008). For the total population,
the publicity reaction in eligibility age expectations is estimated to be in
between zero and thirty percent. Rather than publicity, random shifts
thus explain the majority of the variance in changes in eligibility age
expectations, with especially older individuals being more imprecise in
their expectation reports. The differences in the publicity reaction among
subgroups are considerable however. The middle-aged, those who infre-
quently read newspaper and those who know little about Dutch politics
are found to have a relatively high publicity reaction. This can be under-
stood if the majority of newspaper articles about old age social security
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contains ‘old news’ rather than real information revelations. It is after
all likely that those with lower quality initial expectations adapt their
expectations more whenever already available information is repeated in
the media. Moreover, I find that those over the age of 64 and high income
individuals do not adapt their expectations more often in publicity-high
periods. It seems as if those with low stakes in the future of the old age
social security eligibility age pay little attention to publicity on the mat-
ter.
Provided that the explanations that I propose for my PRC results are
valid, policy-makers could learn the following about publicity and expec-
tations formation. On the one hand, those who have low quality initial
expectations are easily influenced by whatever appears on the subject in
newspapers and on television. If policy-makers would like to influence
the expectations of the weaker informed group it would be wise to often
repeat high-quality information in the media so that eventually even this
group hears the news. On the other hand, those who feel they have lit-
tle to do with the expectation at hand are hard to influence by public
information dissemination, as they will choose to ignore the news. This
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Figure 2.A.2: Interquartile range for probability assigned to higher eligi-
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19 2006 13-mei No No No No
23 2006 10-jun No No No No
29 2006 22-jul 2-apr No No Yes Yes
33 2006 19-aug 14-mei No No Yes Yes
38 2006 23-sep 11-jun No No Yes Yes
42 2006 21-okt 23-jul No No Yes Yes
46 2006 18-nov 20-aug No No Yes Yes
50 2006 16-dec 24-sep No No Yes Yes
54 2007 13-jan 22-okt No No Yes No
58 2007 10-feb 19-nov No No Yes No
62 2007 9-mrt 17-dec No No No No
67 2007 13-apr 14-jan No No No No
72 2007 18-mei 11-feb Yes No No No
76 2007 15-jun 10-mrt Yes Yes No No
80 2007 13-jul 14-apr Yes No No No
85 2007 17-aug 19-mei Yes Yes No No
89 2007 14-sep 16-jun Yes Yes No No
93 2007 12-okt 14-jul Yes No No No
98 2007 16-nov 18-aug No No No No
102 2007 14-dec 15-sep Yes No No No
107 2008 19-jan 13-okt Yes No No No
111 2008 16-feb 17-nov No No No No
115 2008 15-mrt 15-dec No No Yes Yes
119 2008 12-apr 20-jan No No Yes No
125 2008 24-mei 17-feb No No Yes No
128 2008 14-jun 16-mrt No No No No
132 2008 12-jul 13-apr No No No No
137 2008 16-aug 25-mei No No No No
141 2008 13-sep 15-jun No No No No
146 2008 18-okt 13-jul No No No No
150 2008 15-nov 17-aug No No No No
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Table 2.A.2: Number of observations in estimation of Publicity Reaction
Coefficients for the total expectation changes sample
(I) (II)
Publicity-poor vs. Publicity-very-poor vs.
publicity-rich publicity-very-rich
10 years 20 years 10 years 20 years
Prob. for higher age 1,233 1,155 685 633
(744) (742) (302) (273)
Prob. for two year 1,232 1,154 684 632
higher age (744) (736) (302) (272)
Prob. for lower age 1,232 1,152 684 631
(742) (734) (301) (271)
Prob. for two year 1,231 1,152 683 631
lower age (741) (733) (301) (270)
Observations in publicity-poor periods in parentheses
Table 2.A.3: Number of observations in estimation of PRCs for the prob-
ability of a higher eligibility age for five different age groups
(I) (II)
Publicity-poor vs. Publicity-very-poor vs.
publicity-rich publicity-very-rich
10 years 20 years 10 years 20 years
Age 25-34 166 150 95 83
(103) (97) (48) ( 34)
Age 35-44 231 186 133 98
(116) (117) (38) (38)
Age 45-54 304 268 166 155
(177) (198) (81) (86)
Age 55-64 279 281 146 150
(185) (173) (71) (59)
Age >64 253 270 145 147
(163) (157) (64) (56)
Observations in publicity-poor periods in parentheses
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Table 2.A.4: Number of observations in estimation of PRCs for the prob-
ability of a higher eligibility age for five different education groups
(I) (II)
Publicity-poor vs. Publicity-very-poor vs.
publicity-rich publicity-very-rich
10 years 20 years 10 years 20 years
Primary 53 68 31 37
(43) (47) (18) (19 )
Vocational secondary 341 312 196 174
(232) (207) (89) (78)
General secondary 127 151 71 84
(83) (85) (40) (22)
Vocational tertiary 258 233 136 135
(146) (143) (48) (51)
Higher vocational 299 264 171 139
(156) (180) (77) (71)
Academic education 155 127 80 64
(84) (80) (30) (32)
Observations in publicity-poor periods in parentheses
Table 2.A.5: Number of observations in estimation of PRCs for the prob-
ability of a higher eligibility age for five different income groups
(I) (II)
Publicity-poor vs. Publicity-very-poor vs.
publicity-rich publicity-very-rich
10 years 20 years 10 years 20 years
Low income 252 204 149 118
(150) (124) (61) (43)
Lower middle 223 255 138 131
income (151) (142) (66) (44)
Middle income 244 207 133 119
(159) (178) (56) (62)
Higher middle 256 224 134 125
income (130) (161) (62) (68)
High income 244 256 127 136
(150) (136) (57) (56)
Observations in publicity-poor periods in parentheses
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Table 2.A.6: Number of observations in estimation of PRCs for the prob-
ability of a higher eligibility age for newspaper consumption and self-
reported political awareness
(I) (II)
Publicity-poor vs. Publicity-very-poor vs.
publicity-rich publicity-very-rich
10 years 20 years 10 years 20 years
Average newspaper 676 627 355 313
consumption (397) (421) (153) (147)
Low newspaper 119 128 58 67
consumption (55) (78) (18) (31)
Average television 712 681 375 340
news consumption (408) (450) (151) (162)
Low television 83 74 38 40
news consumption (44) (49) (20) (16)
Average informedness 662 640 340 328
(384) (425) (145) (151)
Low informedness 133 115 73 52
(68) (74) (26) (27)
Observations in publicity-poor periods in parentheses
Table 2.A.7: Number of observations in estimation of PRCs for the prob-
ability of a higher eligibility age for five different newspaper readership
groups
(I) (II)
Publicity-poor vs. Publicity-very-poor vs.
publicity-rich publicity-very-rich
10 years 20 years 10 years 20 years
Free newspapers 80 91 49 53
(55) (56) (20) (28)
De Telegraaf 89 86 40 48
(Populist) (47) (49) (21) (15)
De Volkskrant 78 65 37 28
(Progressive) (46) (59) (15) (24)
NRC Handelsblad 50 57 28 26
(Liberal) (40) (31) (18) (7)
Other 459 405 243 196
(241) (280) (90) (94)









After several industrialized countries had installed old age social security
in the 1940s and 1950s, economists wondered what the effect of these new
institutions would be on private savings. A large literature developed
that was interested in to what extent public pension schemes crowded
out private pension savings. More than fifty years after most Western
governments introduced Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) pension schemes, gov-
ernments no longer discuss the adornment but rather the demolition of
these systems. Particularly the ageing of populations has recently put
pressure on policy-makers to cut down on the generosity of their pub-
lic pension schemes, creating policy uncertainty in first pillar pensions.
Therefore, it is now relevant to investigate the response of private savings
to a (possible) dismantlement of old age social security.
This chapter tries to answer this question focusing on potential future
changes rather than on changes that have already been implemented. Do
people sufficiently prepare for the policy changes in PAYG pensions that
1Thanks to Arthur van Soest, Frederic Vermeulen, James Banks, Rob Alessie,
Norma Coe, Katie Carman, Gema Zamarro and several seminar participants for useful
comments and suggestions.
3.1. Introduction
they anticipate? In addition to discovering more about the relationship
between public and private pension schemes, this chapter thus also ana-
lyzes individuals’ capacity to assess how likely policy alterations are and
on their capacity to respond accordingly. Knowing whether their citi-
zens are indeed capable of mitigating the negative effects of these policy
changes is essential for all governments, and in particular for those that
are currently deciding upon policy changes in their old age social secu-
rity system. The empirical association between subjective expectations
regarding two different policy changes and private pension participation
is examined for The Netherlands. Though nothing can be concluded on
causality, those who are more convinced of future deteriorations are indeed
more likely to participate in a private pension fund. These findings sug-
gest that positive probabilities of a deterioration in social security ‘crowd
in’ private pension savings. I define crowding in here as an increase in
private savings, in analogy to crowding out which in this context refers
to a decrease in private savings due to the installment of old age social
security.
In this introduction, some of the relevant literature is discussed. Fur-
thermore, important features of the Dutch pension system are explained.
Section 3.2 then sets out a theoretical model of optimal savings under
uncertainty over the future of the old age social security system. Subse-
quently, Section 3.3 explains the estimation strategy and includes a de-
scription of the data used in the empirical analysis. Section 3.4 presents
the estimation results. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes and gives some pol-
icy advice.
3.1.1 The crowding-in of private savings
A relationship between savings and social security was first empirically
revealed by Feldstein in 1974. He used aggregate time series to show
that social security wealth had halved the rate of private savings in the
US. Feldstein argued that consumers had lowered savings because they
would be receiving a certain income from PAYG-benefits in retirement.
This ‘crowding out’ effect of old age social security has since then been
addressed by many scholars using both macro- and micro-data sources.
Results based on individual information provide weak to strong evidence
of crowding out effects in various industrialized countries. See Kotlikoff
(1979) for the U.S., Jappelli (1995) and Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003)
for Italy, Guariglia and Markose (2000) and Attanasio and Rohwedder
(2003) for the U.K. and Alessie, Kapteyn and Klijn (1997), Euwals (2000)
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and Kapteyn, Alessie and Lusardi (2003) for The Netherlands.
In 1974, when Feldstein published his paper, the outlook on the future
of social security was very optimistic, as the following quote indicates.
“The history of social security shows continually rising benefit
levels, a fact that individuals no doubt perceive when they con-
template the order of magnitude of their benefits at retirement
age.” (p. 911)
Since the publication of Feldstein’s article, increased awareness of ageing
altered this outlook on publicly provided old age pensions in most West-
ern countries. An illustration of this can be found in Dominitz, Manski
and Heinz (2002 and 2003), who have described expected eligibility for
U.S. old age social security using data from the Survey of Economic Ex-
pectations (SEE) for 1999 to 2002. They find that a substantial number
of respondents believe that the U.S. social security system will collapse
entirely within the foreseeable future. In this chapter I show that many
Dutch individuals are also pessimistic about the future of Dutch old age
social security.
Taking these expectations into account, this chapter investigates the
crowding in effect of uncertainty in social security on private savings. In
analogy to Martin Feldstein’s crowding out effect, a crowding in effect
refers to increases in private wealth because of a possible dismantlement
of the social security system. To my knowledge, the effects of a potential
degeneration of the social security system on wealth accumulation have
not been assessed so far.
3.1.2 Expectations measured in subjective probabil-
ities
In this study the response to expectations is analyzed by exploiting vari-
ation in the subjective probabilities individuals assign to policy changes.
The analysis of explicit subjective expectations is a popular new field of
research in economics. Manski (2004) provides an overview of the use
of subjective probabilities in modern economics. Individuals seem sur-
prisingly able to translate their knowledge on the idiosyncratic risk they
face into a probability that is equal to the ex-post realized probability.
For example, Hurd and McGarry (2002) find that elderly who die within
two years of participating in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS)
had reported a much smaller probability of surviving until the age of 75
than those who actually survived. Subjective probabilities concerning the
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future occurrence of a change in the social security system will be the in-
dependent variables of interest here.
The relationship between subjective expectations and individual sav-
ings behavior is analyzed by e.g. Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese (1992)
and Stephens (2004). Guiso et al. use a subjective measure of income un-
certainty in order to quantify the size of precautionary savings. Stephens
examines whether job loss expectations affect savings behavior and does
not find any effect. He argues this could be because of probability weight-
ing in a loss aversion context (see Bowman et al., 1999) so that individuals
with very small job loss probabilities actually over-weight these.
3.1.3 Old age social security in The Netherlands
The Netherlands has a hybrid pension system. All three traditional pil-
lars - the mandatory public pillar, the mandatory occupational pillar and
the voluntary private pillar - are of considerable importance in providing
an income for the elderly when compared to other countries (see Boersch-
Supan, 2004 for more information). The first pillar has a Pay-As-You-Go
character, while the second and third pillars are capital funded.
Most employees are obliged to participate in the second pillar, the oc-
cupational pension schemes. Annuitization of their assets is compulsory
and there is little freedom over the investment choices. The most common
formal third pillar pension products are the so-called ‘lijfrente-polissen’
(translated as life-interest contracts) and ‘koopsom-polissen’ (translated
as lumpsum life-interest contracts). Consumers can buy these annuities
from banks and insurers either through regular contributions (life-interest)
or through the deposit of a lump-sum (lumpsum life-interest). Contribu-
tions to second and third pillar pensions schemes are to a certain degree
tax-deductible. Private wealth that is accumulated outside of these des-
ignated pension schemes could be called the informal third pillar.
The old age social security arrangement in The Netherlands, the Al-
gemene Ouderdomswet (AOW), was established in 1957 to provide a base
pension for all inhabitants. Designed on Beveridge’s principle, the eligibil-
ity for and level of AOW benefits does not depend on contributions paid,
income or wealth, only on years of residence in The Netherlands. For
each year one has legally resided in The Netherlands between the ages of
15 and 65, one receives two percent of the maximum AOW amount from
the age of 65 onwards, irrespective of retirement. The real level of AOW
benefits has remained stable since 1979, at approximately seventy percent
of the minimum wage. The net level of a couple’s combined AOW ben-
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efits equals the net minimum wage. In 2007, this came down to a gross
monthly allowance of EUR 945 for singles and EUR 648 for pensioners
with a partner2.
Ageing as well as changing economic and political circumstances trig-
gered discussions on the sustainability of PAYG-pensions from the late
1970s onwards. The historical Dutch policy debate is summarized by Van
Eekelen (2006). Despite this debate the old age social security arrange-
ment has remained roughly the same as it was when introduced in 1957.
The fact that the PAYG-system is so universal, i.e. each individual
in principle receives the same benefits, provides a great research environ-
ment. The expectations individuals form over the future of the system
thus all relate to the exact same thing and are not confounded by idiosyn-
cratic risk factors. In contrast, the expectations regarding eligibility for
U.S. social security reported in Dominitz et al. (2003) combine expecta-
tions about macro (such as policy uncertainty) and micro risks (such as
unexpected income shocks).
3.2 Theoretical model
The life-cycle model developed here is a three-period model of consump-
tion. All individuals live for three periods. Individuals just face two
decisions in their life; what to save in the first period (Si) and what to
consume out of these savings in the second period (zi). Labor supply
and retirement are thus exogenous. This assumption is a simplification
of reality, but endogenous retirement would not greatly change my re-
sults3. In the first period everybody is young and working. Workers
receive individual-specific wages (Ii), which are larger than one for ev-
eryone. All individuals are retired in periods two and three. I assume a
2The system is financed through an earmarked payroll tax, which constitutes 17.9%
on the first EUR 30,000 of gross income. Those over 64 do not pay this tax as they
are already receiving benefits. In 1997 the AOW tax rate was legally capped so that
the remainder of AOW expenditures are now financed through general taxes which
are also paid by retirees with a substantial pension income. Whereas in 2001 still all
expenditures were financed through the payroll tax, in 2006 this decreased to 70% of
AOW expenditures.
3If labor supply is an additive function of the utility derived from potential labor
income and the disutility experienced from working and if labor demand is a function
of workers’ productivity, the age at which people retire is independent of the - universal
and uniform - PAYG benefit. However, if utility would have a non-additive functional
form the retirement age could depend on when and how much benefits an individual
receives in the future.
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standard additive model as in Browning and Lusardi (1996) that allows
for a precautionary savings motive, as this provides clear and plausible
results. Lifetime utility therefore additive has a logarithmic functional
form.
There exists a government that pays out a fixed old age social secu-
rity benefit (P ) to all citizens. The government raises both a general
consumption tax τ and an additional consumption tax θ that equals the
contribution to the old age social security system. I choose a consumption
tax in order to mirror the tax-deductible nature of pension savings. In-
dividuals that receive a pension benefit do not contribute to the pension
system, although they do pay general taxes. Hence, there is a Pay-As-
You-Go pension system in place. Note that the government can run a
deficit as I assume there exists a financial fund that gathers the excess
contributions or pays the excess benefits. For simplicity, it is impossible
to leave a bequest in the model and the market interest rate and the dis-
count rate offset each other. Like in the real world, individuals cannot
borrow against future old age social security benefits so first period sav-
ings should be nonnegative (Si ≥ 0).
In the status quo, policy option A, the government pays out the PAYG
benefit of level P to all citizens in both periods two and three. The util-
ity functions for all three periods in the status quo are displayed in the
equations below.
uA1 = ln((1− (τ + θ))(Ii − Si))
uA2 = ln((1− τ)(zi + P ))
uA3 = ln((1− τ)(Si − zi + P ))
Note that the lifetime utility maximization problem can be solved us-
ing backward induction; first maximizing over zi and then over Si. For
expositional reasons I will therefore substitute zi by the optimal consump-
tion out of savings in the second period in the remainder of this section.
One could think of the government’s financial fund running out of money
because of persistently shrinking generations. At first, the status quo
might be maintained as governments can easily borrow on the credit mar-
ket. After some time though, policy-makers could respond to the ageing of
the population by adapting the PAYG pension scheme. The government
would then choose one of the following alternative policy options.
• Option B: providing a lower benefit. Individuals will receive a ben-
efit of (1− λ)P , for 0 < λ < 1.
• Option C: only providing benefits in period three. The government
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will shift the eligibility age upwards: it will only provide benefits of
the original level P in the third period, but not in the second.
Hence, individuals choose an optimal savings level (Si) in the first period
under uncertainty over the state of the world in the second and third
period. The government decides on a policy option after the first period
and this decision is carried out and publicly known in period two and
period three. It seems realistic to assume that the government will not
change any policy rules for those who are already retired (i.e. between
period two and three).
In their first period maximization problem consumers then maximize
utility over savings taking into account the probabilities they individually
assign to the future occurrence of the different policy options. As each
individual is one of many each individual is assumed to be a ‘system-taker’
(think of a price-taker). This means that the subjective probabilities a
single individual assigns to different policy options do not influence the
actual choice of the government.
P (Option A: Status quo) = αi
P (Option B: Lower benefits) = βi
P (Option C: Later benefits) = δi
I will analyze uncertainty about two possible policy changes at a time.
Individuals thus consider only two possible states of the world. First, the
options will be the status quo (policy option A) and a significant policy




ln((1− (τ + θ))(Ii − Si)) + 2(1− βi) ln((1− τ)(1
2
Si + P ))
+2βi ln((1− τ)(1
2
Si + (1− λ)P ))
The solution to this maximization problem can be found in appendix
3.A.1 and involves terms which are difficult to interpret at first sight. For
clarification, a 3D image of optimal savings is drawn with the probability
an individual assigns to lower benefits (βi) on the x-axis and the cut in
the benefit level (λ) on the z-axis in Figure 3.1. The value of the benefit
level, P, is normalized to one here and income is set to twice the benefit
level.
The figure presents intuitive results, such that if the cut in benefit
levels is negligible (i.e. zero) the probability an individual assigns to pol-
icy option B does not affect the savings level. Similarly, if someone does
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Figure 3.1: Optimal savings when there is uncertainty between the status
quo and lower benefits (option B), for different levels of βi and λ.
not assign any positive value to lower benefit levels coming into effect, the
actual size of the cut has no influence on savings. For any positive level
of λ however, savings are increasing in βi, the probability one assigns to
lower benefits. Correspondingly, for any positive level of βi, savings are
increasing in λ, the potential cut in benefits.
When there is only uncertainty between policy options A, the status
quo, and C, an increase in the eligibility age, the maximization problem
can be found below. Note that the sum of αi and δi is assumed to be
equal to one so that potential changes to the benefits level are ignored.
max
Si,zi
ln((1− (τ + θ))(Ii − Si)) + 2(1− δi) ln((1− τ)(1
2
Si + P ))
+2δi ln((1− τ)(1
2
(Si + P )))
The analytical solution to this problem can be found in Appendix
3.A.1. Figure 3.2 graphically represents optimal saving under uncertainty
over the status quo and later benefits, depicting the probability assigned
to later benefits, δi, on the x-axis. The graph, that has income fixed
at twice the benefit level again, is very straightforward. The higher the
probability individuals assign to a shift in the social security eligibility
age, the higher are optimal savings.
Not surprisingly, assigning a positive probability to any ageing-
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Figure 3.2: Optimal savings when there is uncertainty between the status
quo and later benefits (option C), for different levels of δi.
induced policy change in old age social security should lead to higher
savings. This phenomenon could be called crowding in, the opposite of
crowding out as introduced by Feldstein (1974).
From now on, the situation is considered in which the status quo is
no longer sustainable. Saving is analyzed in a world that inhibits uncer-
tainty over which of the two alternative policy options the government
will choose, lower benefits (option B) or later benefits (option C). I there-
fore define γi here as
δi
βi+δi
, so as the ratio of the later benefit expectations
over the sum of the lower and later benefits expectations. Note that this
is necessary in the model as βi and δi can add up to more than one. The
pertaining maximization problem is represented by the equation below.
max
Si,zi
ln((1− (τ + θ))(Ii − Si)) + 2(1− γi) ln((1− τ)(1
2
Si + (1− λ)P ))
+2γi ln((1− τ)(1
2
(Si + P )))
The analytical solution can be found in Appendix 3.A.1, and optimal
savings are graphically presented in Figure 3.3. This graph shows γi, the
ratio of later benefit expectations over the total expectations of any policy
change, on the x-axis and λ, the cut in the benefit-level in case of lower
benefits, on the z-axis.
Figure 3.3 uncovers an interesting pattern. The relationship between
savings and the parameter γi reverses as the benefit cut gets larger. For
low cuts (λ < 0.5), savings increase in γi, as the loss associated with only
benefits in the third period is larger than the loss associated with lower
benefits. For high cuts however (λ > 0.5), savings actually decrease in
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Figure 3.3: Optimal savings when there is uncertainty between lower
benefits (option B) and later benefits (option C), for different levels of γi
and λi.
γi, as the loss associated with later benefits is now smaller than the loss
associated with lower benefits.
The situation in which the government will definitely change the social
security system continues to be investigated here. I will argue that the
level of private pension savings also depends on the interaction between
γi - which policy change a person believes is more likely - and her life
expectancy. In order to do so the parameter for the cut in benefit levels
(λi) is personalized to represent differences in the relative individual loss
associated with lower (option B) or later (option C) benefits. The idea is
that in real-life different survival probabilities render the loss associated
with lower and later benefits different across individuals. For example,
someone who is certain to die between the age of 65 and 67 is likely to
associate a larger loss to a two year increase in the old age benefits eligi-
bility age than to a ten percent cut in the benefits level.
To illustrate this further Figure 3.4 depicts optimal savings for two
groups of individuals: the ‘long-lived’ and the ‘short-lived’. The long-
lived individuals are certain they will live for three periods, while the
short-lived individuals only live for two periods. People know themselves
to what group they belong, but the government has no way of differentiat-
ing between people in terms of the social security benefit. The long-lived
group will therefore receive later benefits with probability γi, while the
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short-lived group will receive no benefit at all with the same probability.
Both groups will receive a benefit of level (1− λi)P with the probability
(1− γi). The analytical expression of optimal savings for the short lived
can be found in the appendix. For simplicity, Figure 3.4 includes results
for a λ equal to 0.40, which corresponds roughly to a real-life cut in ben-
efit levels of ten percent relative to a two-year increase in the eligibility
age.
Figure 3.4: Long-lived and short-lived individuals: Optimal savings when
there is uncertainty between lower benefits and later benefits for different
levels of γi (λ = 0.4).
Figure 3.4 shows that savings for the short-lived are much more sensi-
tive to their subjective expectation γi, representing the relative likelihood
of an increase in the social security eligibility age over a decrease in ben-
efit levels. It can be shown that this difference is larger for higher levels
of the benefit cut, λ.
In the empirical analysis there are thus three notions to check: a)
Private savings, and hence participation in a private pension scheme, are
increasing in the subjective probability individuals assign to lower bene-
fits, βi. b) Private savings, and participation in a private pension scheme,
are also increasing in the subjective probability individuals assign to an
increase in the eligibility age, δi. c) Private savings, and thus participa-
tion in a private pension scheme, are increasing in the relative ‘fear’ for
later benefits (over the sum of lower and later benefits) for short-lived in-
dividuals, that assign themselves a relatively low survival probability. To
investigate these three notions separately, several models are estimated in
Section 3.4.
67
3.3. Estimation strategy and data
3.3 Estimation strategy and data
3.3.1 Estimation strategy
Eight single probit regression models are estimated of voluntary partic-
ipation in a pension scheme. These models all include one or multiple
of the expectation parameters: βi - the probability that benefits will be
lowered-, δi - the probability that the social security eligibility age will
increase - and/or γi - the ratio of δi over the sum of βi and δi. The de-
pendent variable, participation in a voluntary pension scheme, is binary.
The first four estimated models, 1a to 4a, can be found in the equations
below. The last four estimated models, 1b to 4b, are identical to their
respective a-versions but include interactions of the expectations with a
dummy for being subjectively short-lived.
y∗i = ζβ1 ∗ βi + x′iζ + εi (1a)
y∗i = ζδ1 ∗ δi + x′iζ + εi (2a)
y∗i = ζγ1 ∗ γi + ζsum ∗ (βi + δi) + x′iζ + εi (3a)
y∗i = ζβ1 ∗ βi + ζγ1 ∗ γi + x′iζ + εi (4a)
The error terms are all assumed to be i.i.d. drawings from a normal
distribution. This implies that it is assumed that the expectations are
independent of the error terms. The identification of the expectation
coefficients therefore comes from the heterogeneity in expectations among
individuals. Although it is possible that some of the heterogeneity in
expectations involves general pessimism, this probably does not capture
all variation. If pessimism drives everything, the ratio of different policy
change expectations should not have a significant coefficient once the sum
of the policy change expectations is also included. Pessimism should after
all affect the two policy expectations similarly. Nevertheless, I do find
significant results for the ζγ-coefficient in tables 3.2 and 3.3.
3.3.2 Data
For the empirical analysis data from the Dutch Central Bank Households
Savings Survey (DHS), waves 2003 up to 20074 is combined with data
from the Dutch Pensionbarometer, waves May 2006 up to May 2008.
These datasets are both collected by Tilburg University’s CentERdata;
4Earlier years of the DHS are available but not included as no subjective survival
probabilities were administered before 2003.
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the first in cooperation with the Dutch Central Bank and the latter in co-
operation with Netspar, a Network for Studies on Pensions, Ageing and
Retirement. Both datasets are enumerated through the same Internet
panel. Much is done to prevent selection effects. The respondents are ran-
domly selected from the general municipalities’ administration and when
a chosen individual does not have access to the Internet, access is pro-
vided. The surveys enumerate partly overlapping subsets of a large pool
of respondents so that the datasets could be merged on the identification
number of individuals. The information about pension scheme participa-
tion and all independent variables except for the expectations are taken
from the Dutch Central Bank Households Savings Survey. This survey is
designed to investigate savings decisions and enumerates approximately
3000 households each year. The subjective expectations were taken from
the Pensionbarometer which is collected mainly to produce longitudinal
statistics for confidence levels in the Dutch pension system. Every month
on average 500 respondents receive the digital questionnaire although ev-
ery respondent only receives the questions once every three months. This
batch system was introduced to be able to produce the confidence statis-
tics regularly, but not to overwhelm the respondents with questions. In
this chapter, the first twenty-four waves of the Pensionbarometer are used
of which the last was enumerated in April 2008. A total of 2,554 individ-
uals were interviewed. The sample is limited to those individuals between
the ages of 30 and 59 who are participating in a mandatory occupational
pension scheme and who have participated in the Pensionbarometer more
than once. As a result of the merge and my selection, my sample consists
of 3,228 observations and 1,114 individuals.
The dependent variable in the analysis is a dummy on voluntary pen-
sion scheme participation. I have taken this variable as the most indica-
tive of one’s intention to save voluntarily for old age. As could be already
understood from the introduction, most Dutch employees are obliged to
participate in occupational pension schemes and total pension wealth is
therefore not necessarily a reflection of individual savings decisions. Un-
fortunately, I do not have detailed information on the level of contribu-
tions made into the voluntary (nor the mandatory) pension schemes each
year nor of total informal private savings.
The information for this variable is taken from several binary ques-
tions in the DHS that ask about voluntary pension scheme contributions
each year. An example of such a question is “Did you contribute to a
life-interest pension scheme?”. Although there is no specific time horizon
mentioned in this question, respondents seem to interpret it as relating to
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Table 3.1: Percentage of full sample participating in voluntary pension
asset types (N=3,228)
Asset type 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
3rd pillar - life-interest 31% 33% 32% 30% 26%
3rd pillar - lumpsum life-interest 9% 11% 12% 10% 10%
2nd pillar - extra entitlements 1% 2% 1% 2% 1%
2nd pillar - extra payments 2% 2% 1% 1% 1%
One of the above 38% 42% 42% 38% 35 %
N 500 617 697 695 719
a finite time period such as a year. Evidence for this is found in the tran-
sition probabilities from one survey to the next: nineteen percent of my
sample switch from having contributed to a life-interest to not having con-
tributed whereas this would be impossible if respondents would interpret
the question as ever having contributed. The dummy in the regressions
summarizes whether someone contributed to one designated third pillar
pension accounts and/or whether someone voluntarily contributed more
than they were obliged to to their occupational pension fund.
Table 3.1 presents the number of respondents participating in any of
these asset schemes per survey year. The variable in the bottom row,
whether an individual owns any of the asset types above, is used in the
regressions. The most popular voluntary pension savings product is a
so-called life-interest contract, a private pension product that requires
regular contributions. The second most popular pension product is the
lumpsum life-interest contract, a private savings account that is like the
life-interest to a certain degree tax-exempt, but that - as the name sug-
gests - requires a lump-sum contribution. Overall, about forty percent of
my sample owns at least one type of designated voluntary pension assets.
Older individuals (46%) and richer individuals (49%) contribute more
often to pension schemes, but young individuals (32%) and low income
individuals (27%) still contribute quite often.
The most important independent variables in my analysis are those
that represent the policy change expectations, βi and δi. The variables are
based on subjective probability answers taken from the Pensionbarome-
ter collected by Tilburg University’s CentERdata. Every three months
respondents are faced with the following two questions; “What probabil-
ity (between 0 and 100) do you assign to at least ten percent lower real
AOW-benefits within twenty years” and “What probability (between 0
and 100) do you assign to an at least two year higher AOW-eligibility age
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within twenty years”. I use the individual means of the assigned prob-
abilities over the observed 24 monthly waves as my measures for βi and
δi. This is done for two reasons. First, as it is unlikely that consumers
will change their pension plans every three months according to their up-
dated social security beliefs, I am interested in a relatively stable measure
of policy expectations. Second, as Chapter 2 suggests that expectations
are measured with a great deal of noise, individual averages will cancel
some of that noise out.
Histograms of the βi (lower benefits probability) and δi (later benefits
probability) variables are found in Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 respectively.
It can be seen that the mode of βi is lower than that of δi, suggesting that
in general individuals believe that an increase in the eligibility age is the
most likely policy change. This is confirmed when checking the average
expectations (42 with s.d. 24 and 53 with s.d. 24).
Figure 3.7 displays a histogram of γi, the ratio of the estimates of δi
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(later benefits probability) over the sum of βi (lower benefits probability)
and δi. About 34% of individuals assign an equal probability to both
policy changes, but the majority of individuals believes one of the two
is more likely to occur with a larger group considering the eligibility age
increase more likely. The correlation-coefficient of βi and δi actually is
equal to 0.5.
Another important independent variable in the empirical analysis is
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the respondent’s life expectancy, proxied by a dummy on whether some-
one is subjectively short-lived. A binary variable was chosen to render
the estimation results easy to interpret. The variable is constructed from
of a question posed in the Dutch Central Bank Household Savings Sur-
vey that asks “What is the probability - between 1 and 10, that you will
survive up until the age of 75?”. A histogram of answers to this question
can be found in the appendix (Figure 3.A.1). The unconditional mean
of and median of the survival probability are equal to seven, the mode
is equal to eight. In order to construct the short-lived dummy average
probabilities are calculated per age and gender group. A graph of these
average probabilities can be seen in the appendix (graph 3.A.2). The
short-lived dummy is then equal to one if an individual reports a lower
probability than the average of his or her appropriate birth year and gen-
der group. This means that 39% of my sample is classified as short-lived.
Other controls in the pension fund participation regressions include log
gross income, education level, age, a partner dummy, a child dummy and
year dummies. Descriptive statistics for six different sub-samples can be
found in the appendix (tables 4.1 and 4.2).
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Figure 3.7: Histogram of γi (the ratio of the estimates of δi (lower benefits
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3.4 Estimation results
This section discusses the results of the empirical analysis. The appendix
contains a table of standard errors (Table 3.A.3). The Akaike’s informa-
tion criteria of these models can be found in Table 3.4.
Table 3.2 displays the relevant coefficients of all eight probit regressions
of participation in a voluntary pension scheme. All models are estimated
on four different samples; the total sample (column I), the young sample
- those between 30 and 39 (column II), a middle aged sample - those be-
tween 40 and 49 (column III) and a relatively old sample - those between
50 and 59 (column IV). This was done as there is reason to believe that
the degree to which individuals prepare for a policy change in old age
social security is different across ages. One could for example argue that
the larger the number of years to retirement, the weaker the incentive
is to act upon current policy change expectations. Table 3.2 certainly
confirms this notion.
The coefficients for the first three models in the first column estimated
on the entire sample, in which one type of uncertainty is investigated at a
time, illustrate that individuals who assign high policy change probabili-
ties participate more in voluntary pension schemes. This is in accordance
with the first two notions developed in Section 3.2. It seems that model
2a, in which there is only policy uncertainty between the status quo and
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Table 3.2: Coefficients of probit models. Dependent: participation in
voluntary pension scheme. Low age: 30-39 years, Middle age: 40-49 years,
High age: 50-59 years. Interactions are with the short-lived dummy.
Model Variable (I) (II) (III) (IV)
All Low age Middle
age
High age
1a Beta 0.241 -0.075 0.301 0.446
2a Delta 0.507** 0.104 1.139*** 0.443
3a Gamma 0.078 0.263 0.809* -0.319
Beta + Delta 0.269** 0.022 0.572*** 0.307*
1b Beta 0.481* -0.171 0.688* 0.782*
Interaction -0.619* 0.248 -0.992* -0.895*
Short-lived 0.090 -0.27 0.247 0.203
2b Delta 0.339 -0.042 1.213*** 0.127
Interaction 0.454 0.402 -0.193 0.875*
Short-lived -0.414* -0.386 -0.043 -0.610*
3b Gamma -0.315 0.150 0.572 -0.952*
Interaction 1.067* 0.343 0.611 1.694**
Beta + Delta 0.265** 0.021 0.573*** 0.285
Short-lived -0.778** -0.35 -0.499 -1.132**
4a Beta 0.033 -0.162 -0.148 0.306
Delta 0.464** 0.183 1.200*** 0.329
4b Beta 0.411 -0.196 0.256 0.866**
Interaction -1.013*** 0.066 -1.040* -1.600**
Delta 0.168 0.049 1.107** -0.204
Interaction 0.899** 0.381 0.223 1.527**
Short-lived -0.221 -0.398 0.179 -0.313
N 3,228 931 1,097 1,198
Ind 1,114 414 422 439
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level (Table 3.A.3)
All regressions include the short-lived dummy, a constant, log income, education level,
age, a child dummy, a partner dummy and year dummies.
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an increase in the social security eligibility age, explains most variation in
the data. This conclusion can however not be drawn for all age groups.
The young react most to their relative ‘fear’ for a higher eligibility age
(γi), the middle age category reacts very strongly to their higher eligibility
age expectations (δi), whereas the oldest age group responds most to their
lower benefit level expectations (βi). The middle age category apparently
drives the effects in the overall sample as this group displays the strongest
reaction to its policy change expectations. The young on the other hand
do not significantly prepare for the anticipated policy changes.
The models 1b, 2b and 3b furthermore include an interaction term
between the expectations variables and a dummy for being subjectively
short-lived (see Section 3.3 for an explanation of this dummy). In model
1b, where only expectations on the level of benefits is considered, the
interaction effect in the total sample is significant and negative, undoing
the positive effect of the change probability for the short-lived. Only in-
dividuals who believe they have a good chance of being around at age 75
thus prepare for a possible decrease in social security levels. This effect is
clear for those older than 39, but is not present for younger individuals.
In model 2b, where only uncertainty in the eligibility age is considered,
the interaction effect in the entire sample is positive, so that short-lived
individuals react more to their eligibility age expectations. The coeffi-
cient is however not significant as the interaction has an opposite sign
for the middle-aged group. Short-lived individuals between 50 and 59 do
significantly let their voluntary pension scheme contribution depend on
their δi. Focusing on the total sample coefficients in the 3b model, the in-
teraction between being short-lived and the relative fear for an eligibility
age increase is large, positive and significant, exactly as theory predicts.
The model explains that the expected cost of a higher eligibility age is
relatively larger than the cost of lower benefits for individuals that expect
to live shorter than others. The empirical effect is clearly driven by the
oldest age group, probably because the subjective survival probabilities
for this group contain most information.
In model 4a, both policy change expectations are included without the
interactions, which takes away some of the effect of lower benefit expecta-
tions. However, pension scheme participation is still significantly affected
by the probability that the social security eligibility age will go up. Also
in this model, the middle age group reacts most distinctly and those under
forty hardly react at all. In model 4b, both policy change expectations
are included as well as the interactions. The two interactions are both
highly significant in the total sample model. Conditioning on the later
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benefit expectations, short-lived individuals that assign a high probabil-
ity to lower benefits participate less in pension schemes. Conditioning on
the lower benefit expectations, short-lived individuals participate more in
pension schemes when they believe a higher eligibility age is likely. When
considering the results for the young sample only, it becomes clear that
individuals between 30 and 39 do not really prepare for a policy change.
Retirement is apparently too far away for this group to take current pol-
icy change expectations into account when purchasing pension products.
The older two age categories do significantly prepare for policy changes
and the interaction effects of being short-lived are most important for the
oldest group.
Age is not the only demographic characteristic that is used to divide
the sample to estimate the eight models separately. In the last three
columns of Table 3.3 the sample is split in three equal income categories
to investigate how different income groups react to policy change expec-
tations. There is reason to believe that responses will be different because
the Dutch old age social security benefit levels are equal for all (see Sec-
tion 3.1.3) so that concavity of the utility function could lead to a smaller
response to policy change expectations for richer individuals. Column V
displays results for low income-individuals - those who earn less than EUR
25,150 a year -, column VI shows coefficients for middle-income individ-
uals - those with a gross yearly income between EUR 25,150 and EUR
38,100 - and the estimates in column VII use information of high income
individuals - those with a gross yearly income over EUR 38,100. The ap-
pendix contains a table of standard errors (Table 3.A.4) associated to the
displayed coefficients. It turns out that responses indeed vary. Broadly
speaking, rich individuals indeed do not care so much about upcoming
policy changes. The level of social security benefits relative to their own
income probably does not justify any additional action if old age benefits
might be affected. Middle-income individuals respond much more to their
policy change expectations. In particular, the eligibility age expectations
explain a substantial degree of pension scheme participation. Moreover,
the coefficients of the expectation interaction terms with the short-lived
dummy are more significant for those individuals who happen to belong
to the middle-income group. Perhaps this group better realizes how the
two policy options have different effects on short- and long-lived individu-
als. Individuals in the low-income group also seem to participate more in
voluntary pension schemes when they feel that policy changes are likely.
This group is especially worried about the level of pension benefits as
the AOW-benefits constitute a very large part of their expected pension
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income. The interactions with the short-lived dummy are less important.
Table 3.4 provides insights into the fit of the different models for all
seven (sub)samples by displaying Akaike’s information criteria. The cri-
teria can only be compared within each separate (sub)sample. For the
entire sample (column I) model 4b, including both the benefit level (βi)
and eligibility age (δi) expectations as well as the interactions with a
short-lived dummy, is preferred. This is also the case for the middle age,
high age, low income and middle-income sub-samples. For the two sub-
categories that did not display significant reactions in pension scheme
participation according to their policy expectations, the low age and high
income groups, this is not the case. Model 2a is preferred when only an-
alyzing young individuals and model 4a is preferred when only analyzing
the rich, although the differences in the Akaike’s criteria for these two
groups are small.
The regression results thus support the three notions introduced in
Section 3.2. Participation in voluntary pension schemes is higher for those
who assign a high probability to any future change in the PAYG pension
scheme. People’s expectations regarding a shift in the eligibility age are
particularly important. Moreover, conditional on the sum of change ex-
pectations, individuals who believe they do not have a long life and who
also believe that an increase in the eligibility age is more likely than a
decrease in the benefit level, participate more. This can be explained by
the fact that the cost of an eligibility age increase will be relatively larger
to them. These effects are however not equal for all age and income cat-
egories, which can be explained by different time horizons, variation in
the relative financial importance of AOW-benefits and differences in the
informational value of subjective survival probabilities.
3.5 Conclusion
From the 1960s and 1970s onwards economists have been anxious to know
whether private savings in industrialized countries had been crowded out
by the installment of old age social security systems in the decades before.
The future of Pay-As-You-Go pension schemes seemed prosperous at the
time and most studies took “continually rising benefit levels (Feldstein,
1974, p. 911)” into account. During the last two decades however, both
economists and policy-makers have realized that Western populations are
ageing and that this has consequences for the financial sustainability of
old age social security systems. Governments in many OECD-countries
are now contemplating how to change their public pension schemes so that
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Table 3.3: Coefficients of probit models. Dependent variable: participa-
tion in voluntary pension scheme. Low income: lower than EUR 25,150,
Middle income: EUR 25,150-EUR 38,100, High income: more than EUR
38,100. Interactions are with the short-lived dummy.
Model Variable (I) (V) (VI) (VII)
All Low inc Middle inc High inc
1a Beta 0.241 0.712** 0.333 -0.445
2a Delta 0.507** 0.640* 0.767** 0.136
3a Gamma 0.078 -0.201 0.304 0.268
Beta + Delta 0.269** 0.458** 0.401* -0.092
1b Beta 0.481* 1.010** 0.629* -0.250
Interaction -0.619* -0.750 -0.724 -0.548
Short-lived 0.090 0.209 0.218 -0.095
2b Delta 0.339 0.448 0.491 0.109
Interaction 0.454 0.510 0.710 0.081
Short-lived -0.414* -0.399 -0.475 -0.371
3b Gamma -0.315 -0.860* -0.314 0.123
Interaction 1.067* -0.630 1.474* 0.419
Beta + Delta 0.265** 1.286 0.380* -0.090
Short-lived -0.778** -0.860* -0.923* -0.558
4a Beta 0.033 0.544 0.010 -0.590*
Delta 0.464** 0.398 0.762** 0.357
4b Beta 0.411 1.022** 0.518 -0.347
Interaction -1.013*** -1.168* -1.419** -0.689
Delta 0.168 -0.029 0.279 0.237
Interaction 0.899** 1.048* 1.404** 0.353
Short-lived -0.221 -0.195 -0.238 -0.21
N 3,228 1,076 1,076 1,076
Ind 1,114 495 481 421
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level (Table 3.A.4)
All regressions include the short-lived dummy, a constant, log income, education level,
age, a child dummy, a partner dummy and year dummies.
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Table 3.4: Akaike Information Criteria per model and sample
Model Akaike Information Criterion
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII)
All Low age Mid age Hi Age Low inc Mid inc Hi inc
1 4144.8 1127.1 1400.3 1608.2 1212.3 1434.4 1463.7
2 4123.0 1127.0 1362.7 1607.2 1216.5 1417.7 1469.4
3 4131.3 1128.5 1372.5 1603.4 1209.7 1423.8 1469.8
5 4136.9 1128.7 1394.1 1602.0 1209.5 1431.7 1463.4
6 4119.7 1128.0 1364.4 1600.7 1216.4 1415.5 1471.4
7 4119.5 1130.2 1373.1 1589.6 1206.3 1416.8 1471.1
4 4124.9 1128.4 1364.1 1605.9 1210.1 1419.7 1461.9
8 4102.4 1131.4 1360.4 1580.8 1202.5 1405.6 1462.9
N 3,228 931 1,097 1,198 1,076 1,076 1,076
these can last into the (aged) future. Wherever PAYG- pension schemes
are still unaltered there thus exists significant uncertainty about future
pension policies. Therefore, it is now relevant to investigate how indi-
viduals adapt their private savings to a possible dismantlement of public
pension provisions.
In this chapter empirical evidence from The Netherlands shows a posi-
tive relationship between individuals’ expectations about the future of old
age social security and their participation in voluntary pension schemes.
This increased participation is most pronounced for individuals who as-
sign a higher probability to a potential increase in the eligibility age, but
a small positive effect of the subjective probability assigned to a decrease
in benefit levels is also found. Which of these policy options an individual
believes is more likely to occur also matters. Taking the sum of policy
change expectations into account, those who believe that an increase in
the eligibility age is more likely than a decrease in the benefit level par-
ticipate slightly more. This effect is however much stronger for those who
assign themselves a low survival probability, probably because an eligibil-
ity increase implies relatively larger costs for them.
The empirical effects are however not equal for all age and income
categories. The young and those with a relatively high income do not
seem to prepare much for a policy change, regardless of how likely they
believe such a change will be. Retirement is perhaps too far away for
those between 30 and 39 to take current policy expectations into account
in their savings decisions. Rich individuals on the other hand probably
do not care about the future of public pension benefits as these benefits
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only amount to a small fraction of their anticipated pension income. The
middle-aged and those in the middle-income category seem particularly
concerned with an increase in the social security eligibility age, whereas
the low-income group responds to a greater extent to their benefit level
expectations. The latter makes sense as social security benefits are by
far the largest part of anticipated pension income for this group. The
different effects for short- and long-lived individuals are most pronounced
in the oldest group and in the middle-income group. Apparently, these
groups are better aware of the differential impact of later and lower ben-
efits on different survival groups.
Policy-makers and politicians can learn two things from the above
results. First, as people’s policy expectations matter for their savings
behavior, these expectations should be managed with care to the extent
that this is possible. The public debate on the future sustainability of old
age social security supposedly influences policy expectations and there-
fore concern should only be raised if this is somehow justified. Second,
the results suggest that wealth effects of policy changes in old age social
security will partly be offset by individuals’ private pension savings. This
finding encourages governments to actually carry out necessary changes
to the PAYG pension-system if these are generally expected anyhow.
Although my empirical results are suggestive, the case for a crowd-
ing in effect would be stronger if the same results would be replicated
using level of savings data and longitudinal expectations date, enabling
more specific and causal inference respectively. Evidence from other coun-
tries about the effect of the (potential) degeneration of the PAYG-pension
scheme on private savings is also essential to draw definitive conclusions
about the crowding in of savings by policy uncertainty in first pillar pen-
sions. The relatively new SHARE dataset, that collects identical infor-
mation in several European countries, could be ideal for this purpose.
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3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Algebraic results
This appendix displays optimal savings equations resulting from the model
described in Section 3.2.
The following savings level is optimal when the government chooses
between the status quo (A) with probability (1 − βi) and lower benefits




(−8P + 2Ii + 6Pλ− 4Pβiλ+
√
((−8P + 2Ii + 6Pλ− 4Pβiλ)2+
12(−4P 2 + 4PIi + 4P 2λ− 4PIiλ + 4PIiβiλ)))
Normalizing the benefit level P to be equal to one and income to be equal




(−4 + 6λ− 4βiλ +
√
(−4 + 6λ− 4βiλ)2 + 12(4− 4λ + 8βiλ))
The savings below are optimal when the government chooses between the
status quo with probability (1− δi) and an increase in the eligibility age




(−5P − 2δiP + 2I+
√
P 2 + 20δiP 2 + 4δ2i P
2 + 4PIi + 16δiPIi + 4I2i )
Normalizing the benefit level P to be equal to one and income to be equal






25 + 52δi + 4δ2i )
The following equation displays optimal savings when there will certainly
be a policy change but it is uncertain which option the government will
choose, either lower benefits with probability (1 − γi) or an increase in
the eligibility age with probability γi =
δi
δi+αi




(−5P + 2Ii − 2Pγi + 2Pλ + 4Pγiλ+
√
((−5P + 2Ii − 2Pγi + 2Pλ + 4Pγiλ)2+
12(−2P 2 + 2PIi + 2PIiγi + 2P 2λ− 4PIiγiλ)))
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Normalizing the benefit level P to be equal to one and income to be equal




(−1− 2γi + 2λ + 4γiλ+
√
12(2 + 4γi + 2λ− 8γiλ) + (−1− 2γi + 2λ + 4γiλ)2)
(1)
The equation for optimal savings of short-lived individuals (those that
know they will die after the second period) when there is uncertainty be-
tween policy option B (lower benefits) and policy option C (later benefits)




(−P + Ii − Pγi + Pλ + Pγiλ+
√
(−P + I − Pγi + Pλ + Pγiλ)2 + 8(PIiγ − PIiγiλ))
Normalizing the benefit level P to be equal to one and income to be equal




(1− γi + λ + γiλ +
√
8(2γi − 2γiλ) + (1− γi + λ + γiλ)2)
(2)
3.A.2 Figures and tables
82
Chapter 3. Preparing for Policy Changes











0 2 4 6 8 10
Prob. that you will turn 75 eventually
Figure 3.A.2: Lowess smoothing graph of average survival probabilities
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Table 3.A.1: Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables
in the estimations for different age groups.
Variable (II) (III) (IV)
Low age Middle age High age
Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd
Dummy pension particip. 0.321 0.467 0.365 0.482 0.463 0.499
Prob. of lower benefits (βi) 0.442 0.230 0.426 0.238 0.395 0.247
Prob. of later benefits (δi) 0.539 0.227 0.531 0.230 0.529 0.261
Ratio later over lower (γi) 0.557 0.144 0.567 0.163 0.580 0.185
Sum of expectations 0.981 0.395 0.957 0.392 0.924 0.428
Dummy for short-lived 0.408 0.492 0.388 0.488 0.384 0.487
Log of gross income 9.904 1.843 9.742 2.346 9.934 2.149
Age 34.290 2.821 44.813 2.814 54.325 2.827
Dummy for female 0.437 0.496 0.428 0.495 0.356 0.479
Dataset 2003 0.148 0.356 0.160 0.367 0.155 0.362
Dataset 2004 0.189 0.392 0.203 0.403 0.182 0.386
Dataset 2005 0.218 0.413 0.215 0.411 0.215 0.411
Dataset 2006 0.205 0.404 0.213 0.410 0.225 0.418
Dataset 2007 Omitted category
Primary education Omitted category
Secondary education 0.226 0.418 0.342 0.475 0.421 0.494
Vocational education 0.293 0.455 0.248 0.432 0.163 0.370
Tertiary education 0.456 0.498 0.377 0.485 0.383 0.486
Other education 0.021 0.145 0.010 0.100 0.002 0.041
Dummy for child 0.534 0.499 0.603 0.490 0.358 0.480
Dummy for partner 0.716 0.451 0.754 0.431 0.762 0.426
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Table 3.A.2: Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables
in the estimations for different income groups.
Variable (V) (VI) (VII)
Low inc Middle inc High inc
Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd
Dummy pension particip. 0.267 0.442 0.407 0.492 0.493 0.500
Prob. of lower benefits (βi) 0.421 0.253 0.430 0.241 0.405 0.224
Prob. of later benefits (δi) 0.538 0.249 0.549 0.239 0.511 0.233
Ratio later over lower (γi) 0.573 0.168 0.569 0.168 0.564 0.165
Sum of expectations 0.959 0.429 0.979 0.407 0.917 0.381
Dummy for short-lived 0.415 0.493 0.389 0.488 0.373 0.484
Log of gross income 8.377 3.198 10.367 0.108 10.836 0.265
Age 44.849 8.650 44.612 8.701 46.482 8.211
Dummy for female 0.724 0.447 0.335 0.472 0.152 0.360
Dataset 2003 0.164 0.370 0.147 0.354 0.154 0.361
Dataset 2004 0.192 0.394 0.185 0.388 0.196 0.397
Dataset 2005 0.213 0.409 0.225 0.418 0.210 0.408
Dataset 2006 0.207 0.406 0.237 0.425 0.202 0.401
Dataset 2007 Omitted category
Primary education Omitted category
Secondary education 0.442 0.497 0.356 0.479 0.215 0.411
Vocational education 0.295 0.456 0.246 0.431 0.148 0.355
Tertiary education 0.209 0.407 0.370 0.483 0.627 0.484
Other education 0.010 0.101 0.019 0.135 0.002 0.043
Dummy for child 0.562 0.496 0.436 0.496 0.478 0.500
Dummy for partner 0.798 0.401 0.675 0.469 0.765 0.424
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Table 3.A.3: Coefficients and standard errors of probit models. Depen-
dent variable: participation in voluntary pension scheme.
Model Variable All Low age Middle
age
High age
1a Beta 0.241 -0.075 0.301 0.446
(0.159) (0.268) (0.269) (0.260)
2a Delta 0.507 0.104 1.139 0.443
(0.163) (0.281) (0.286) (0.246)
3a Gamma 0.078 0.263 0.809 -0.319
(0.238) (0.448) (0.410) (0.345)
Beta + Delta 0.269 0.022 0.572 0.307
(0.097) (0.164) (0.170) (0.150)
1b Beta 0.481 -0.171 0.688 0.782
(0.191) (0.349) (0.327) (0.314)
Interaction -0.619 0.248 -0.992 0.895
(0.268) (0.462) (0.450) (0.448)
Short-lived 0.090 -0.270 0.228 0.205
(0.132) (0.223) (0.228) (0.205)
2b Delta 0.339 -0.042 1.213 0.127
(0.191) (0.351) (0.343) (0.285)
Interaction 0.454 0.402 -0.193 0.875
(0.289) (0.470) (0.528) (0.446)
Short-lived -0.414 -0.386 -0.043 -0.610
(0.172) (0.277) (0.312) (0.260)
3b Gamma -0.315 0.150 0.572 -0.952
(0.267) (0.543) (0.470) (0.390)
Interaction 1.067 0.343 0.611 1.694
(0.422) (0.740) (0.749) (0.650)
Beta + Delta 0.265 0.021 0.573 0.285
(0.098) (0.164) (0.170) (0.153)
Short-lived -0.778 0.350 -0.499 -1.132
(0.252) (0.435) (0.449) (0.393)
4a Beta 0.033 -0.162 -0.148 0.306
(0.176) (0.301) (0.295) (0.286)
Delta 0.464 0.183 1.200 0.329
(0.179) (0.316) (0.312) (0.270)
4b Beta 0.411 -0.196 0.256 0.866
(0.210) (0.390) (0.360) (0.336)
Interaction -1.013 0.066 -1.040 -1.600
(0.305) (0.530) (0.524) (0.497)
Delta 0.168 0.049 1.107 -0.204
(0.209) (0.395) (0.373) (0.304)
Interaction 0.899 0.381 0.223 1.527
(0.323) (0.539) (0.598) (0.483)
Short-lived -0.221 0.398 0.179 -0.313
(0.177) (0.291) (0.320) (0.268)
Standard errors are in parentheses
86
Chapter 3. Preparing for Policy Changes
Table 3.A.4: Coefficients and standard errors of probit models. Depen-
dent variable: participation in voluntary pension scheme.
Model Variable All Low inc Middle inc High inc
1a Beta 0.241 0.712 0.333 -0.445
(0.159) (0.249) (0.259) (0.272)
2a Delta 0.507 0.640 0.767 0.136
(0.163) (0.251) (0.256) (0.76)
3a Gamma 0.078 -0.201 0.304 0.268
(0.238) (0.410) (0.396) (0.383)
Beta + Delta 0.269 0.458 0.401 -0.092
(0.097) (0.144) (0.158) (0.169)
1b Beta 0.481 1.010 0.629 -0.250
(0.191) (0.309) (0.308) (0.326)
Interaction -0.619 -0.750 -0.724 -0.548
(0.268) (0.418) (0.436) (0.484)
Short-lived 0.090 0.209 0.218 -0.095
(0.132) (0.216) (0.224) (0.220)
2b Delta 0.339 0.448 0.491 0.109
(0.191) (0.419) (0.461) (0.522)
Interaction 0.454 0.510 0.710 0.081
(0.289) (0.419) (0.461) (0.522)
Short-lived -0.414 -0.399 -0.475 -0.371
(0.172) (0.257) (0.283) (0.296)
3b Gamma -0.315 -0.860 -0.314 0.123
(0.267) (0.449) (0.441) (0.436)
Interaction 1.067 -0.630 1.474 0.419
(0.422) (0.707) (0.733) (0.711)
Beta + Delta 0.265 1.286 0.380 -0.090
(0.098) (0.144) (0.161) (0.170)
Short-lived -0.778 -0.860 -0.923 -0.558
(0.252) (0.420) (0.429) (0.430)
4a Beta 0.033 0.544 0.010 -0.590
(0.176) (0.290) (0.290) (0.287)
Delta 0.464 0.398 0.762 0.357
(0.179) (0.293) (0.282) (0.294)
4b Beta 0.411 1.022 0.518 -0.347
(0.210) (0.359) (0.339) (0.344)
Interaction -1.013 -1.168 -1.419 -0.689
(0.305) (0.506) (0.521) (0.519)
Delta 0.168 -0.029 0.279 0.237
(0.209) (0.344) (0.328) (0.333)
Interaction 0.899 1.048 1.404 0.353
(0.323) (0.513) (0.530) (0.558)
Short-lived -0.221 -0.195 -0.238 -0.210
(0.177) (0.254) (0.294) (0.311)











This chapter is based on Boone, Van der Wiel and Vermeulen (2009).
4.1 Introduction
Common sense suggests that no two persons, and particularly not one
man and one woman, are alike. And although it can be argued that two
persons that voluntarily form a household will probably do so on the ba-
sis of shared interests and preferences, no one will maintain that married
individuals have identical preferences on all accounts. This means that
(economic) decisions taken jointly in a household will be more compli-
cated than those taken by an individual.
One of the important insights from recent applied microeconometrics
is that multi-person households indeed do not behave as single decision
makers. This single decision maker assumption, which is fundamental to
the standard unitary model of household behavior, is associated with the
1Many thanks to my co-authors Jan Boone and Frederic Vermeulen. Moreover,
thanks to Arthur van Soest, Arie Kapteyn and Tobias Klein, as well as seminar par-
ticipants at Tilburg University, for useful comments and suggestions.
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theoretical implication that observed demand or labor supply should sat-
isfy the well-known Slutsky conditions. Slutsky symmetry and negativity,
though, are usually rejected when confronted with consumption or labor
supply data of households (see Fortin and Lacroix, 1997, Browning and
Chiappori, 1998, Vermeulen, 2005, and Cherchye and Vermeulen, 2008,
for some recent examples). Evidence thus suggests that intra-household
bargaining aspects within multi-person households cannot be ignored.
A number of alternatives to the unitary model have been put for-
ward. One strand in the literature assumes that household members only
choose Pareto efficient allocations. This is either formalized by means of
axiomatic bargaining theory (see, for example, Manser and Brown, 1980,
and McElroy and Horney, 1981) or via the so-called collective model (see
Chiappori, 1988, 1992, and Apps and Rees, 1988). Another strand of
the literature assumes that household members behave non-cooperatively
(see Leuthold, 1968, and Ashworth and Ulph, 1981, for seminal contribu-
tions and Browning, 2000, and Browning, Chiappori and Lechene, 2009,
for more recent work).
One of the main implications of the models that recognize that house-
holds do not behave as single decision makers is that intra-household
allocations may depend on individual resources of household members
rather than on only the household’s aggregate means. A leading empir-
ical example in this respect is that children seem to benefit more when
the mother (or the caring grandmother) brings relatively more financial
resources into the household. This has been consistently shown for both
developed and developing nations (e.g. Lundberg, Pollak and Wales, 1997,
for the U.K., Thomas, Contreras and Frankenberg, 1997, for Indonesia,
and Duflo, 2003, for South Africa). From a policy point of view this de-
pendence on who brings what to the table is very important. It implies
that policy makers can alter the intra-household allocation of resources
through targeted taxes or transfers.
The targeting issue has been investigated in a collective setting (see
Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir, 2005) as well as in a non-cooperative set-
ting. The usual approach in the latter is by considering models that focus
on the private provision of public goods (see, among others, Bergstrom,
Blume and Varian, 1986, Chen and Woolley, 2001, and Lechene and Pre-
ston, 2008). An important restriction in the above non-cooperative mod-
els is that the labor incomes of both the husband and the wife, and thus
the household’s resources, are assumed exogenous. However, it is not dif-
ficult to come up with arguments in favor of more realistic models that
not only describe the intra-household allocation of resources but also the
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generation of these resources themselves.
A first aim of the current study is to fill this gap by focusing on the
private provision of public goods while also taking into account labor sup-
ply decisions and the consequent endogenous individual incomes. We will
start out with the most general model and investigate what could hap-
pen to public goods demand in this set-up. We define three regimes and
show that all Nash equilibria fall in either of these regimes. In the first
regime, the husband is dictator (denoted by HD). More specifically, the
household’s demand for public goods fully reflects the husband’s prefer-
ences given the household’s aggregate resources. The second regime is
associated with split might (SM): each spouse’s preferences are reflected
in the household’s spending on public goods. The extent to which this
happens depends on the spouses’ relative wage rates. Finally, the third
regime is associated with the wife being the dictator (WD).
Like in Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2009), and contrary to
Lundberg and Pollak (1993), the regimes are determined ‘endogenously’
by the spouses’ relative wage rates. The main difference between our
results and those obtained by Browning et al. (2009) is that we do not
have a pure local income pooling phenomenon. In their paper, income
pooling refers to the particular situation in which the allocation of a con-
stant amount of resources is independent of which partner brings these
resources to the table. As labor supply is endogenous in our model, ex-
ogenous shifts in individual income that keep the household’s aggregate
budget fixed are ruled out, and therefore pure income pooling doesn’t
exist. Still, there is some sort of local income pooling in both dictator-
ship regimes: aggregate spending on public goods is as the most powerful
spouse would want it to be.
A second contribution of the current study is that the theoretical
model for the private provision of public goods with endogenous labor
supply will be brought to the data. Contrary to collective models, of
which a wide variety of empirical applications are available, empirical ev-
idence for the private provision of public goods remains scarce. This gap
will be partly filled in our study by means of an empirical model that
focuses on expenditures on children’s goods (such as children’s clothing,
toys or tuition fees). These child related goods are considered to be public
goods inside a household. The empirical model does impose more struc-
ture than the general model, so that we can derive testable implications
against the standard unitary model. The data for the application are
drawn from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) collected by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor. Taking the
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targeting literature into account, we suspect that preferences within the
household regarding spending on children’s goods will differ. We find that
we can reject the standard unitary model in favor of our non-cooperative
approach for couples with two or three children under the age of 18. Using
the estimated preference parameters, we can then divide households into
dictatorship and split might regimes. It turns out that 73% of two-child
and 57% of three-child couples spend according to the wife’s preferences.
The rest of this chapter unfolds as follows. In Section 2, we propose
a general private provision of public goods model with endogenous labor
supply and discuss its implications. Section 3 focuses on the empirical
specification and the estimation strategy, that will be based on a maxi-
mum likelihood approach. The data and estimation results are discussed
in Sections 4 and 5. Section 6 concludes.
4.2 The model
We focus on two adult households where f denotes the wife and m the
husband.2 Spouses have to decide on their demands for leisure lf , lm ∈
[0, 1] (normalized between zero and one; including the option to be out
of the labor market) and on how the household’s aggregate resources are
allocated to a vector of private (denoted by the vectors qf ∈ Rnf+ ,qm ∈
Rnm+ ) and public goods inside the household (denoted by the vector Q ∈
Rnp+ ). The household’s aggregate resources are assumed to be equal to the
sum of the individual labor incomes wf
(
1− lf) + wm (1− lm). To keep
things simple, we abstract away from non-labor income. Prices of private
and public goods are denoted by respectively pf , pm and P.
In what follows, we assume that leisure is a private good in the sense
that it does not entail intra-household externalities. Therefore, the wife’s








um (lm,qm,Q) . (2)
The question now is how the household makes decisions. Following,
among others, Browning et al. (2009), we assume a non-cooperative set-
ting by adopting a Nash approach. A Nash equilibrium is defined as
follows:
2It goes without saying that all results apply to same-sex couples as well. For
notational reasons we stick to the traditional husband and wife terminology.
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Definition 1 A Nash equilibrium consists of individual leisure, a vector
of individual private consumption and individual contributions to public









s.t. wili + pi′qi + P′Qi = wi.
We make the following assumptions on the utility functions. We denote
marginal utility with respect to good x by ufx or u
m
x and assume that
these derivatives are well defined. The first four assumptions are fairly
standard. The combination of the first and the third assumption seems to
imply that both partners participate in the labor market, as one obtains
infinite utility from consuming some private goods and as labor income
is the only resource available to pay for these private goods. We come
back to this below. The last assumption is most interesting as it implies
a conflict within the household.
Assumption For arbitrary values of li, qi (in which i = f, m) and Q,
we have that
1. limx↓0 uix(l
i,qi,Q) = +∞ for leisure (x = li), each private good
(x = qik) and each public good (x = Qk),
2. limx→+∞ uix(l
i,qi,Q) = 0 for each private good (x = qik) and each
public good (x = Qk),
3. uil(1,q
i,Q) < +∞,
4. ui(li,qi,Q) is concave in leisure, each private good and each public
good and







The first assumption says that for each good the marginal utility goes
to infinity as the amount of the good goes to zero. The second assumption
says that for each private and public good the marginal utility goes to
zero as the amount of the good goes to infinity. These assumptions are
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made for ease of exposition. Since we are interested in corner solutions
where one of the partners does not contribute to a public good, we want to
avoid corner solutions in private goods and total contributions to public
goods.3 The third assumption implies that uil (for i = f, m) is finite if
the partner does not work at all (li = 1). This leaves us with two ways to
capture non-participation in the labor market by a partner. First, wf = 0
(wm = 0) implies that the wife (husband) does not participate. Second,
in the empirical specification we assume that there are no private goods
because of data limitations. Without private goods, non-participation
then arises for a range of wages wf > 0. Concavity is sufficient to allow
us to use stationary points to characterize a global maximum. Finally, we
assume that there is a tension between the partners. They never agree
on the overall contributions to all public goods. Under assumptions one
to five, we can prove the following. The appendix contains the proof.












for each private good qk.
We next define three regimes and show below that all Nash equilibria fall
in either of these regimes. In the first regime, the husband is dictator
(denoted by HD). More specifically, the household’s demand for public
goods fully reflects the husband’s preferences given the household’s ag-
gregate resources. The second regime is associated with split might (SM):
each spouse contributes to public goods but not to all of them, and, more-
over, has a say on how the household’s aggregate resources are allocated.
The resulting allocation is however not as any of the spouses would wish
it to be. Finally, the third regime is associated with the wife being the
dictator (WD). Like in Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2009), and
contrary to Lundberg and Pollak (1993), these regimes are determined
3Allowing for such corner solutions adds inequalities to the optimality conditions.
This complicates notation without adding insight. The corner solutions for individual
contributions to public goods are however interesting as we show below.
4It follows from Theorem 1.2 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p. 34) that a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium exists in our case as the strategy spaces of both spouses
(potential labor supply and consumption) are nonempty, compact, convex subsets of
an Euclidean space and as the utility functions of both spouses are continuous in both
spouses’ strategies and quasi-concave in their own strategy. Multiple equilibria cannot
be ruled out.
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‘endogenously’ by the spouses relative wage rates. Note that one special
case within the SM regime is the Separate Spheres regime of the latter
two papers. Under Separate Spheres, each spouse contributes to strictly
different sets of public goods (an example will be given in the empirical
application in Section 4.3).
Formally, we have the following (where we use the convention on in-
equalities with vectors that x < y implies that xk ≤ yk for all k where
the inequality is strict for at least one k).
Definition 2 The three regimes are defined as follows












where λi = uiqk/pk (from Lemma 1) is the Lagrange multiplier associated
with partner i’s (i = f, m) budget constraint.
The following proposition demonstrates that the three regimes above are
the only ones that can occur in equilibrium. The proof can be found in
the appendix.
Proposition 1 If wm > 0 and/or wf > 0, then HD, SM and WD are the
only possibilities. That is, each Nash equilibrium in (3) is characterized
by the equalities in Lemma 1 and the conditions in either HD, SM or WD.
The example in Browning et al. (2009) demonstrates that the regimes are
ordered as HD, (our) SM and WD and that the ordering is a function of
the wife’s exogenous share of income. We present a similar result, with
endogenous incomes, in the next section. Here we consider what we can
say about this ordering in our general set-up. The next result (partially)
characterizes the ordering of the three regimes in terms of relative wages
ρ = wf/wm. See the appendix for a proof.
Proposition 2 There exist critical values ρ0 > 0 and ρ1 > ρ0 such that
the household is in regime HD for each wf/wm < ρ0 and in regime WD
for each wf/wm > ρ1.
Our empirical specification in the next section imposes more structure on
the utility functions um and uf . This allows us to show that for given
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wm > 0 we move through the regimes as wf increases in the order HD,
SM and finally WD. With the general set-up in this section we cannot
rule out orderings like HD, SM, HD (again), WD. The robust insight is
that when one partner (potentially) has a sufficiently higher wage rate
relative to that of the other partner, the household allocation to public
goods is determined completely by this partner’s preferences - given the
household’s aggregate resources. That is, one always starts with HD (for
low ρ) and ends up with WD (for high ρ).
4.3 Empirical specification and estimation
strategy
4.3.1 Empirical specification
We will illustrate the existence of dictatorship and split might regimes
by means of a sample of couples with children drawn from the Consumer
Expenditure Survey (CEX). This dataset contains not only detailed pur-
chases by households but also information on wages and labor supply of
each household member (see the next section for more details). Given
the particular data at hand, we will focus on a special case of the gen-
eral model described above. In this special case the only possible regimes
continue to be Husband Dictatorship, Split Might and Wife Dictatorship.
Moreover, in the empirical specification the ordering of the regimes is
perfectly known. Firstly, it turns out that almost all prime age men in
the selected sample work full time. Therefore, we will assume that men’s
labor supply is exogenously fixed. Wives, on the contrary, are assumed
to have a continuous hours choice (including non-participation). Wives’
leisure is a private good in the model. Secondly, as is common in budget
surveys, expenditures are recorded at the household level. This implies
that, for most goods, one cannot observe the spouses’ individual consump-
tion of private goods. As a result, we will assume that all consumption
is public inside the household. Two public goods will be distinguished:
a composite good that relates to expenditures on children’s goods (such
as clothing, toys and tuition fees) and a composite good relating to other
(nondurable) expenditures.
To obtain a tractable empirical specification, we will assume that
spouses have preferences that can be represented by Cobb-Douglas utility
functions. The utility functions of the husband and the wife are written
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as follows:
um = β ln Q1 + (1− β) ln Q2 (4)
uf = ω ln lf + (1− ω)(α ln Q1 + (1− α) ln Q2), (5)
where Q1 (Q2) is the composite good related to non-children’s (chil-
dren’s) goods and lf is the wife’s leisure. Let us denote the respective
prices of these public goods by P1 and P2. The spouse-specific preference
parameters α, β and ω are between zero and one.
Since we want to let the data speak for themselves, we will not make
any explicit assumption on the spouses’ relative valuation of the public
goods. In other words, we will not impose that, say, the wife values the
child related public good relatively more than the husband. Therefore,
two cases can be distinguished: if β > α, then the husband values the
child related public good less than the wife, while we have the reverse
conclusion if β ≤ α.
Let us first focus on the β > α scenario. As shown below, this model
is associated with three regimes like in the general model in Section 4.2.
The first regime is characterized by the husband being the dictator, which
implies that the household’s aggregate financial resources are entirely allo-
cated according to his preferences. The second regime is associated with
split might. Given the assumption that β > α, the child related pub-
lic good is entirely financed by the wife, while the other public good is
entirely financed by the husband. This situation corresponds to the Sep-
arate Spheres case in Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2009). Finally,
there is the regime where the wife will be the dictator. In this regime,
the household’s aggregate resources are allocated according to her prefer-
ences. The specific regime in which a couple will be located will depend
on the wife’s wage given her husband’s wage and the spouses’ preference
parameters. Let us now explicitly characterize the three regimes when
spouses have the above Cobb-Douglas utility functions. It turns out that
the three regimes contain four regions, as the HD regime contains two
distinct situations.
Husband dictator First, for the wife’s wage wf rather small (to
be made precise below) the husband dictates the entire allocation over
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where
y = wm + (1− lf )wf . (8)
Now consider the wife’s labor supply decision in this situation:
max
lf


















Solving for lf , we get




Taking account of the fact that lf ≤ 1, the wife will not participate (i.e.,
lf = 1) if
wf ≤ wm ω
1− ω .
We will refer to this situation as the first region on the demand curve. In








Next consider the case where wf ∈ [wm ω
1−ω , w
m 1−β(1−ω)
β(1−ω) ]. The household’s
aggregate resources are now given by
y = (1− ω)(wf + wm). (11)
This situation will be referred to as the second region. In this case, the
husband stays the dictator and the demand functions for public goods are
Q1 =




(1− β)(1− ω)(wf + wm)
P2
. (13)
Hence, we find that the husband’s contribution to Q2 is given by
Qm2 =




wm − β(1− ω)(wm + wf )
P2
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as the wife spends her entire income on Q2. This phase stops once Q
m
2 = 0
which happens when wf ≥ wm 1−β(1−ω)
β(1−ω) .
Split might Assume that wf ∈ [wm 1−β(1−ω)
β(1−ω) , w
m 1−α(1−ω)
α(1−ω) ]. This is
the situation in which Qm2 = 0 and Q
f










(1− ω) wf − ωwm
P2
. (16)











α(1− ω) . (17)
Wife dictator For wf ≥ wm 1−α(1−ω)
α(1−ω) , the allocation of the house-
hold’s aggregate resources is entirely determined by the wife’s preferences:
Q1 =




(1− α)(1− ω)(wf + wm)
P2
. (19)
The above characterization of the three regimes applies when β > α (i.e.,
when the wife values the child related public good relatively more than
the husband). Figure 4.1 summarizes what happens in this situation for
given values of wm, α, β and ω.5 Note that the Husband Dictatorship
regime can be divided into two regions. The first region, in which the
wife decides not to work, is represented by a single allocation between
the two public goods, namely the most left dot on the thick line. The
second region, in which the wife does work but allocation is according to
male preferences, is represented by the remainder of the thick HD-line. A
similar characterization can be derived for the situation when β ≤ α (i.e.,
when the husband values the child related good relatively more than the
wife). The characterizations of the different regimes, in four regions, for
5The parameters in the figure are based on the data that we introduce below.
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Figure 4.1: The kinky nature of demand for public goods when β > α.
As wf increases demand moves along the thick line.(Here wm = 55.000,
α = 0.887, β = 0.932 and ω = 0.191.)
both situations are summarized as follows:
Situation 1: β > α
lf =
{


























































if wf > wm 1−α(1−ω)
α(1−ω) .
Situation 2: β ≤ α
lf =
{




























































if wf > wm 1−(1−α)(1−ω)
(1−α)(1−ω) .
4.3.2 Estimation strategy
As is clear from above, the household demand system for female leisure
and both public goods has a kinked nature. Figure 4.1 highlights this.
Moreover, the kinks are determined endogenously since they depend on
the spouses’ preference parameters and relative wage rates. In what fol-
lows, we will lay down a maximum likelihood estimation strategy to obtain
estimates of the unknown α, β and ω parameters. We will estimate these
preference parameters separately for various demographic groups, namely
for households with different numbers of children.
It is easily seen that in each regime within the situations (20) and
(21) there is adding up: adding expenditures on the two composite public
goods and female leisure always equals the household’s full budget (i.e.,
wf lf + P′Q = wf + wm). This implies that, as in standard demand anal-
ysis, one of the goods in the three-good demand system may be deleted.
We opt to model the wife’s leisure and the child related public good.
The stochastic model specification of our model is as follows. First,
we introduce optimization errors in both the observed demand for leisure
and in the demand for the child related public good. Let Qi2 denote
the demand for the child related public good in couple i and let lfi be





i , Pi1, Pi2
)






i , Pi1, Pi2
)
+ εi2, where f
r,1
k
(for goods k =1,2, and for regions r =1,2,3,4) correspond to the left-hand
side equations in (20) and f r,2k to those in (21). Optimization errors are
captured by the disturbances εik (k =1,2). Second, we introduce mea-
surement error in the wife’s wage rate. Let us assume that the true wage
rate of the wife in couple i is observed with some additive measurement
error ηi independent from the true wage. The vector containing both
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Each household’s contribution to the likelihood function contains two
parts. This first part refers to the probability that a household is observed
in one of the four regions in the demand system (i.e. in the two regions in
HD, in SM or in WD) and the second part refers to the probability den-
sities of the observed demands for leisure and for the child related good.
For expositional reasons we now assume that β > α. Probabilities asso-
ciated with the situation where β ≤ α (denoted by P r,2i for r = 1, 2, 3, 4)
can be derived in a similar way.
The probability that couple i is located before the first kink in the
demand curves, i.e. in the HD regime without a working wife, can be
written as P
(
wfi + ηi ≤ wmi ω1−ω
)
. As the scale of the measurement error
is not identified, we normalize it by assuming that it is equal to the vari-
ance of observed wages. Given the distributional assumptions made, this






. In a similar
way, the probabilities associated with the other kinks can be derived. In
summary, we have the following probabilities:
P 1,1i = P
(

















1− ω < w
f
























β(1− ω) < w
f





























Besides these probabilities, the likelihood function that will be max-
imized also takes into account the densities of the disturbance terms in
the observed leisure and observed expenditures on the child related goods.
Let us introduce the binary variable d0 which equals 1 if the starting val-
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ues for the preference parameters imply that β̂0 > α̂0 and 0 otherwise. Let
us further introduce four couple-specific dummy variables dri0 (r =1,2,3,4)
that indicate the region in which a couple locates on the basis of these
starting values. Combining all probabilities and densities, and taking ac-
count of the above distributional assumptions, one obtains the following
loglikelihood function:






























































This loglikelihood function is optimized using an iterative procedure.
For given starting values for the unknown preference parameters, denoted
by α̂0, β̂0 and ω̂0, the (couple-specific) location of the kinks in the demand
system can be calculated. Maximizing the loglikelihood function using
these initial locations obtains the first-round estimates of the preference
parameters (α̂1, β̂1 and ω̂1). On the basis of these estimates, updated
couple-specific locations of the kinks in the demand system can be derived.
Furthermore, updated locations of couples on the demand system can be
determined in a similar way as above. This also results in updated binary
variables d1 and d
r
i1 that are defined in a similar way as d0 and d
r
i0, while
updated probabilities (22) can be calculated. Finally, all these variables
are brought together in the updated loglikelihood function log L1, which
has the same form as log L0 but this time constructed on the basis of
the estimates α̂1, β̂1 and ω̂1. The loglikelihood function log L1 is again
maximized to obtain new estimates α̂2, β̂2 and ω̂2. The iteration procedure
is repeated until convergence of the parameter estimates. I.e., until the
final maximum likelihood estimates equal the second to last ones which
were used to construct the boundaries and probabilities.
Note that the parameters α, β and ω have to be between zero and
one to have a coherent system. This requirement turns out to be satisfied
in the application below. Note as well that the loglikelihood function
is continuous in the parameters whenever for a sequence of iterations
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β is always larger than or always lower or equal than α. Given that
convergence of the iteration procedure implies the same ordering of β and
α when the parameters are about to converge, potential discontinuities do
not pose any problem here. As a final remark, we should stress that several
local maxima may exist, which is taken into account in the estimation
process.
4.4 Data
For the empirical analysis in this chapter we have used the Consumer
Expenditure Survey (CEX) collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of
the U.S. Department of Labor. Like most authors in the consumption lit-
erature that use the CEX (e.g., Deaton and Paxson, 1994, Attanasio and
Weber, 1995, and Attanasio and Davis, 1996) we have compiled a dataset
from the quarterly Interview Survey (IS) that collects data through a re-
call questionnaire rather than from the biweekly Diary Survey (DS) that
collects data through a daily purchase questionnaire.6 This was done for
three reasons. First, the IS contains more observations. Second, the IS
was especially designed to collect data on major items of expense. The
most substantial elements of child expenses, such as tuition, classify as
such. Third, the expenditure component directly related to children is
larger - both in terms of absolute and relative value - in the IS than in
the DS.
Our CEX dataset comprises of quarterly household observations from
the first quarter of 2005 until the first quarter of 2008. The IS has a
rotating panel setup in which one household is interviewed a maximum of
four times. This means that 89 percent of households in the CEX enters
the dataset more than once and 54 percent of households are observed for
a full year. We aggregate all family expenses to the quarterly level so that
we can also keep the observations of those families that are not observed
for a full year. There are 90,955 observations in our waves of the CEX.
We construct a sample that is best suited for our structural approach.
It includes observations of all married couples in which the husband works
at least 25 hours a week for at least 40 weeks a year and in which neither
of the spouses is enrolled in a college or university nor is self-employed.
Those families with one or both spouses currently attending college or
university are excluded because we would like to be sure that tuition ex-
6For a detailed comparison of the Interview Survey and the Diary Survey see Bat-
tistin (2004).
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Number of households 2,596 3,312 1,168
Mean direct child expenditures $2,212 $2,517 $3,106
Median direct child expenditures $800 $1,270 $1,588
Mean hourly wage husband $25.29 $28.63 $30.63
Median hourly wage husband $21.06 $23.42 $23.67
Mean hourly wage wife $17.39 $18.23 $17.91
Median hourly wage wife $14.92 $15.44 $14.58
Wife not in labor force 23.4% 29.8% 34.5%
penses can be classified as direct child expenses. Households that included
other adults were dropped. Furthermore, those households in which male
wages or female wages fell in the 1st or 99th percentile of the male in-
come distribution were disregarded. Also, those families in which the wife
worked more hours than the average male were not included in the sample.
Finally, we divide our sample on the basis of the number of children under
the age of 18 living in the household. In order for the direct children’s
expenses to be comparable on an absolute level we differentiate between
families with one, two or three children. Because of the many constraints
we impose on the data, our three samples are considerably smaller than
the total CEX. They consist of 2,596, 3,312 and 1,168 observations for
one, two and three child families respectively. Table 4.1 displays sum-
mary statistics for the three groups.
For the estimation of the structural parameters in our model we need
four variables: lf , the wife’s leisure; Q2, which contains an estimate of
total yearly child expenses per household; wm, which is the husband’s
total yearly net labor income; and wf , which is the wife’s full budget
being her net wage rate times the maximum number of hours (normal-
ized to one) she could have worked. Not all child expenses are separately
observed in the CEX. As we do not know who consumes what it is un-
clear whether expenses such as sweets or cinema tickets were intended
for children or for adults. For some categories it can however be ruled
out that the goods were intended for adults. These expense categories
include school meals, infant furniture, boys apparel, girls apparel, boys
and girls footwear, infants apparel, toys, educational books and supplies,
and elementary school, high school and college tuition and fees. Note
that we have quarterly expenditure information and that this amount is
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then multiplied by four to obtain an estimate of yearly expenses in the
household.
Price information is also obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Seasonally adjusted Urban Consumer Price Indices that were reported per
calendar month have been used. This means that we do not take regional
price variation into account. We compute a monthly CPI for child ex-
penses by averaging the available separate product CPIs and taking the
weights that these products have in total child expenses into account.
Separate CPIs were available for all components of Q2, except for baby
furniture and school meals. As the quarterly IS interviews take place
during all 12 months of the year, our dataset contains 40 monthly values
of Q2’s CPI. Because households report expenditures over the previous
three months, we have chosen to assign the CPI that pertains to the third
month prior to the interview. Cumulative inflation on our basket of child
expenses has been 11.9 percent from November 2004 until February 2008.
This amounts to a yearly average inflation level of 3.3 percent on Q2.
The CEX documents total yearly household net income as well as in-
dividuals’ gross labor incomes. We have employed two alternative ways to
estimate the husband’s net labor income, wm. If the household received
no non-labor income we derived it as the percentage of household’s net
income corresponding to his gross labor income share. If the household
did receive some non-labor income, we computed his net wage on the ba-
sis of his gross wage using an estimated spline relation between gross and
net income in the households that did not receive any non-labor income.
Potential female wage income, wf , is based on the same gross to net
conversion as male wage income. The hourly wage rate is moreover com-
puted for all women that are employed but imputed for all women that
are currently unemployed or out of the labor force. To do the latter, we
estimate a Heckman selection model in which the overidentifying vari-
able is the number of children each women has (the wage imputation is
done on the total CEX dataset). The Heckman model corrects for the
wife’s education level, age group, her state of residence, and for the year
of the survey. The potential female wage income, wf , is then computed
by multiplying the (imputed) wage rate times the average weekly number
of hours worked by men times 52 (the number of weeks). The female
wage rate was imputed in respectively 23.4%, 29.8% and 34.5% of the
households in our samples. In other words, these are the percentages of
mothers that did not participate in the labor market.
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Single fathers 212 124 29
Single mothers 965 591 193
Mean child expenditures men $1,181 $1,786 $2,565
Median child expenditures men $528 $1,264 $1,696
Mean hourly wage men $20.30 $24.67 $19.56
Mean child expenditures women $1,200 $1,731 $1,758
Median child expenditures women $600 $1,080 $948
Mean hourly wage women $15.20 $15.04 $14.49
4.5 Estimation results
4.5.1 Stylized facts about child expenses of singles
Using the CEX we also construct similar datasets of single - fulltime em-
ployed, non-college going - parents with one, two or three children in order
to obtain a first impression of male and female preferences for child ex-
penses. As can be seen in Table 4.2 it turns out that if we do not control
for income, single mothers of one child spend on average more on their
children than single fathers. Given that the hourly wage rate of the single
women is on average lower than that of single men, this is remarkable. In
the two and three children samples, the single fathers spend uncondition-
ally more.
If we assume that labor supply of single mothers and single fathers
is exogenous7 (as it is assumed for husbands), then we can estimate the
Cobb-Douglas model with a gender taste shifter. Singles are necessarily
dictators in this set-up - public good demand is according to their pref-
erences alone. Hence, we estimate a βf for single women and a βm for
single men using their respective labor incomes. Table 4.3 presents the
estimates. It can be seen that in all groups, the female taste for spending
on children is higher than the male taste. The difference between the two
estimates of β is however only significant at a five percent level in the two
children group. The small number of single fathers with three children
could account for the lack of significance in their sample.
7The selection of parents is such that they should all work 25 hours or more a week,
for at least 40 weeks a year.
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Table 4.3: Estimation results for singles
One child Two children Three children
Est. St. err. Est. St. err. Est. St. err.
βf 0.964 0.003 0.949 0.009 0.939 0.013
βm 0.974 0.007 0.971 0.004 0.949 0.015
4.5.2 Results for couples with children
Let us now focus on the estimation results for couples with respectively
one, two and three child(ren). Preference parameter estimates were ob-
tained by means of the estimation strategy outlined above. The iterated
maximum likelihood method worked well: estimates were obtained after
only a few iterations. Moreover, the unconstrained preference parameters
were between zero and one as theory predicts they should be.8
Table 4.4 summarizes the estimation results for the three sets of cou-
ples. It is clear from the results that on average wives value the child
related public good more than their husbands. This is in line with the
results obtained for singles. The table further shows that, ceteris paribus,
the marginal utility of the child related public good increases with the
number of children. This is the case for both husbands and wives. This
makes sense since the data show that the aggregate expenditures on chil-
dren increase with their number.9 Also the wife’s marginal utility of
leisure increases with the number of children. This is moreover reflected
by the data given that women on average work less when they have more
children.
As is clear from Section 4.3, our non-cooperative model nests the stan-
dard unitary model. If α equals β, then the household behaves as if it
consists of a single decision maker with preferences that are equal to those
of the wife (given that preferences also depend on the wife’s leisure). We
tested the null hypothesis that α is equal to β for the three sets of couples
by means of a Wald test. Interestingly, the null hypothesis is strongly re-
jected for the couples with two and three children (p-values are close to 0).
Their observed behavior can clearly not be captured by a single decision
maker’s rational preferences. Note though that the null hypothesis could
not be rejected for couples with one child (p-value equals 0.47). The ex-
8A few local maxima were found. We retained the highest maximum. The results
discussed below are qualitatively robust for the different maxima.
9This may be remarkable given the public good connotation of the child related ex-
penditures. Still, for a given family constellation, this does not rule out that children’s
expenses are public in the sense that they appear in both spouses’ utility functions.
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Table 4.4: Estimation results for couples
One child Two children Three children
Est. St. err. Est. St. err. Est. St. err.
α 0.922 0.024 0.887 0.009 0.823 0.020
β 0.966 0.040 0.932 0.006 0.894 0.012
ω 0.140 0.006 0.191 0.005 0.222 0.010
Table 4.5: Proportion of couples in the different regimes
One child Two children Three children
Husband dictator 6.82 19.62 32.11
Split might 5.20 7.28 11.30
Wife dictator 87.98 73.10 56.59
penditures on child related goods are relatively low for these households.
It could well be the case that the data therefore do not allow for a sharp
distinction between the spouses’ preference parameters.
On the basis of the above preference parameters, the expected num-
ber of couples in each of the three regimes can be calculated. Since β̂ > α̂,
we derive these numbers on the basis of the right-hand sides of equation
(20). The obtained proportions are presented in Table 4.5. Interestingly,
all possible regimes contain a significant proportion of the couples in the
sample. Moreover, it turns out that most of the households behave as if
the wife was the dictator in the household. More specifically, for these
families, the allocation of the household’s aggregate resources is according
to the wife’s preferences. Note though that the proportion of households
with the wife acting as the dictator decreases with the number of children.
A partial goodness-of-fit test exists, as we know that at least the house-
holds in which the wife does not work should be in a Husband Dictatorship
according to our model. Table 4.1 presented the relevant percentages for
one, two and three-child households. Unfortunately, these percentages
are in all three samples larger than the estimated percentages of HD-
households. Further research is necessary to improve the goodness-of-fit
of our estimates.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we model the consumption and labor supply behavior of a
couple in a non-cooperative setting by adopting a Nash approach. Using
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minimal assumptions, we prove that demand for public goods is defined
by only three regimes. Demand for public goods is either determined
by the preferences of one of the partners only (Husband Dictatorship or
Wife Dictatorship), or by both spouses having a say on the allocation of
income to public goods (Split Might). The particular regime in which
a couple locates is shown to depend on the spouses’ relative wage rates,
which resembles the endogenous regimes (depending on exogenous indi-
vidual incomes) in Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2009).
By imposing more structure on the general model, we can derive
testable implications on observed demand for public goods and labor sup-
ply that allow testing the model against the standard unitary model where
a couple behaves as a single decision maker. The model is applied to a
sample of couples drawn from the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey
(CEX) whereby we focus on expenses on children’s goods that act as a
public good in the spouses’ preferences. We find that for couples with
two or three children the standard unitary model is strongly rejected in
favor of our non-cooperative model. Women apparently like to spend
more on goods for their children than men, which would explain findings
in the literature that indicate that children benefit more when household
resources are owned by women (e.g., Lundberg, Pollak and Wales, 1997,
and Duflo, 2003). Using the estimated preference parameters, we can di-
vide households into dictatorship and split might regimes. It turns out
that 73% of two-child and 57% of three-child couples spend according to
the wife’s preferences.
A drawback of the present study is that we assume that the prefer-
ences of all husbands and all wives are equal, and that differences in what
we observe are only generated by differences in potential wages and by
optimization and measurement errors. Given the complexity of our cur-
rent estimations, this was a necessary first attempt. However, a natural
extension of this study will be to allow for unobserved heterogeneity in
the preference parameters so that we do not have to assume equal pref-
erences. We are currently working on a random preference version of our
model.
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4.A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1






ui(εi) = ui(li + dli,qi + dqikιk,Q)
where ιk denotes a vector which equals 1 (one) at position k and is zero
everywhere else. Note that dli and dqik are defined in such a way that
εi 6= 0 is feasible in terms of the budget restriction.
It follows that




First, consider the case where wi > 0. Then we prove by contradiction







utility increases with εi contradicting equation (3). We need to be careful
though as εi > 0 is not possible with li = 1. However at li = 1 we
have qik = 0 (as there is no income to spend on private goods) and thus
uiqk = +∞ (by assumption 1). Since uil is finite at li = 1 (by assumption












implies εi < 0
would raise utility again contradicting equation (3). It is not possible to






at li = 0.
Second, consider wi = 0. Then we have li = 1, qik = 0. Due to






and the equality in the lemma holds. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 1
The proposition implies that we need to rule out two cases. First, we need
to rule out that uiQk > λ
iPk for any partner i = f, m and any public good
Qk. Second, we need to rule out that both u
f
Q = λ
fP and umQ = λ
mP.
Suppose (by contradiction) that uiQk > λ
iPk. Since we assumed
wm > 0, the husband will contribute to every public good (if the wife
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does not contribute to any public good). If wf > 0 the wife can con-
tribute to public goods as well. In either case we have Qk > 0 for each
public good Qk and hence u
i
Qk
is finite for both partners. Given the Nash
assumption that Qj∗k for j 6= i is given, partner i can raise utility by in-
creasing Qik which contradicts equation (3).
Second, assume (by contradiction) that both ufQ = λ
fP and umQ =









for each pair of public goods Qk, Qk′ . However, this contradicts assump-
tion 5. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 2
Consider wm > 0 and wf = 0. Hence Qf = 0 as the wife earns no income.
Given assumption 1 it is optimal for the husband to contribute to each
public good Qk. Hence u
f
Qk
is finite for each public good Qk. Since w
f = 0
implies that qf = 0, we have λf = +∞. Hence, indeed we are in regime
HD. By continuity this also holds for wf > 0 close enough to zero.
The proof of the existence of ρ1 is done in the same way but then
starting from wf > 0, wm = 0. This gives us regime WD. By continuity
we are also in regime WD for wm > 0 close enough to zero. Q.E.D.
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Better Protected, Better Paid:
Evidence on how Employment
Protection Affects Wages1
This chapter is forthcoming as a paper in Labour Economics (Van der
Wiel, 2009).
5.1 Introduction
Employment protection legislation (EPL) has been on the (European) po-
litical agenda for several decades and continues to be widely debated. On
the one hand employers complain that they are incapable of adapting to
economic circumstances because of the high cost of firing employees and
on the other hand vulnerable groups of employees complain that the firing
risk they face is too large. Policy-makers in the meantime have to decide
upon an optimal level of protection. In order to make such decisions
politicians need to know how different types of employment protection
affect labor market outcomes. In order to provide such answers, a large
economic literature on employment protection has been developed.
The rationale for installing employment protection legislation is clearly
not to manipulate wages. In practice EPL might however have a consid-
erable impact on them. In fact, this impact is a central issue in the aca-
demic EPL literature as it is closely related to the effect of employment
1Thanks to Arthur van Soest, Jan van Ours, Frederic Vermeulen, Gerard Pfann,
Anja Deelen, Bas ter Weel, Davida van Praag, two anonymous referees and several
seminar participants for useful comments and suggestions.
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protection on employment levels2. How these two labor market outcomes
are theoretically related depends on the type of employment protection
(EP) under investigation, on the relevant labor market institutions and
on which further assumptions the respective researcher makes. When one
for example considers a competitive economy with individual wage-setting
as in Lazear (1990), transferable firing costs such as a severance payment
will be shifted to the worker at the onset of an employment contract.
In Lazear’s model, wages will adjust downwards to take the future firing
costs into account and employment will not be affected. Alternatively, one
could consider central wage bargaining by a union who cares for incum-
bent workers only and a general turnover cost associated with dismissals
as in Bertola (1990). According to insider/outsider theory, employment
protection will then induce unions to bargain for higher than competitive
wages. As a result, firms will fire (and hire) fewer workers.
Empirically, only suggestive evidence of the true relationship between
employment protection and wages exists. This is partly because most
empirical research has analyzed macro-data and composite employment
protection indices, which introduces comparability issues and confound-
ing factors into the estimations. This chapter seeks to use the Dutch
Socio-Economic Panel (SEP) dataset to empirically establish the causal
effect of a specific type of employment protection, namely the employer’s
term of notice (ToN), on the wage level of employees. The term of no-
tice is defined here as the amount of time an employer has to notify an
employee in advance of her upcoming dismissal. Specific groups, notably
older workers, are often protected by a longer term of notice. The term
of notice is usually ignored in the empirical employment protection liter-
ature. This is unfortunate as a long term of notice corresponds to a large
number of obligatory wage payments and hence is a substantial firing cost
to the employer.
The Dutch labor market has two relevant features that makes it suit-
able as a research ground for this chapter. First, for each worker, it is
possible to calculate the ‘dormant’ term of notice. I define ‘dormant’ here
as the notice period that would apply in case the employer would soon
want to fire the worker. The term of notice can be calculated because the
law sets out a formula to do so, which generates variation in the degree of
employment protection for workers of different ages and tenure. Second,
2I do not discuss the empirical effect of employment protection on employment in
this chapter. In order to do a similar fixed effects analysis for employment rather than
wages, one would need a dataset containing a substantial number of individuals that
are observed over time as being both fired and non-fired. The Dutch socio-economic
panel unfortunately features too little of these observations.
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in 1999 the legal formula to calculate the term of notice was changed.
In short, low-tenured workers of all ages benefited from the introduction
of the law on flexibility and security as their employer’s term of notice
increased while older high-tenured workers experienced a shorter term of
notice after the 1st of January 1999. This chapter will exploit this exoge-
nous policy change to answer the causality question and to separate the
age, tenure and term of notice effects on wages.
The remainder of this chapter presents evidence of a strong positive
causal effect of the term of notice on wages. Each additional month in-
creases wages by three percent. It is also demonstrated that regressions
that ignore the multi-collinearity issues involved can overestimate this ef-
fect. The theoretical literature provides two plausible reasons for a posi-
tive effect of employment protection on wages. First, insider/outsider the-
ory suggests that the bargaining position of insiders is enhanced by better
protection when unions only represent incumbent workers. In wage nego-
tiations this could then drive wages up. Second, employment protection
creates more incentives for firms and workers to invest in match-specific
human capital. These investments will then lead to higher productivity
and higher wages. Longitudinal data reflecting individual productivity
in all types of jobs would be necessary to ultimately distinguish between
the alternative explanations. Unfortunately, this is not available in The
Netherlands. Using the alternative data at hand, I do present suggestive
evidence that invalidates the investment argument.
This chapter continues as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the most im-
portant findings in the employment protection literature on wages. Sec-
tion 5.3 then lays out the term of notice regulations in The Nether-
lands and the changes introduced in the law of flexibility and security
(‘Flexwet’). The empirical strategy is explained in Section 5.4. The uti-
lized data are discussed in Section 5.5 and results will be presented in
Section 5.6. Section 5.7 concludes.
5.2 Literature
5.2.1 Theoretical literature
Employment protection, i.e. firing costs, comprises of two elements: taxes
to be paid outside the job-worker pair and transfers from the firm to the
worker (Garibaldi and Violante, 2005, p.799). Taxes are broadly defined
here: any kind of legal costs associated with layoffs fall under the first
type. The term of notice and the severance pay however fall under the
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second type of employment protection. The length of the term of notice,
or the number of additional wage payments, partly determines the size
of the transfer firing costs. An extensive theoretical literature looks into
the effects of employment protection or firing costs on the labor mar-
ket. Concerning wages, the predictions of what employment protection
actually does vary greatly. Many of these differences result from consider-
ing different types of employment protection and different types of labor
market institutions. Some of these views are explained in this section,
although I do not claim to be exhaustive.
In the employment protection literature (e.g. Oi, 1962, and Bentolila
and Bertola, 1990), whether a profit-maximizing firm would like to fire an
individual worker primarily depends on the wage of the worker and her
match-specific productivity3. When the difference between these entities
is negative, an employer loses money and she will consider firing the em-
ployee. It is costly however to adjust the number of employees downward
because of associated firing costs. When wages are fixed and whenever
there is a possibility that in the nearby future the worker’s productivity
could increase, higher firing costs such as a longer term of notice then
lower the propensity to fire (and hire) a worker.
Wages are exogenous in the greatest part of this literature. Notable
exceptions to this will be discussed here. Bertola (1990) draws from
the insider/outsider literature. See Lindbeck and Snower (2001) for an
overview. In short, the theory divides the labor market into insiders - in-
cumbent workers who benefit from employment protection - and outsiders
- those who do not benefit such as temporary workers and the unemployed.
Because it is difficult to get rid of them, insiders have some bargaining
power in the wage process and hence demand higher than competitive
wages (for a formal model, see Lindbeck and Snower, 1986).
Bertola looks at how employment protection affects wages under dif-
ferent wage setting institutions. First, he investigates labor demand and
endogenous wages when wage negotiations take place at the individual
level. He finds that under certain assumptions total received wages might
not be affected, although outsiders might offer to work for a very low wage
in order to become an insider and insiders might afterwards rise wage de-
mands above the competitive level. Second, Bertola assesses wages when
there is a wage setting union that cares for everyone in the labor mar-
ket. He concludes that in this set-up lifetime wages would also remain
unaffected. Only in the instance of unions who solely represent working
members does employment protection increase total labor income for in-
3This chapter considers individual lay-offs that have a financial firing rationale.
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siders indefinitely.
Garibaldi and Violante (2005) exploit the idea that a country’s wage-
setting institutions influence the effect of employment protection on wages
in a search and matching framework. The authors built a model with en-
dogenous wage setting behavior by a monopolistic union. Garibaldi and
Violante stress that in such a setting the introduction of an exogenous
firing cost has two opposing effects on the workers’ desired wage level:
workers would like to have a higher wage (the income effect) but do not
enjoy the accompanying higher probability to get fired (the job security
effect). Whenever the elasticity of the firm’s firing probability to wages
is low enough, workers will demand higher wages when they are better
protected.
Lazear (1990) wrote an influential paper on employment protection,
arguing that firing costs do not necessarily affect hirings and firings. He
reasons that in a flexible labor market, in the absence of contract and
market restrictions, transfer employment protection such as the term of
notice could be undone by efficient wage setting behavior between workers
and firms. He predicts that in a competitive economy with decentralized
wage setting, firing costs drive wages down, up to the point where the sev-
erance pay and the wages paid during the term of notice can be seen as a
delayed payment. Note that Lazear predicts wages to go down at the on-
set of an employment contract. Pissarides (2001) also suggests a negative
effect of employment protection on wages, but argues from the workers
point of view (like Bertola and Rogerson, 1997). In his search and match-
ing model the term of notice is endogenous and generates lower wages
because risk averse workers accept a lower income during the productive
period of a job, in order to receive a higher income during unproductive
times.
Because most of the relevant literature thinks about workers as having
fixed or at least exogenous productivity, it often ignores another possi-
ble route through which employment protection positively affects wages.
More employment protection namely enhances the incentives for a firm to
invest in a worker and for a worker to invest in firm-specific human capital.
Nickell and Layard (1999) briefly describe this mechanism. These human
capital investments could pay off in terms of higher productivity and
higher wages. Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan (2004) present some indi-
rect empirical evidence that employment protection does increase training
of employees. Using a European dataset, they find that those on fixed
term contracts take up less training than those on permanent contracts.
While certain theories thus suggest the term of notice could increase
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wages, others argue it could decrease wages. The most appropriate the-
ories for this empirical study are the ones involving some market imper-
fections, moderate centralized wage-setting and exogenous employment
protection. Lazear’s argument is hence not likely to hold in the Dutch
economy, in which employers organizations and a small number of labor
unions negotiate over wages per industry. For more information on wage
setting in The Netherlands see Wallerstein, Golden and Lange (1997).
5.2.2 Empirical literature
The empirical literature has experienced difficulties in establishing a clear
relationship between firing costs and wages. Some of the papers discussed
in the previous subsection do attempt to present empirical evidence of
their models. However, the authors typically only provide suggestive ev-
idence of their theories, mainly because most of them use macro-data
and aggregate indices of employment protection that are hard to com-
pare. The estimates are furthermore troubled by confounding factors.
Contrary to what his theoretical model predicts, Bertola (1990) for ex-
ample presents some evidence that the productivity wage gap is actually
lower in countries with stricter employment protection. The empirical
wage setting literature in its turn often ignores employment protection as
it is so hard to quantify. See for example the establishment-level study
by Blanchflower, Oswald and Garrett (1990) and the cross-country study
of industry wage differentials by Holmlund and Zetterberg (1991). Both
papers do suggest substantial insider wage gains.
An interesting firm-level study by Autor, Kerr and Kugler (2007) in-
cludes employment protection - i.e. tax employment protection - explic-
itly. The paper exploits U.S. state variation in the adoption of wrongful-
discharge protections in order to study firm-level productivity differences.
The authors find that the introduction of these laws coincided with a
rise in capital investment, non-production worker employment and hence
measured a labor productivity increase. Another firm-level analysis was
published by Martins (2009), who analyzes a Portuguese policy change in
tax employment protection that favored firms with twenty or less work-
ers. In 1989 the strict Portuguese rules and regulations considering layoffs
were considerably softened, and more so for the smaller firms. Using a
large administrative dataset that links employers to employees he finds,
among other things, that after the policy change average wages in the
smaller firms fell more than in the larger firms. This suggests that in a
highly regulated labor market the better protected workers earn more.
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The use of micro-data in the empirical employment protection litera-
ture is limited. This is unfortunate as micro-data is often a prerequisite
for identifying causality and as even in highly regulated economies wages
are very heterogeneous across workers of different ages and tenure in the
same firms. I am aware of only one micro study on employment protection
and wages, which is a paper by Leonardi and Pica (2007). The authors
empirically analyze the effect of severance payments on male wages by
exploiting an Italian policy change that introduced severance payments
for unjust dismissals for firms with less than fifteen employees. This pol-
icy change is explained in more detail in Kugler and Pica (2008). Their
paper, like mine, thus analyzes transfer employment protection rather
than legal protection such as in Martins (2009). Leonardi and Pica ap-
ply a regression discontinuity design, with the discontinuity being the
number of employees, to study entry wages and the tenure wage profile.
They use individual wage information from an administrative employ-
ers dataset from the Veneto region in Northern Italy. Contrary to their
theoretical predictions, the authors find no causal effect of severance pay-
ments on entry wages. They do find that the average returns to tenure
of previously dismissed workers declined by three percent in the smaller
firms, relative to larger firms that did not experience an increase in em-
ployment protection. Leonardi and Pica interpret this as partial evidence
for Lazear’s argument that government-mandated employment protection
can be shifted to employees if any employment contract is allowed. Us-
ing a Dutch dataset of individuals of all tenures and backgrounds, I find
an opposite average effect of employment protection on wages, namely
a strongly significant positive one. Additional research should teach us
which specific characteristics of the analyzed environments generate these
differences.
5.3 Term of notice
There are two paths to dismissal in The Netherlands, and the legal term
of notice only applies to the labor office path. This is a relatively slow
route that does not require severance payments. The labor office has the
discretion to refuse an application, but only does so in a small percent of
the cases (i.e. five percent in 2002). Mainly individual lay-offs in small-
and medium sized firms and collective lay-offs are dealt with by the labor
office, but the path is open to all employers. The other route, through
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court, is faster and involves substantial severance payments4. The can-
tonal court judge in principle always allows a lay-off but adapts the re-
quired severance payment to the specific firing rationale (i.e. a worker
receives more if the employer could have done more to prevent the lay-
off)5. An employer is free to choose a dismissal path and the labor office
is thus a credible threat to all workers. Furthermore, nothing changed
in the court procedure over the analyzed period. This means that the
employer’s term of notice and the associated policy change are relevant
to all employees on a permanent contract.
The policy change that will be exploited in the fixed effects method be-
low is the introduction of the law on flexibility and security (the ‘Flexwet’)
in The Netherlands on January 1st, 1999. This law intended to diminish
differences in the labor market between temporary and permanent work-
ers. On the one hand, employees with temporary contracts received better
legal protection than before. On the other hand, employees with perma-
nent contracts lost some rights. The main change for tenured employees
was the adaptation and simplification of the legal formula for the term
of notice. See Heerma van Voss (1998) and Smitskam and Kronenburg-
Willems (2000) for a detailed description of the new law. The calculation
of the term of notice before the 1st of January 1999 (old-ToN) was as
follows. For every year of tenure an employer had to add a week to the
notice period, with a maximum of thirteen weeks. On top of this, workers
received an extra week of notice for each year they had worked while be-
ing forty-five or older, also with a maximum of thirteen weeks. Note that
tenure - which determines the term of notice - is legally defined as the
amount of time that has passed since one started working for a certain
employer.
The law introduced on the 1st of January 1999 consists of two ele-
ments: a new term of notice formula for newly-hired employees and a
transitory arrangement for workers that were already employed. The new
formula does not depend on age6 and accommodates fewer term of no-
tice possibilities. For workers employed in between zero and four years
4Figure 5.A.1 in the appendix shows the ratio of lay-offs through the labor office
over the total number of lay-offs. A constant percentage of about fifty percent of lay-
offs are handled by the labor office. A small increase in the ratio can be seen in 1999,
the year the legal term of notice was changed. It can be argued that the labor office
procedure became more profitable that year because the term of notice went down for
the majority of workers.
5In a limited amount of cases a cantonal court judge refuses to end the labor
contract, for example when a sick worker is dismissed because of her illness.
6All age related components of Dutch employment laws are supposed to be phased
out in order to satisfy European anti-discrimination treaties.
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employers face a term of notice of one month. When a worker is em-
ployed between five and nine years, her employer will have to notify her
two months in advance. If a worker’s tenure is between ten and four-
teen years, her employer will have to notify her three months in advance.
Any tenure longer than fourteen years results in a term of notice of four
months.
The ‘Flexwet’ included an important transitory arrangement for those
workers that were already employed by the 1st of January 1999. For these
employees, the employer had to calculate both the old term of notice for
the employee’s tenure and age on the 1st of January 1999 and the new
term of notice for the employee’s tenure and age at the time of firing. The
longest notice period of the two applied. This transitory arrangement was
agreed upon so that no workers would suffer a large sudden decline in EP.
Another feature of the new scheme was that for both newly hired workers
and those in the transitory scheme, the law allows employers to deduct
one month of the notice period if they have waited to end the labor agree-
ment until after they have received permission from the labor office. The
minimum term of notice should however remain one month, so that the
deduction only applies to workers with a tenure above four years. This
subtraction is granted in almost all relevant cases (i.e. ninety-six percent
in 2002 according to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment). In
my ‘dormant’ term of notice calculations I assume that this permission
is always granted. Note that I define ‘dormant’ here as the notice period
that would apply in case the employer would soon want to fire the worker.
Hence, the introduction of the ‘Flexwet’ generated a discrete change in
EP for many workers at the beginning of 1999, and the transitory scheme
ensured a further gradual move towards the new scheme.
The relationship between the old and new term of notice thus depends
on age and tenure of the worker and on calendar time. More specifically,
besides on tenure and time, it depends on tenure obtained from the age of
45 onwards. Figure 5.1 shows the old- and new-ToN for the respondents
in the entire SEP dataset over tenure and selected ages. As the term of
notice will be identical for all employees under 45, there is one panel repre-
senting them. Additionally, three panels display the relationship between
tenure and the term of notice for all 50-, 55-, and 60-year old workers.
As can be seen in the below-45-panel, the old term of notice went up
by a week each tenure year and had a maximum of thirteen weeks. How
the policy change affected different workers depends on their respective
tenure. The new term of notice turns out to be longer than the old term of
notice for those employees with a tenure below five years. Young workers
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Figure 5.1: Employer’s Term of Notice before and after the introduction
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with a tenure from six to fourteen years experience a new term of notice
that is shorter than the old-ToN. For young workers with a tenure of both
five and a tenure above fourteen years the old and new term of notice are
exactly the same.
A different picture emerges for older workers. As can be seen in the
panels for the 50-, 55- and 60-year old workers, the old term of notice went
up by two weeks each tenure year for at least some of the years and the
maximum term of notice was longer than thirteen weeks. The difference
between the three panels is determined by how much older one is than 44
as this explains the number of two-week-years in the graph. For employ-
ees with a tenure below three years the new term of notice is longer than
before. Those who have been working for their employer for exactly three
years face the same term of notice before and after the introduction of
the ‘Flexwet’. The term of notice of workers with a tenure of four years
and over is shortened in the new scheme. Wherever there are multiple
terms of notice visible for an age-tenure combination this is because of
the transition scheme. This arrangement ensures that the term of notice
moves closer to the new calculation as the evaluation date is further from
the 1st of January 1999. So, the employers of two workers with identical
tenures (say fifteen years) and age (say sixty years) but fired at different
times after the policy change (say at the 1st of February 1999 and at the
1st of February 2002) will face different terms of notice (in this case five
months and four-and-a-half months).
Although the length of the term of notice that applies in the labor
office path is set out by law, the ‘Flexwet’ made it possible to agree upon
a different term in a collective wage agreement. For the analysis in this
chapter it is important to know to what extent this occurred7. Combining
information from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment and my
own calculations I find that after the 1st of January 1999 the legal term
of notice applied to eighty percent of workers8. If the deviation from the
7Smits (2000) and Smits and Samadhan (2002) report that the one month de-
duction, with a minimum term of notice of one month, prevailed in practically all
agreements settled after the 1st of January 1999.
8About twenty percent of the workers do not fall under any sort of collective agree-
ment and hence the legal term of notice will always apply to them. The other eighty
percent of workers do fall under a collective agreement. I checked 112 (of about 200)
collective wage agreements in alphabetical order that were declared to hold for all
workers in the relevant sector between 1999 and 2002 and found that roughly seventy
percent of these featured the term of notice set out in the ‘Flexwet’. In sixteen percent
of the cases a term of notice calculation that is related to age and tenure still existed.
In fourteen percent of the analyzed collective wage agreements I found a constant
term of notice. If I assume that the distribution of workers is equal across the different
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labor law, i.e. the measurement error in the real term of notice, is in-
dependent of wages, the measurement error leads to an attenuation bias
which will drive the coefficient of the term of notice down. Any significant
results will hence be underestimating the true causal effect of the term
of notice. In the Smits and Samadhan report the distribution of devia-
tions over sectors seems rather equal. Therefore, and because it is hard
to know which agreement specifically applies to which worker, I abstract
from the deviation in the collective wage agreements and assume that the
legal term of notice applies to everyone. In the empirical specification I
do control for industry categories.
For older, long tenured employees the introduction of the law on flexi-
bility and security thus resulted in a lower term of notice, but for shorter
tenured workers of all ages the term of notice increased. This variation
in the direction of the policy change will prove useful in identifying the
causal effect of the term of notice on wages in Section 5.6.
5.4 Empirical strategy
The dependent variable in my analysis is the log of the real gross hourly
wage rate. Several econometric difficulties trouble the identification of a
causal effect on this rate of the term of notice. Everything arises from the
fact that for the vast majority of employees in The Netherlands the term
of notice is determined by a deterministic function of the total number
of years an employee has worked for her employer and the number of
years she has done so while being 45 or older. The only other variable
influencing the employer’s term of notice is calendar time.
ToNit = f(Tenureit, Tenure after 45it, Timet)
Note that calendar time both determines under which legal framework
a worker is fired and also plays a role in the transition arrangement from
the old towards the new scheme. The analyzed wage model can be seen in
equation 1, where Xit refers to personal characteristics, Zit to employer
and job characteristics, υi to an individual-specific time-invariant error
term and εit to an i.i.d error term.
Wagesit = h(ToNit(Tenureit, Tenure after 45it, Timet), Xit, Zit) + υi + εit
(1)
agreements it can be concluded that eighty percent of workers on a permanent contract
face the legal term of notice after January 1st 1999.
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The first econometric problem that arises is that of strong multi-
collinearity between the term of notice and the important covariates
tenure and age. When one would analyze periods in which the term of
notice formula doesn’t change, its marginal effect on wages cannot be de-
termined ceteris paribus as changes in the notice period from one year to
the next would coincide with changes in tenure and age. To nevertheless
answer the research question, one can exploit an exogenous change in the
term of notice that does not coincide with a change in tenure and age. To
identify a causal relationship between the term of notice and wages this
chapter therefore uses the exogenous policy change described in Section
5.3: the introduction of the law on flexibility and security in The Nether-
lands. It is not necessary to apply any specific type of policy evaluation
method however. For reasons explained below, I will estimate a fixed ef-
fects regression model which has the additional trait that - through the
subtracted average - it automatically incorporates the exogenous varia-
tion in the term of notice.
Even when including the exogenous policy change, it is still crucial to
correctly control for tenure and tenure beyond the age of 45 so that an
estimated term of notice coefficient does not capture any linear or non-
linear relationship between these variables and wages. Without imposing
any structure on the relationship beforehand I therefore include a full set
of all relevant tenure times tenure after 45 dummies. These dummies
control for the effect of tenure on wages, for the effect of tenure in older
ages on wages and for the interaction effect of the two on wages in the
most flexible way. I observe 43 different tenures and 19 different tenures
experienced over the age of 45. This leaves me with a total of 513 tenure
times tenure beyond 45 dummies9. Naturally, other interactions between
age and tenure, such as tenure obtained over the age of 25, could poten-
tially also influence wages. However, omitting such interactions will not
bias the coefficient of interest as these interactions do not enter the term
of notice calculations.
Solving the multi-collinearity and non-linearity problems alone does
not result in unbiased estimates of the term of notice coefficient. This is
because tenure and subsequently the term of notice suffer from an endo-
geneity problem. Tenure is an endogenous variable because unobservable
characteristics such as work attitude and innate ability influence tenure
as well as wages. As a result of the fixed formula for the notice period
this endogeneity stains the term of notice variable as well. A permanent
9The full set of tenure interactions amounts to less than 45*19=817 dummies as
the tenure obtained beyond 45 will always be equal to or smaller than general tenure.
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endogeneity problem can and will be addressed by applying a fixed effects
type estimator that filters out any time-invariant individual components
in the wage regression. Doing so however does not remove a potential
non-permanent effect of the unobserved quality of a worker on tenure and
wages induced by the 1999 policy change10.
I will explain the non-permanent endogeneity problem by focusing on
two types of workers: low-quality workers that earn a relatively low wage
and high-quality workers that earn a relatively high wage. Here I assume
that the type is unobserved by the econometrician. Of both types of work-
ers, the relatively high-tenured ones (53 percent of the sample) will have
experienced a decrease in their employer’s term of notice on the first of
January 1999. It is possible that this decrease had a different impact on
the two types in terms of layoffs and job switches. Low-quality employees
could have been fired sooner than their high-quality colleagues. These
fired low-quality workers would then either leave the sample or re-enter
the sample in a new job. This would lower the number of low-paid work-
ers in the high term of notice group, resulting in an overestimation of the
effect of the term of notice on wages. Note that underestimation is also
a possibility, as the 1999 policy change made high-tenured jobs less at-
tractive in terms of employment protection. Hence all workers could have
become more likely to voluntarily quit a high-tenured job. High-quality
workers potentially quitted their jobs more often than their low-quality
colleagues as they receive better alternative job offers. This would in-
crease the number of high-paid workers in the low term of notice group,
resulting in an underestimation of the term of notice effect on wages. As
it is unclear which job switches and which lay-offs would have taken place
without the policy change, the described time-variant type of endogeneity
cannot be fully controlled for.
The quantitative importance of the effect can be looked at in more
detail. First, it can be checked whether the inclusion of those who get
fired and those who change jobs voluntarily drives the term of notice re-
sults. To check the robustness of estimates I run a wage model on various
restricted samples, such as a sample without anyone that is ever observed
as being fired and a sample without anyone that is ever observed to vol-
untarily switch jobs. The results of these exercises are hopeful and can
be found in the sensitivity analysis in Section 5.6. It seems that the term
of notice results are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of various groups
of mobile workers.
Second, it can be checked whether the number of firings and job
10I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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switches before and after 1-1-1999 differed substantially. Table 5.1 shows
what has happened to the workers in my sample in the year following
their interview. It shows unconditional percentages for those whose term
of notice would have or went down and for those whose term of notice
would have or went up. The latter category also includes individuals
whose term of notice remained unchanged. The first two columns there-
fore present the percentages for relatively high-tenured workers, with an
average tenure of fourteen years, while the last two columns present the
percentages for relatively low-tenured workers, with an average tenure
of six years. Unsurprisingly, all job turnover percentages are lower for
the high-tenured group than for the low-tenured group. Moreover, both
groups experienced more dismissals and voluntary job quits after 1-1-
1999. Overestimation of the effect of the term of notice on wages requires
a substantial number of low-quality, high-tenured workers that are fired
because of the policy change. Since only 0.2 percent more high-tenured
workers were fired after 1-1-1999, it is unlikely that the non-permanent
endogeneity of tenure drives the positive effect on wages found in Section
5.6.
Table 5.1 deserves more explanation. Although theory predicts that
Table 5.1: What happens to employees in the year following inclusion in
the sample, before and after 1-1-1999. Sample divided on the basis of
tenure and tenure over 45.
Flexwet decreased ToN Flexwet increased ToN
or kept constant
(High average tenure) (Low average tenure)
Before After Before After
Same job 93.4% 91.3% 90.0% 82.2%
Fired from job 2.5% 2.7% 5.0% 8.1%
Quitted - Better job 0.6% 0.9% 1.1% 1.6%
Quitted - Personal 3.4% 5.1% 3.9% 8.0%
Total known 3,518 4,601 2,721 4,201
Attrition - Unknown 351 728 324 770
the group who ‘suffered’ from the policy change by being less protected
should display larger increases in job turnover rates this is not what is
happening. In fact, the group of individuals with more incentives to stay
in their jobs (as their term of notice mostly increased) displayed larger
increases in these rates. Apparently, other economic circumstances and
policy changes that occurred between 1997 and 2001 affected the job flows
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of the two groups of workers in the opposite direction. If this is the case,
wages might have seen an opposite development as well. Fortunately, it
is possible to control for these differential time trends in wages as selec-
tion into the higher- or lower term of notice group depends on tenure
and tenure beyond the age of 45 only. In the regressions in Section 5.6
differential wage trends are controlled for in a flexible way by adding in-
teraction terms between a dummy for those surveys after 1-1-1999 and
the full set of tenure times tenure after 45 dummies. While doing so, the
transition arrangement that was part of the ‘Flexwet’ ensures that there
is enough variation in the term of notice after 1999 for identification of
its effect on wages. Table 5.2 in Section 5.6 shows that excluding the
possibility of differential wage trends from the regressions overestimates
the effect of the term of notice of wages.
The 1999 policy change does have one drawback following directly
from the advantage laid out above. The separate effect of employment
protection on wages of newly hired individuals cannot be analyzed. As
Leonardi and Pica (2007) do, it would be interesting to look at this group
separately as wages of outsiders (newly hired individuals) could respond
differently to a change in employment protection than wages of insiders.
As all new employees are under the same term of notice scheme from the
1st of January 1999 onwards, the effect of the change in the term of notice
cannot be distinguished from other wage developments in this group. Ta-
ble 5.2 does show estimates for newly hired individuals only to illustrate
that a negative effect of employment protection on wages is unlikely.
Given the discussion above, the term of notice results will be referred
to as ‘causal’ from now on. The causal effect I am interested in can thus
be obtained as the marginal effect of the term of notice variable in a re-
gression of wages on the term of notice and the full set of tenure times
tenure beyond the age of 45 dummies (and interactions of this set with a
dummy for all periods after 1-1-1999). To furthermore control for other
determinants of wages I include a full set of age dummies, a full set of
time dummies, the job characteristics hours worked and level of occupa-
tion and the employer characteristics company size and industry type.
Equation 2 is then estimated as a fixed effects linear regression model
using the log of the real gross hourly wage rate as the dependent vari-
able. In this equation Xit refers to all personal covariates, Zit to employer
and job characteristics,
∑2001
t=1998 Timet to a set of time dummies, υi to an
individual-specific time-invariant error term and εit to an i.i.d error term.
Wagesit = α +βToN ∗ToNit + γ′Xit + δ′Zit +
2001∑
t=1998
ζtTimet + υi + εit (2)
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5.5 Data
Five waves of the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel (SEP), a household survey,
are used for the empirical analysis of the research question (1997-2001).
This longitudinal dataset has been collected annually around April by
Statistics Netherlands from 1984 to 2002. I use all available waves be-
fore and after the 1999 policy change that contained information on the
type of contract a worker was on and on the sector an individual was
employed in. Note that a job in this chapter refers to a contract between
an employee and an employer and that internal promotions ore demotions
thus do not play a role. Only employees with a permanent contract are
included in the sample as employers only face a legal term of notice for
these workers. This leaves me with a final sample of 17,214 observations.
Although the same individuals are observed multiple times in the sample,
it is not balanced. 79 percent of the individuals are observed both before
and after the policy change, 7 percent only before and 15 percent only
after.
The dependent variable in the wage regressions is the logarithm of the
real gross hourly wage rate. Net wages are not directly observed. Over
the analyzed period the income tax legislation did not change substan-
tially. I use the consumer price index published by Statistics Netherlands
to compute real wages (base year is 2005) and the conversion rate between
the Dutch guilder and the euro that has been fixed to 2.20371 from the
31st of December 1998 onwards. For simplicity I use this exchange rate
for the 1997 and 1998 waves as well. In each survey year, all observa-
tions below the 0.1th percentile and above the 99.9th wage percentile are
dropped, because rates in these areas seem unlikely. Figure 5.2 shows
a kernel density estimation of the cleaned variable both for the period
before the introduction of the ‘Flexwet’ and the period after. The distri-
bution in real wages is very similar across the two periods. The average
wage rate before the policy change was (2005 real) e15.59 euro per hour
(s.d. 5.83) and after the policy change it was e15.89 (s.d. 6.08). Those
with a tenure above two years earn more (e16.63, s.d. 5.72) than those
who are new to their employer (e13.41, s.d. 6.07). As expected, those
over 45 also earn more on average (e17.76, s.d. 6.56) than their younger
counterparts (e14.79, s.d. 5.42).
Figure 5.3 provides information on the average terms of notice in my
sample before and after the policy change for different tenures and ages.
Before 1999 the aggregate average term of notice was 2.1 months (s.d.
1.5), whereas it was 1.8 months (s.d. 1.1) after the introduction of the
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Figure 5.2: Kernel density estimation of the hourly wage rate for the
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‘Flexwet’. Figure 5.3 also presents the ninety percent confidence intervals.
It can be seen that the new law increased the minimum and decreased the
maximum notice period and that the variation in employment protection
across ages and tenures was diminished. In the new scheme, a more dis-
tinct stepwise pattern by tenure is also observed.
Figures 5.A.2 and 5.A.3 in the appendix show histograms of the ages
and tenures of the workers in my sample both before and after the first
of January 1999. Before 1999, the average age is 39.4 years (s.d. 9.4)
and the average tenure is 10.2 years (s.d. 8.7). After the first of January
1999, the average age in the sample is 39.9 years (s.d. 9.8) and the average
tenure is 9.9 years (s.d. 9.2). A relatively large group of employees are
only shortly employed at their employer, and this is more so in the pe-
riod after 1-1-1999. In the sensitivity analysis in the next section, I check
whether only looking at newly hired employees, or only at all individuals
other than the newly hired affects the term of notice results. This is not
the case.
The regressions presented in table 5.2 include the following control
variables of which the descriptive statistics can be found in table 5.A.1 in
the appendix: all tenure times tenure over the age of 45 dummies, all age
dummies, dummies for the years 1998 to 2001, hours worked, industry
and size of the organization in which the worker was employed and level
of her occupation. Table 5.A.1 also includes information on a dummy
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Figure 5.3: Average employer’s Term of Notice and its ninety percent
















































































representing whether someone took up training paid by the employer and
several education dummies. These variables are used in the regressions
presented in table 5.3.
5.6 Results
5.6.1 Impact of term of notice on wages
Table 5.2 presents the results of the empirical wage analysis. The table
only displays the coefficients and standard errors of the variable of in-
terest - the term of notice. This is done for expositional reasons as the
inclusion of all age and tenure times tenure beyond 45 dummies in the
regressions makes these difficult to interpret11. All specifications include
observations of before and after the 1999 policy change. Hence, multi-
collinearity problems can no longer bother the estimates. Note that in
both table 5.2 and 5.3 all standard errors were clustered at the individ-
ual level. The regression diagnostics can be found in table 5.A.1 in the
appendix.
The coefficient and standard error in the first row refers to a fixed
effects linear regression estimate of the log of real gross hourly wages on
the term of notice and the described covariates. The model is preferred
as it includes interactions between the dummies that determine the term
of notice (tenure times tenure after the age of 45 cells) and a dummy
for the period after the first of January 1999. As discussed in Section
5.4 this is done to make sure that the term of notice coefficient does not
capture any differential wage developments over time other than the in-
troduction of the ‘Flexwet’. In the preferred model, the term of notice
coefficient equals 0.0324 and is highly significant. This means that for
each additional notice month the hourly wage rate of a worker goes up by
three percent, ceteris paribus. The estimate in the second row is biased
because the fact that wage trends could have been different for low and
high-tenured workers is ignored. The result in row two suggests that an
additional legal month of notice increases the wage rate, ceteris paribus,
by 5.67 percent, which is a substantial overestimation of the impact of the
term of notice. In the third row a coefficient and standard error are pre-
sented for a pooled OLS regression and the regression estimate therefore
suffers from a time-independent endogeneity problem. The effect of the
term of notice on wages is only 0.77 percent in this specification and not
11All results are however available upon request from the author.
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Table 5.2: Term of notice coefficients and standard errors in wage models.
Dependent: log of real hourly wage rate.
Model Sample Coefficient S.e. N
1 Preferred Full sample 0.0324*** (0.005) 17,214
2 No interact. Full sample 0.0567*** (0.007) 17,214
3 OLS Full sample 0.0077 (0.007) 17,214
4 Preferred Without 1999 0.0324*** (0.005) 13,807
5 Preferred Balanced panel 0.0267*** (0.007) 8,650
6 Preferred Ind before/after 0.0390*** (0.005) 13,582
7 2000 interact. Full sample 0.0351*** (0.005) 17,214
8 2001 interact. Full sample 0.0375*** (0.005) 17,214
9 No interact. Newly hired 0.2084 (0.305) 3,462
10 Preferred Tenure >1 0.0296*** (0.007) 13,752
11 Preferred No lay-offs 0.0307*** (0.005) 16,053
12 Preferred No job switches 0.0356*** (0.006) 14,133
13 Preferred No lay-offs/switches 0.0337*** (0.006) 13,333
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
All regressions include all tenure times tenure after 45-dummies, all age dummies, year
dummies, hours worked, industry type, size of company, level of occupation and
a constant.
The preferred model includes interaction terms of the tenure cells and a dummy for
after the policy change.
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significantly different from zero. Not controlling for the time-invariant
endogeneity of tenure can hence underestimate the effect of the term of
notice on wages.
To check the robustness of the results in the preferred model it was
estimated on several samples and the coefficients obtained in this sensi-
tivity analysis can be found in rows four to thirteen. The analysis clearly
confirms that the positive significant effect of EP on wages is robust. The
model in the fourth row of table 5.2 does not use observations recorded
between April 1998 and March 1999. This was done to ensure that the
causal effect of the term of notice on wages is not the result of wage set-
ting behavior anticipating the January 1999 policy change. Although I
do not find such anticipation, note that such behavior would not contra-
dict but rather emphasize a causal effect of the term of notice on wages.
The fifth line displays the term of notice coefficient for the wage model
on a balanced panel sample in which all individuals are observed five
years in a row. The estimates are reassuring as the ninety-five percent
confidence interval of the significant term of notice coefficient includes
0.0324. The model presented in row six only includes individuals that are
observed both before and after the policy change (so that I loose twenty-
one percent of the sample). The associated effect of the term of notice
is even larger than that found in row one: a four percent wage increase
per month. To be more prudent, my preferred model thus includes the
individuals that are only observed at either side of the policy change.
Row seven and eight display term of notice coefficients for models
in which the possibility for differential time trends with different cut-off
years was included. The model in row seven includes interactions with a
dummy for all periods after 1-1-2000. The model in row eight includes
the same interactions but then with a dummy for all periods after 1-1-
2001. It seems that the causal effect found in row one is not driven by my
choice of interactions as the coefficients in row seven (0.0351) and eight
(0.0375) are even larger. Row nine and ten present the estimates of the
wage model on a sample of newly-hired individuals only and on a selected
higher-tenured sample respectively. Note that the latter coefficient will
be biased because differential wage trends cannot be taken into account
and because selection into this group is highly selective. The selection
problem also plagues the longer-tenured individuals estimate. However,
the positive marginal effects that I find in both models (0.2084, not sig-
nificant, and 0.0296, significant) are reassuring.
As mentioned in Section 5.4 including individual-specific fixed effects
does not solve all endogeneity problems in the data. Although the time-
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variant type of endogeneity cannot fully be controlled for I can show that
the inclusion of marginal groups does not severely affect the term of notice
results. In the estimation for row eleven in table 5.2 all those individuals
are excluded that are ever observed as being fired from 1996 to 2002. This
decreases the sample size to 16,053. The inclusion of this group of people
could potentially overestimate the term of notice effect. Indeed the term
of notice coefficient in row eleven is lower than in the first row. However,
it is precisely estimated at 3.07 percent, which is similar to the estimate in
row one. Row twelve presents results for a sample in which those individ-
uals that ever voluntarily switched jobs from 1996 to 2002 are excluded.
The inclusion of these workers would perhaps underestimate the term of
notice effect, as explained in Section 5.4. The result in row twelve does
suggest this is the case. The estimated term of notice coefficient (0.0356)
is closer to 0.04 than to 0.03. Row thirteen presents an estimate in which
both groups, the ever fired and the ever job switchers, are excluded. This
leaves me a sample of 13,333 individuals who either stay in their job over
the sample period or who quit their job for personal reasons. Using this
subgroup of the population, I estimate a significant effect of the term of
notice on wages of around three percent per month (0.0337) as well.
I thus find evidence that the employer’s term of notice has a strong
positive causal effect on wages. A three percent higher wage rate for each
additional month of notice is a relevant and substantial side-effect of this
type of employment protection. For a prime-aged worker in my sample,
aged 50 with 15 years of tenure in 1998, who experienced a drop in term
of notice from 3.15 months to 2.15 months because of the 1999 policy
change, this equals a loss in the hourly wage rate of three percent. On
a yearly basis this employee, who worked 38 hours a week and earned
19.71 euros, therefore lost e1,262 because of the lower employer’s term of
notice.
5.6.2 Suggestive evidence of mechanism at play
As discussed in Section 5.2 there are two plausible reasons for a positive
effect of employment protection on wages. First, insider/outsider theory
suggests that the bargaining position of insiders is enhanced by better
protection when unions only represent incumbent workers. In wage nego-
tiations this could then drive wages up. Second, employment protection
creates more incentives for firms to invest in workers and for workers to
invest in firm-specific human capital. These investments will then lead to
higher productivity and higher wages. Using the data at hand I can only
137
5.6. Results
provide suggestive evidence on which of the two mechanisms seems more
important. For this purpose table 5.3 in included.
In rows one and two I present the term of notice coefficients of mod-
Table 5.3: Term of notice coefficients and standard errors. Dependent row
1-2: dummy for currently following formal training paid by the employer.
Dependent row 3-5: log of real hourly wage rate.
Topic Model Coefficient S.e. N
1 Training FE OLS -0.0075 (0.006) 17,434
2 Training Probit -0.0705** (0.023) 15,475
3 Wages Low educated 0.0574*** (0.022) 1,864
4 Wages Middle educated 0.0318*** (0.009) 6,017
5 Wages High educated 0.0277*** (0.008) 4,017
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
All regressions include the same controls as in table 5.2.
els estimating formal training on the same covariates as in row one of
table 5.3. The dependent variable here is a dummy equal to one when
the employee is enrolled or has been over the previous year in a course
or training program that her employer is paying for. Although invest-
ment in a employee-employer match could involve more or other things
than formal training, one would expect a positive coefficient of the term
of notice on formal training take-up if the investment mechanism would
play a significant role. Row one depicts results for a linear probability
model and row two for a pooled probit estimation12. Both estimates are
negative (-0.0075, not significantly, and -0.0705, significantly), suggesting
that better protected individuals take up less training offered by their
employer. Arulampalam et al. (2004) found a similar effect using the
European Community Household Panel.
In rows three to five I present term of notice coefficient estimates for
the preferred wage model on three different samples: the sample is divided
into those with a low level of education (regular high school or lower),
those with a middle level of education (higher level high school or voca-
tional training) and those with a high level of education (higher tertiary
education). This was done as I suspected a potential investment mech-
anism to have differential effects over the unobserved quality of workers.
If I assume that there is a strong positive correlation between education
12The large number of independent variables rendered estimating a fixed effects
binary choice model impossible.
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and this quality and if I furthermore assume that the gains from investing
in match-specific human capital would be higher for workers with higher
abilities, the better-incentives-to-invest effect would ensure a higher term
of notice coefficient for the better educated. Note that finding such a
higher coefficient could also indicate that better able employees also excel
at wage bargaining. However, rows three to five in table 5.3 paint the op-
posite picture. The term of notice coefficient for the low educated equals
5.74 percent, while for the middle and high educated it is around three
percent. Low educated individuals thus benefit more from employment
protection in terms of wages. If one indeed believes that higher educated
individuals are better able to obtain match-specific human capital, this
result also invalidates the investment argument.
These pieces of evidence point in the direction of an improved bargain-
ing position as the mechanism driving the positive effect of employment
protection on wages. In the Dutch context, a longer term of notice seems
to improve the position of employees in wage negotiations such that they
are able to extract a larger part of the rent generated in their job. Note
that this conclusion should be treated with caution as the evidence is only
suggestive. More research will be necessary to come up with a decisive
answer on what exactly explains the positive term of notice coefficients.
5.7 Conclusion
This chapter establishes the causal effect of the employer’s term of notice
on the wage level of employees. The legal term of notice is defined as the
amount of time a firm is required to notify a worker in advance of her up-
coming dismissal. As such, the term of notice is an important component
of firing costs and thus of employment protection.
In order to find a causal link, I have performed a fixed effects estima-
tion exploiting an exogenous policy change in the term of notice. This
procedure corrects for the time-invariant endogeneity of tenure and for the
strong multi-collinearity between the term of notice, tenure and age. The
latter problem arises because tenure and age, or more specifically tenure
and tenure obtained while being 45 or over, are the only inputs in the le-
gal formula that calculates the term of notice. The relevant policy change
is the 1999 introduction of the law on flexibility and security (‘Flexwet’)
in The Netherlands. This law altered the calculation of the legal term of
notice such that the term of notice of low-tenured individuals of all ages
went up and the term of notice of older high-tenured individuals went
down. Five waves of the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel (SEP) were used
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for the empirical analysis (1997-2001) in which a fixed effects linear re-
gression model is estimated using the logarithm of real gross hourly wages.
A possible limitation of my approach is that tenure and the term of no-
tice are also influenced by the policy change itself, thereby generating a
time-variant endogeneity problem. Robustness analysis however suggests
that this type of endogeneity is not driving the results.
The preferred econometric model unveils a very significant, positive
causal effect of the ‘dormant’ term of notice on the real hourly gross wage
rate. An increase in the term of notice of one month leads to three per-
cent higher wages. The arguments presented in Section 5.2 describing a
negative effect of employment protection on wages thus do not hold in the
analyzed context. This was to be expected for Lazear’s (1990) efficiency
wage argument as the Dutch labor market institutions do not resemble
his competitive model with individual wage-setting. The same could be
said for Pissarides’ (2001) exposition about an endogenous term of notice
as the term of notice is decided upon by policy-makers.
The theoretical literature provides two plausible reasons for a positive
effect of employment protection on wages. First, insider/outsider theory
suggests that the bargaining position of insiders is enhanced by better
protection when unions only represent incumbent workers. In wage nego-
tiations this could then drive wages up. Second, employment protection
creates more incentives for firms to invest in workers and for workers to
invest in firm-specific human capital. These investments will then lead to
higher productivity and higher wages. More empirical research needs to
be conducted to ultimately decide which of these theories is best describ-
ing reality. To do so, detailed information on individual employees such
as longitudinal micro-data reflecting individual productivity is needed.
Using the available information instead, I present suggestive evidence
that undermines the investment argument. First, better protected em-
ployees do not have a higher take-up rate of formal training paid by their
employer. If anything, those with a longer term of notice participate less
in such courses, which is not what one would expect if the investment
mechanism was playing a large role. Second, the effect of the term of
notice on wages is much stronger for lower-educated individuals than for
middle- and high educated individuals. If one believes that higher edu-
cated individuals are better able to obtain match-specific human capital,
this also suggests that the investment argument is least important. Hence,
the bargaining argument wins the first round in the battle of the mech-
anisms. In the Dutch context, better employment protection probably
improves employees’ wage bargaining position such that a larger part of
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the profits flows to the employee rather than to the employer. Policy mak-
ers should be aware of this side-effect of the term of notice on wages. If
the wage bargaining argument is indeed stronger, employment protection





Figure 5.A.1: The ratio of lay-offs through the labor office over the total
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Table 5.A.1: Descriptive statistics of all variables (N=17,214)
Mean Sd Min Max
Log gross wage rate (per hour) 3.473 0.409 0.387 4.529
Term of notice (months) 1.935 1.273 0.231 6.000
Age (years) 39.694 9.661 17 65
Tenure (years) 10.028 8.996 1 43
Tenure beyond 45 1.629 3.262 0 19
Dataset 1998.995 1.419 1997 2001
Hours worked (per week) 36.231 10.246 12 89
Agriculture Omitted
Fisheries 0.000 0.011 0 1
Mining 0.012 0.110 0 1
Industry 0.143 0.350 0 1
Trade 0.006 0.079 0 1
Construction 0.060 0.237 0 1
Retail 0.109 0.312 0 1
Hospitality 0.014 0.119 0 1
Transport 0.058 0.233 0 1
Financial institutions 0.043 0.203 0 1
Real estate 0.098 0.297 0 1
Public services 0.090 0.287 0 1
Education 0.081 0.273 0 1
Health care 0.158 0.364 0 1
Environmental services 0.026 0.158 0 1
Personal services 0.001 0.029 0 1
Other industry 0.099 0.299 0 1
Company 1-19 employees 0.173 0.378 0 1
Company 20-49 employees 0.125 0.330 0 1
Company 50-99 employees 0.100 0.300 0 1
Company >99 employees Omitted
Unknown level 0.065 0.246 0 1
Elementary occupations 0.053 0.223 0 1
Lower occupations 0.271 0.445 0 1
Middle occupations 0.342 0.474 0 1
Higher occupations 0.210 0.407 0 1
Academic occupations Omitted
Employer-paid training 0.079 0.270 0 1
Lower educated 0.1083 0.311 0 1
Middle educated 0.3495 0.477 0 1
Higher educated 0.2334 0.423 0 1
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Table 5.A.2: Regression diagnostics of the models in table 2 and 3.
Model Sample Aic Ind. N
1 Preferred Full sample -21,228 5,522 17,214
2 No interact. Full sample -21,178 5,522 17,214
3 OLS Full sample 8,445 5,522 17,214
4 Preferred Without 1999 -17,993 5,396 13,807
5 Preferred Balanced panel -7,375 1,730 8,650
6 Preferred Ind before/after -14.261 3,189 13,582
7 2000 interact. Full sample -21,350 5,522 17,214
8 2001 interact. Full sample -21,432 5,522 17,214
9 No interact. Newly hired -3,004 2,102 3,462
10 Preferred Tenure >1 -22,893 4,659 13,752
11 Preferred No lay-offs -20,649 5,078 16,053
12 Preferred No job switches -18,930 4,565 14,133
13 Preferred No lay-offs/switches -18,621 4,248 13,333
1 FE OLS Training sample -6,800 5,561 17,434
2 Probit Training sample 8,964 5,408 15,475
3 Preferred Low educated -2,075 612 1,864
4 Preferred Middle educated -6,964 1,681 6,017
5 Preferred High educated -5,502 1,148 4,017







Hoofdstuk 2: Heb je het al Gehoord? Hoe Echte Verwachtingen
Reageren op Publiciteit
Steeds meer empirisch bewijs hoopt zich op dat subjectieve verwachtin-
gen van individuen economisch gedrag beinvloeden en dat er soms fouten
in deze verwachtingen zitten. Hierdoor wordt het beleidsrelevant om te
weten hoe deze verwachtingen gestuurd kunnen worden. Informatie in de
publieke media is waarschijnlijk een belangrijk kanaal om het algemene
toekomstbeeld van mensen te beinvloeden. Dit hoofdstuk bestudeert de
rol van publieke informatie disseminatie, of publiciteit, op een specifiek
verwachtingsvormingsproces in de werkelijkheid. Hiervoor analyseer ik
een bijzondere dataset met maandelijkse individuele verwachtingen over
de toekomstige leeftijd waarop men in Nederland voor het eerst AOW
ontvangt. Ik gebruik gegevens die verzameld zijn van mei 2006 tot en
met november 2008.
Gemiddeld gezien reageren deze verwachtingen weinig op publiciteit
alhoewel er wel grote verschillen tussen subgroepen zichtbaar zijn. Onder
andere concludeer ik dat hoger opgeleiden en hogere inkomensgroepen
hun verwachtingen bijna niet aanpassen aan nieuwe publiciteit over de
toekomst van de AOW. Degenen die niet vaak een krant lezen laten daar-
entegen wel een relatief hoge publiciteitsreactie zien. Een mogelijke uitleg
hiervoor is dat de kwaliteit van de intitiele AOW-verwachtingen van deze
groep laag is geweest. Als dat waar is, helpt publiciteit met name slecht
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geinformeerden de eigen verwachtingen over de toekomst van de AOW te
verbeteren.
Hoofdstuk 3: Klaar voor de Verandering: Verwachtingen over
Sociale Zekerheid en Spaargedrag
Overheden van rijke landen denken op het moment na hoe zij hun omslag-
pensioenstelsels zo kunnen aanpassen dat deze ook in de toekomst, met
een vergrijsde bevolking, financieel houdbaar blijven. Voor zover beleids-
makers niet al tot versobering van de regelingen besloten hebben, leidt ver-
grijzing dus tot beleidsonzekerheid in eerste pijler pensioenen. Dit hoofd-
stuk onderzoekt de invloed van deze beleidsonzekerheid in Nederland op
de vrijwillige bijdragen van huishoudens aan pensioenproducten. Hier-
voor analyseer ik hoe de verwachtingen van individuen over de toekomst
van de AOW samenhangen met of zij vrijwillig bijbetalen aan pensioen-
producten.
Het blijkt dat participatie in vrijwillige pensioenproducten hoger is
voor diegenen die hogere kansen toewijzen aan een toekomstige versober-
ing van de AOW, en dan met name voor diegenen die geloven dat de
AOW-leeftijd binnenkort omhoog zal gaan. Er kan dus geconcludeerd
worden dat Nederlandse huishoudens zich voorbereiden op beleidswijzigin-
gen in de eerste pensioen pijler.
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Hoofdstuk 4: Kantige Keuzes, Dictators en Samengaande Macht:
Een Non-Cooperatief Model voor Consumptie en Arbeidsaan-
bod binnen het Huishouden
Het is onwaarschijnlijk dat een koppel het altijd eens is over wat er van
het gezamenlijk budget gekocht moet worden. Ook is het onwaarschijnlijk
dat een getrouwd stel het altijd eens is over hoeveel uur beiden zouden
moeten werken; een beslissing die weer van belang is voor de hoogte van
het gezamenlijke budget. In dit hoofdstuk presenteer ik daarom een non-
cooperatief model van de consumptie en arbeidsaanbod van een koppel
dat met elkaar onderhandeld op de ‘Nash’ manier. Terwijl we weinig aan-
names doen, kunnen we bewijzen dat de vraag naar publieke goederen bin-
nen het gezin gekarakteriseerd wordt door drie regimes. De vraag wordt
ofwel geheel bepaald door de voorkeuren van een van de twee partners
(Man Dictatorschap of Vrouw Dictatorschap), of door de voorkeuren van
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beide partners waarbij de invloed van een partner afhangt van diegenes
relatieve loonvoet (Samengaande Macht). De drie regimes zorgen er ver-
volgens voor dat alle vraagcurves van het koppel naar publieke goederen
scherpe knikken vertonen.
Als we een aantal extra aannames doen, kan ons model getest wor-
den op data over de totale vraag naar publieke goederen binnen gezinnen
en over het arbeidsaanbod van mannen en vrouwen. We kunnen ons
non-cooperatieve model dan testen ten opzichte van een standaard uni-
tair model waarin het koppel zich als een enkele besluitvormer gedraagt.
We testen ons model op een steekproef uit de Amerikaanse Consumenten
Uitgaven Studie (CEX) waarbij we ons expliciet focussen op de uitgaven
aan kinderen. We nemen deze uitgaven aangezien deze publieke goed-
eren zijn, dwz. dat deze gewaardeerd worden door zowel de man als de
vrouw terwijl geen van beiden de goederen op gebruiken. Het blijkt dat
we het standaard unitaire model voor koppels met twee of drie kinderen
sterk kunnen verwerpen in het voordeel van ons non-cooperatieve model.
Bovendien blijkt dat in de meerderheid van de stellen, de vrouw de dicta-
tor is in de zin dat het uitgavenpatroon aan kindergoederen volgens haar
voorkeuren plaatsvindt.
Hoofdstuk 5: Beter Beschermd, Beter Betaald: Empirisch Be-
wijs dat Ontslagbescherming Lonen Beinvloedt
Dit hoofdstuk stelt de empirische invloed vast van de lengte van de opzegter-
mijn op het loonniveau van werknemers. Met de opzegtermijn wordt hier
de periode bedoeld die een werkgever in acht moet nemen als zij een
werknemer via het arbeidsbureau wil ontslaan. In Nederland bepaald een
vaste formule in de wet de lengte van deze termijn. De lonen die moeten
worden uitbetaald gedurende deze periode zijn een belangrijk element van
de ontslagkosten en dus van ontslagbescherming.
Om een causaal verband aan te tonen, maak ik gebruik van een exo-
gene verandering in de berekening van de opzegtermijn die optrad door
de invoering van de Nederlandse Flexwet op 1 januari 1999. Ik kan aan-
tonen dat een langere ’latente’ opzegtermijn tot hogere lonen leidt. In
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